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ABSTRACT

Factors associated with hospital entry into joint venture arrangements with
Ambulatory Surgery Centers
by Reethi Narasimhan Iyengar, Ph.D.
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctoral of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University.
Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond Virginia, May 2011
Director: Michael J. McCue, D.B.A.
Professor, Department of Health Administration

This study presented an empirical analysis of the key market, regulatory,
organizational, operational and financial factors associated with hospital entry
into joint venture (JV) arrangements with Ambulatory Surgery Centers (ASCs) as
examined through the framework of resource dependency theory complimented
with neo-institutional theory.
This study used a cross sectional design to examine hospitals that entered
into a joint venture arrangement with ASCs in 2006 and 2007. The data for this
study were drawn from five main sources: the American Hospital Association
Annual Survey (AHA), the Area Resource File (ARF), the CMS (Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services) minimum dataset, the National Legislative
Assembly Website and the CM case-mix files. Descriptive analysis and

multivariate logistic regression were performed to examine the association of
various factors in this study.
The study found that market factors such as unemployment rate and
percentage of elderly were strongly associated with the hospitals decision to joint
venture with ASCs. Also organizational size (measured by bed size) was a
significant factor in these decisions. Other factors which showed a marginal
significance were Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, number of ASCs, certificate of
need laws, ownership status, and operating expense per adjusted discharge of
the hospital.
This research project sheds light on joint venture arrangements between
hospitals and ASCs at a very opportune time. In light of the new Health Reform
Legislation, studying hospital-ASC joint ventures is very important. For hospitals
and ASCs, and their collaborative interests such as joint ventures, Accountable
Care Organizations (ACO‟s) could either provide incentives to help improve
quality of care to patients or stint on needed care by making them focus narrowly
on higher margin services (Fisher and Shortell 2010; Shortell and Casalino
2010). Since policy measures should encourage the first and not the second
outcome, it is important to have a transparent performance measurement system
that can win the confidence of the provider organizations such as hospitals and
ASCs. Lacking which, it may discourage joint venture arrangements between
hospitals and ASCs in future.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Historically, physicians have preferred to work independently as
consultants rather than as employees of hospitals. Physicians have traditionally
used hospitals for mutually beneficial arrangements such as exchanging the use
of hospital facilities with taking emergency calls and serving on various hospital
committees. They also preferred not to have formal financial ties with hospitals
(Pauly and Redisch 1973; Starr 1982; Stevens 1989; Lake et al. 2003; Berenson
et al. 2007). Thus the term, hospitals serving as “physicians‟ workshops”
(Robinson 1997; Casalino et al. 2008) was coined.
Over the last two decades, market conditions have drastically changed the
relationships between physicians and hospitals. In the early 1990‟s, managed
care and the at-risk payment system of capitation led to the purchase of
physician practices in the form of arrangements such as Organized Delivery
Systems (ODS) and Physician-Hospital Organizations (PHO). Forming ODS and
PHO arrangements provided hospitals the leverage to negotiate higher payments
from Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs).
During the above referenced period, hospitals competed primarily on
price by providing services specifically targeted towards managed care plans that
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contracted for large number of enrollees. This is often times referred to as
„wholesale strategies‟ in the healthcare literature (Devers et al. 2003).
By late 1990‟s, there was a change in this trend. Less than anticipated
payment arrangements through selective contract arrangements resulted in the
decline of the use of capitation to pay providers. As a result, hospitals shifted
their focus from building ODS and PHO arrangements to creating strong
relationships with specialists. This new strategic focus of hospitals towards
„branding, marketing and providing service‟ to individual physicians is referred to
as „retail strategy‟ in the healthcare literature (Devers et al. 2003; Berenson et al.
2007). Thus, hospitals switched from capitation-based wholesale strategy (price
competition) to service line based retail strategy (non-price competition).
As a consequence, hospitals anticipated that this would lessen the threat
of competition by specialists who delivered high-margin specialized services
such as outpatient services (Berenson et al. 2006; Berenson et al. 2007). To
counteract this retail strategy and compete directly with hospitals, loosely
affiliated specialists opened their own facilities, primarily in the form of
Ambulatory Surgery Centers (ASCs) (Berenson et al. 2007). ASCs are „distinct
entities that exclusively furnish outpatient surgical services not requiring an
overnight stay‟ (MedPac 2004). Subsequently, the formation of these ASCs
resulted in an increase in outpatient services and competition with hospitals for
specific services such as Gastroenterology, Ophthalmology and Orthopedics
(Devers et al. 2003; MedPac 2004).
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Given the increase of specialist owned Ambulatory Surgery Centers
(ASCs) in the early 2000‟s (Devers et al. 2003), hospitals began to pursue
alternate strategies to better align with them. As specialists competed with
hospitals in the same markets, specialists preferred owning their facilities as
opposed to being employed by hospitals. Ownership of ASCs enabled the
specialists to capture a facility fee previously paid to the hospitals and provided
them with greater flexibility in terms of scheduling. This strategy led to higher
efficiency and generally gave them more control over the care process, unlike in
a hospital (Casalino et al. 2008).
In the mid 2000‟s, the healthcare market place witnessed a dramatic
increase in the number of ASCs. From 2000 to 2006, the number of ASCs
nationally grew dramatically by 55 percent, from 3,028 to 4,707 (MedPac 2007;
Casalino et al. 2008). This growth trend in new ASCs continued at an annual rate
of 6.7% till 2007; however in 2008, the rate of growth slowed to 3.7% (MedPac
2010). The decline in the growth rate from 2007 to 2008 has been attributed to
the downturn in U.S. economy and the reductions in Medicare reimbursement for
ASCs (MedPac 2010).
In 2002, almost 99% of ASCs were freestanding facilities owned by
physicians, independent of hospitals (MedPac 2004). Only 1% of ASCs were
owned by physician-hospital partnerships. By 2006, 61% of ASCs were owned
by physicians alone (Kurtz 2010) and 20% of ASCs had an ownership model of
hospital-physician joint ventures (Health Connect Partners 2010). Thus, over the
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last few years, sole ownership of ASCs by physicians is declining and there is an
increasing trend of joint venture arrangements with hospitals. A joint venture is
an agreement between two entities towards the combination of their resources to
accomplish a specific purpose.
The aim of this study is to present an empirical analysis of the key market,
regulatory, organizational, operational and financial factors associated with
hospital entry into joint venture (JV) arrangements with Ambulatory Surgery
Centers (ASCs) as examined through the framework of resource dependency
theory complimented with neo-institutional theory.
There is very little empirical literature on hospital-ASC joint venture
arrangements, mainly because American Hospital Association Annual Survey
(AHA) started reporting hospital joint ventures with ASCs, only from 2005. Prior
studies were unable to empirically assess hospital-ASC joint venture
arrangements due to non-reporting of this arrangement by AHA. In 2005, AHA
started to report the joint-venture arrangement between hospitals and ASCs.
Table 1 depicts the increasing trend of hospital-ASC joint ventures since
2005. This table presents the rate of growth of Medicare-certified ASCs and rate
of growth of hospital-ASC joint venture arrangements. The data for the number of
ASCs have been obtained from the MedPac 2010 report and the data on the joint
venture between hospitals and ASCs have been obtained from the American
Hospital Association databases for various years.
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Table1: Growth of ASCs and Hospital-ASC joint venture by year

Number of ASC Centers
% Growth from previous year
Hospital-ASC joint ventures
% of hospitals joint venturing with ASCs

2005
4441
7.3
324
5.1

2006
4700
5.8
391
6.2

2007
4991
6.2
422
6.7

2008
5174
3.7
434
6.8

* Data is drawn from MedPac 2010 report and AHA datasets for various years.
Joint venture: An agreement between two entities towards the combination of their resources to
accomplish a specific purpose

Table 1 shows that although both the number of ASCs and the number of
hospital-ASC joint venture arrangements show an increase, the percentage of
increase in hospital-ASC joint venture has been more consistent. In addition to
this data, industry reports also predict an increase in the number of joint venture
arrangements between hospitals and ASCs for the next 5-10 years (Kurtz 2010;
Health Connect Partners 2010) as hospitals and healthcare systems prepare for
Health Care Reform and Accountable Care Organizations (Kaiser Health News
2010; Paige 2010; Neuterra Healthcare 2010). This further reinforces the need to
study the driving factors behind these increasing number of hospital-ASC joint
venture arrangements. Thus, this research study adds to the understanding of
such joint ventures by providing the theoretical and empirical foundation for
analyzing factors associated with these arrangements.
Transitioning Health-care Industry
and the Effect on Hospitals
Rising costs of healthcare have become a top priority among issues
addressed by Congress. Over the last four decades, Congress has introduced
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many bills in order to curtail health care expenditures. The Stark Law of 1972,
HMO Act of 1973 and Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982
were three such early efforts followed by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and
the more recent amendment “Phase III” of the Stark Law in 2007.
The Stark Law of 1972 was brought into effect in order to protect patients
and federal health care programs from the adverse effect of corrupt influence of
monetary incentives on health care decisions. This law essentially forbade
anyone from offering, paying, soliciting or receiving money in order to
induce/arrange any referral reimbursed by federal health care programs, such as
the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).
The HMO Act which followed in 1973 brought a change in the payment
structure by increasing funds for managed care programs. This change in
payment structure resulted in a drastic growth in managed care enrollment, i.e.,
almost 20 % within a decade (Between 1990 - 2000), according to the latest
statistics published by the Bureau of Census in 2008.
This was followed by the TEFRA Act of 1982. This further changed the
payment system and introduced the concept of diagnostic related groupings
(DRGs) and prospective payment system (PPS). The reimbursement for inpatient
hospital services went from a retrospective payment mechanism to a prospective
payment mechanism following subsequent regulation. PPS took into
consideration all hospital costs with the exception of capital costs. TEFRA
required hospitals to budget prospectively and hospitals were penalized for
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exceeding their budgets. This resulted in putting the provider organization
(hospitals) at risk. They felt pressurized and were forced to take measures that
reduced their cost of treatment. These measures included reducing length of stay
of patients, internal restructuring to improve efficiency and reducing operating
costs (MedPac 2001). Despite these measures, hospitals could not fully
compensate for changes resulting from TEFRA and faced adverse financial
effects.
In 1997, Congress enacted the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) in order to
stem the sudden rise in Medicare expenditures. In addition to inpatient services,
the act also revised payment for outpatient services and other services such as
rehabilitation, home health services and skilled nursing services. This resulted in
a steep decline in profit and operating margins of the hospitals. Post enactment
of BBA, there was a steady decline in revenues of hospitals and other health
services providers (Harrison 2002).
Congress incorporated some safe harbors in the Stark Law in Phase III
(referred to as Stark III) which favored the growth of ASCs. These safe harbors
were incorporated in order to protect small business investments as well as to
open strategic expansion avenues for hospitals. Hospitals began to consider
strategies such as joint venture arrangements with physicians, in order to
supplement their financial resources. In 1999, OIG finalized the ASC safe harbor.
Revision of Stark III is another important regulatory change relevant to this study.
CMS has continued its effort to reduce the regulatory burden on health care
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industry, with ongoing revisions to Stark III. It has also modified the previous
exceptions to Stark III of general prohibition on referrals, reviving the increasing
trend of hospital-physician ventures (Jones 2004).
Significance of the Study
This study empirically assesses the factors that are associated with
hospitals entry into JV arrangements with ASCs. In addition to enhancing the
current body of knowledge on hospital joint venture arrangements, this study will
also provide better understanding of the application of resource dependency
theory and neo-institutional theory literature, in the context of organizational
response to environmental change.
Regulatory and technological changes have brought about considerable
environmental uncertainty in the healthcare industry. Hospitals have responded
by engaging in strategic alliances, to maintain access to financial and other key
resources. The last two decades have witnessed a growth in the number of
mergers, acquisitions and joint venture arrangements in the healthcare industry
(Harrison 2006). Although, mergers and acquisitions have now become a
common means of dealing with competition, other strategies such as
diversification, increasing products, services and technological range (Currie
2000), and establishing joint ventures are becoming more prevalent in hospitals.
These strategies provide greater flexibility and are more temporary in nature
(Tsang 2000). These JVs allow hospitals to adapt to the environment and
enhance their chances of survival and growth, by soliciting physician loyalty.
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This study furthers the understanding of hospitals‟ adaptation to market,
regulatory and financial pressures. As very little evidence is present on such joint
venture arrangements, the results of this study lays the foundation for further
research on strategies to tackle environmental uncertainties as well as benefits of
strategic alliances with ASCs. The contribution of this study pertains to two main
areas: theoretical development and application, and empirical evidence for
hospitals decision making process. The purpose of this study is to strengthen the
applicability of resource dependency theory and neo-institutional theory to the
study of joint venture arrangements. Findings of this study will also provide
managers of hospitals, with better insights in the decision making process, while
considering strategic alliances under uncertain environmental conditions.
The Health Reform Legislation, specifically accountable care
organizations (ACOs) has introduced yet another regulatory change in the
healthcare environment. Market analysts speculate that ACOs would create an
environment that would foster consolidation activity between hospitals and
physicians (Neuterra Healthcare 2010). With increasing environmental
uncertainty due to market competition and changing regulatory requirements, the
findings of this study would also help hospitals make an informed decision
towards considering joint venture arrangements with ASCs.
Purpose of the Study
Given the environmental uncertainty and regulatory pressure surrounding
the healthcare industry, hospitals are finding strategies to ensure greater access
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to resources and improve their chances of survival. In such a scenario, we see a
growing trend in joint venture (JV) arrangements between hospitals and other
providers. The study examines the factors associated with hospital JV
arrangements with ASCs for the period 2005-2007.
The three main expansion strategies that hospitals consider to strengthen
their chances of survival are mergers, acquisitions and joint venture
arrangements. In this study, JVs are examined as they have an advantage over
both mergers and acquisitions. JVs provide greater flexibility (retaining their
identity) and are relatively more temporary (set for a pre-determined duration of
time) compared to mergers. JV arrangements let hospitals and ASCs retain their
individual organizational identities and just introduce a channel of
interdependency to supplement each provider‟s resources, unlike in an
acquisition. Hospitals continuously seek to improve their access to financial
resources. The financial literature provides comprehensive documentation on
joint venture arrangements.
A well accepted definition of a joint venture arrangement is “a legal
agreement between two entities towards the combination of their resources to
accomplish a specific purpose” (Pelfrey and Theisen 1989; Ginter et al. 2004;
Harrison 2006). This definition is well accepted within both the financial as well
as healthcare industry.
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Research Questions
Currently, the studies analyzing joint venture arrangements of hospitals
with ASCs are descriptive and qualitative in nature and lack a theoretical and
empirically based analysis. Therefore, this study aims to empirically evaluate the
key market, regulatory, organizational, operational and financial factors that are
associated with hospital-ASC joint venture arrangements as viewed through the
framework of resource dependency theory supplemented with neo-institutional
theory. The literature is also silent with respect to hospital-ASC joint venture
arrangements after the introduction of the safe harbors in the Stark Law. This
study, therefore, will add to the understanding of such joint venture arrangements
under the regulatory change during the time period of this study is between 2005
and 2007. This study also provides the theoretical and empirical foundation for
studying hospital joint venture arrangements with ASCs.
More specifically, the study provides insights and answers to the following
questions:
1) Are market conditions (such as unemployment rate and per capita
income) associated with hospital‟s entry into joint ventures with ASCs?
2) Are regulatory constraints such as Certificate of Need (CON) laws and
ownership status associated with a hospital‟s decision to joint venture with
ASCs?
3) Is the size of a hospital and its affiliation to a multi-hospital system related
to hospital‟s decision to joint venture with ASCs?
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4) Is the operational performance of hospitals (e.g., occupancy rate) related
to their decision to joint venture with ASCs?
5) Does the financial performance of hospitals (e.g., cash flow margin, days
cash on hand, operating expense per adjusted discharge, and long term
debt to total capital) drive their decision to joint venture with ASCs?
Theoretical Premise
A combined perspective of resource dependency theory and neoinstitutional theory is used to examine the main research question in this study.
Both these theories are based on an organization level of analysis. They are
based on a natural model - open systems theory. An open system theory
basically means that organizations (hospitals) engage in exchange relationships
with the environment. Hence, there is both a dependency on the environment as
well as an influence of the environment on the hospitals. Natural systems theory
takes into account the human component of hospitals and their pro-active role in
organizational response.
Based on resource dependency theory, an organization‟s environment is
the source of scarce and valued resources necessary for survival (Alexander and
Morrisey 1989; Scott 2003). Organizations must interact with the environment to
obtain resources as they are not capable of generating all of their needed
resources. These resources could be monetary, physical, informational or even
related to social legitimacy. The level of resource scarcity will influence an
organization‟s decision to forego autonomy and form strategic alliances.
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Therefore, this theory is used to study the factors that are associated with
hospitals‟ entry into JV arrangements with Ambulatory Surgery Centers.
An organization is subjected to other pressures (cognitive, regulatory and
normative) in a competitive market. These pressures can be explained by neoinstitutional theory. Neo-Institutional theory is based on Institutional theory.
Institutional theory distinguishes between institutional and technical
environments. An institutional perspective of organizations was developed by
Meyer and Rowan in 1977. This was further developed into a neo-institutional
approach by DiMaggio and Powell from 1983. According to this perspective,
cognitive, regulative, and normative interactions are the three pillars of
institutional environments. These pillars demonstrate levels of interactions
between organizational environments and organizations (Scott 2003).
Neo-institutional theory complemented with resource dependency theory
states that joint venture arrangements are more likely in more competitive
environments. Hence, a multi-theoretical approach provides a better framework
to examine the association of the factors with hospitals‟ entry into JV
arrangements with ASCs.
Methodology
This study uses a cross sectional design to examine hospitals that entered
into a joint venture arrangement with ASCs in 2006 and 2007. The comparison
group is a random sample of hospitals that did not enter into a joint venture with
ASCs during the same time period. The unit of analysis for this study is non-
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federal, general medical and surgical hospitals in the U.S. This study includes a
pooled cross-sectional model using 2006 and 2007 data. This study empirically
tests various hypotheses related to the central research question, i.e., examining
the market, regulatory, organizational, operational and financial factors
associated with hospital joint venture arrangements with ASCs using resource
dependency theory and neo-institutional theory framework.
The data for this study are drawn from five main sources. The American
Hospital Association Annual Survey (AHA) provides organizational data including
whether a hospital is in a joint venture with an ASC. The Area Resource File
(ARF) provides information on market structure, demographics and other
measures of the hospital environment. The CMS (Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Services) minimum dataset provides information on hospital financials.
The data on CON are obtained from the National Legislative Assembly Website.
Lastly, the data for case-mix index are obtained from the CM case-mix files.
Descriptive and multivariate data analysis is performed in this study.
Descriptive analysis includes descriptive statistics of various independent
variables, univariate test of significance for each independent variable in isolation
and correlation analysis for potential multicollinearity issues among independent
variables. Multivariate analysis includes logistic regression to test the association
between hospitals that joint venture compared to those that do not joint venture
with ASCs with the various markets, regulatory, organizational, operational and
financial factors.
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Summary of Remaining Chapters
Chapter 2 presents an exhaustive review of literature on joint venture
arrangements and other strategic alliances such as mergers and acquisitions.
Also reviewed in this chapter are the regulatory concerns as applies to the
changing healthcare environment and the reimbursement system as this is
critical to the decision of joint venturing, for hospitals. In addition, the review also
presents pertinent literature on market, regulatory, organizational, operational
and financial factors related to Hospital JV arrangements with physicians owned
entities.
Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework and conceptual model for
the study. The theoretical perspectives that form the foundation for this study are
resource dependency theory and neo-institutional theory. The framework, based
on the combined insights of these two theories, helps develop the hypotheses for
this study, and guides the directionality of the hypotheses.
Chapter 4 elaborates on the methodology used in testing the hypotheses
in this study. It presents the data sources, the time period for the study, and the
data elements i.e., the variables used in this study. The analytical procedures
(descriptive and multivariate) to analyze and answer the research questions in
this study are also explained.
Chapter 5 presents the findings of the study. The relationships between
the independent variables and the dependent variable are discussed in detail in
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this chapter. It presents the findings of both descriptive as well as multivariate
procedures.
Chapter 6 discusses the results of the study, their relevance and
implications. In addition to interpreting the results obtained in Chapter 5, this
chapter elaborates on the theoretical and empirical implications of these findings.
Lastly, the chapter discusses the findings and their significance in light of the
current healthcare market and suggests further areas of research.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Hospitals operate in a dynamic and highly competitive healthcare
environment. Issues such as attracting and retaining physicians, declining
reimbursements, changing regulations governing provider (hospitals and ASCs)
organizations, competition and rapidly changing market conditions add to the
environmental uncertainty. Hospitals are increasingly considering various
strategic alliances (i.e., acquisitions, mergers, joint venture arrangements) that
could help overcome the operational, financial and human resource limitations
resulting from the complex healthcare environment.
This chapter presents pertinent literature on the growth of outpatient
surgeries vis-à-vis inpatient surgeries, history of ambulatory surgery centers
(ASCs), ASC characteristics and the impact of ASCs on hospitals. Relevant
literature on integration strategies considered by hospitals (i.e., acquisitions,
mergers and joint ventures) are also presented. The chapter also presents
literature on the similarities and differences between these three strategies. As
the focus of this study is on hospital joint venture arrangements with ASCs, the
most common types of joint venture arrangements between these two entities
are also presented. This section is followed by a discussion of the laws pertinent
to hospital-physician relationships and the regulatory environment for such
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relationships. Hospitals and physicians collaborate in order to draw leverage from
one another. These motivations are discussed briefly in this chapter. The last
section of this chapter presents literature on hospitals attempting to turn the
„threat of competition to strategic advantage‟ by engaging in joint venture
arrangements with ASCs.
Growth in Outpatient Surgeries vis-à-vis Inpatient Surgeries
Healthcare spending in the United States reached $2.5 trillion in 2009,
despite a decline in the gross domestic product (“GDP”) from the previous year
(CMS 2010; VMG Intellimarker 2010). A large percentage of this expenditure is
attributed to surgical services provided to the patients. Examining surgical
services usage is becoming increasingly important as growth in healthcare
spending is fast outpacing GDP growth. Figure 1 presents the percentage share
of inpatient surgeries vis-à-vis outpatient surgeries performed between 1988 and
2008.

Source: AHA 2010 Chartbook: Trends Affecting Hospitals and Health Systems, Chapter 3.

Figure 1: Percentage Share of Inpatient versus Outpatient Surgeries, 1988-2008.
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Outpatient surgeries as a percentage of total surgeries have increased
significantly between 1988 and 2008. This increase is primarily attributed to
„technological and surgical procedure innovation‟, which has expanded the types
of procedures suitable for an outpatient setting (Bian and Morrisey 2006).
Another factor that has been linked to this increase is changes in reimbursement
arrangements (National Health Statistics Report 2009). Medical advances
included innovations in Anesthesia which allowed for fewer after effects, and
improved analgesics for pain relief. These advances made surgical procedures
simpler and less risky (National Health Statistics Report 2009). Simultaneously,
changes in Medicare program such as adopting prospective payment system
based on diagnostic-related grouping created strong incentives for hospitals to
shift simpler surgeries to outpatient settings (National Health Statistics Report
2009). Thus, over time, it is observed that outpatient surgeries have increased
and inpatient surgical volume has considerably decreased (Figure 1).
The Journal of the American Medical Association (“JAMA”) first explored
the idea of performing surgeries on an outpatient basis in 1966. In this
exploration, it was suggested by JAMA that a program of Anesthesia for
outpatient surgery could be conducted without compromising patient safety. This
resulted in an exploration of alternatives to mitigate the high costs associated
with inpatient surgical procedures by the health insurance industry.
Simultaneously, the United States National Advisory Commission on health
facilities also began experimenting with lowering healthcare costs (VMG
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Intellimarker 2010). This resulted in the rise of Ambulatory Surgery Centers
(ASCs).
History of Ambulatory Surgery Centers (ASCs)
ASCs are defined as „distinct entities that exclusively furnish outpatient
surgical services not requiring an overnight stay‟ (MedPac 2004). The first ASC
opened in 1970 followed by a second facility within one year. The American
Medical Association (“AMA”) endorsed ASCs in 1971, under general and local
anesthesia, for selected procedures and patients. According to the Ambulatory
Surgical Association, within five years i.e., by 1976, there were 67 ASCs in the
country. Bian and Morrisey (2006) have ascribed the growth of ASCs to the
advancement in surgical technologies. In 1982, Medicare program approved
payment for 200 procedures performed in ASCs (MedPac 2004). Since then,
Medicare has included many more procedures for reimbursement.
In the 1990‟s, hospitals witnessed increased competition in the provider
market from physicians who opened their own ASCs, to provide specialty
services (Berenson et al. 2007). By early 2000‟s, most of the ASCs were
Medicare-certified. As a result of Medicare‟s approval and increased demand for
outpatient services by physician users and patients, the number of Medicare
licensed ASCs grew considerably. By mid 2000‟s, the healthcare market
observed a dramatic increase in the number of ASCs. From 2000 to 2006, the
number of ASCs nationally grew by 55 percent, from 3,028 to 4,707 (MedPac
2007; Casalino et al. 2008). Figure 2 depicts the growing number of Medicare-
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Figure 2: Growth in the number of Medicare-certified ASCs, 2003-2008

certified ASCs over time. The number of Medicare-certified ASCs grew to 4991 in
2007 from 2006, an increase of 6.2%. From 2007 to 2008, the growth rate
decreased to 3.7% (compared to annual average rate of 6.7% from 2003 to
2007). This decreased rate was attributed to the downturn in the U.S. economy
and revisions in ASC payment system (MedPac 2010).
Observing the growth trend of ASCs in conjunction with changing
Medicare reimbursements helps understand the emergence of ASCs as
competitors to hospitals. Understanding this association is extremely important
for this study. The dynamically changing market structures reveal that hospitals
respond to changes in their environment. Hospitals responded to these changes
in market dynamics by refining their strategic approach and considering alliances
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with ASCs. Failing to restructure in tandem with the market could threaten
hospitals‟ survival.
The next section elaborates on some key performance indicators of ASCs.
These include information on: volume, financial, staffing, and facility data. These
indicators draw a brief synopsis of ASC performance and are listed below:
Volume
Volume indicators include number of beneficiaries served, services per
fee-for-service (FFS) beneficiary offered, total cases performed per ASC and the
case volume mix. The number of beneficiaries served in ASCs increased by an
average of 5.7% per year, from 2003 through 2007 (MedPac 2010). During this
time period, the volume of services per fee-for-service (FFS) beneficiary
increased by 10.2%. The volume growth increased slightly, to 10.5% in 2008
(MedPac 2010). VMG Health (2009) study reported that the total cases
performed per ASC increased 2.8% from a median of 3,952 reported in 2007 to
4,173 in 2009. Gastroenterology, orthopedics, ophthalmology and pain
management together comprised over 75% of the case volume mix.
Financial
Since Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has not
mandated ASCs to submit cost data, a national estimate on the cost, operational
expense and financial capital is unavailable. Despite a recommendation by the
Commission for submission of cost data, the concession for not submitting data
was granted on the premise that ASCs are typically small facilities and have
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limited resources for supplying data. Available financial information on ASCs is
presented below.
Net revenue indicators include Medicare payments, net revenue per ASC
and net revenue per case. There has been a steady increase in Medicare
payments to ASCs from 2003 to 2008. Medicare payments increased from $2.2
billion in 2003 to $3.1 billion in 2008 (MedPac 2010). This growth is expected to
continue as a result of newer services being covered by Medicare from 2008.
According to VMG Health (2009), the median net revenue per ASC was $6.4
million in 2009. This represented an increase of 6.8% from $5.6 million, reported
in 2007. Also, the median net revenue per case ranged from $790 in
gastroenterology to $2,453 in orthopedics in 2009. These specialties are the
highest revenue generating specialties amongst ASCs. According to MedPac
2010 report, ASCs operating in Pennsylvania had a 1.9% increase in their
operating margins, going from 24.1% in 2007 to 26% in 2008.
VMG Health in its 2009 Intellimarker study presents some pertinent
financial statistics, analyzed from a nationally representative sample of ASCs.
According to this report, the total operating expense per case increased 14%,
from a median of $995 reported in 2007 to $1,294 in 2009. In 2009, working
capital, as a percentage of net revenue, was 13.5%. Percentage of management
fees vis-à-vis net revenue, were approximately 5.1%. There was a 9.3%
decrease in the median net accounts receivable days outstanding, from 45.0
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days in 2007 to 37.0 days in 2009. In 2009, the median total debt was
approximately $945,000 per ASC.
Staffing
Healthcare providers are facing considerable challenges with regard to
attracting and retaining physicians and nurses as well as rising labor costs (Byrd
and McCue 2003). Labor expenses typically constitute the largest portion of
expenses, in healthcare organizations. A study by GAO in 2006 on ASCs
reported that the share of labor costs of the total operating costs averaged 50%
(GAO 2006; MedPac 2009). Hospitals and ASCs continuously strive to retain
physicians and reduce costs.
The latest staffing statistics for ASCs indicated that ASCs were slightly
successful towards this objective. Total staff hours (median) per case decreased
to 11.6 in 2009 from 14.1 reported in 2007 (VMG Health 2009). A reduction was
also seen in full time equivalent employees (“FTEs”) per ASC. The median FTEs
per ASC decreased to 20.4 in 2009 from 27.4 in 2007 (VMG Health 2009).
Although, the median staff hourly salaries and wages increased to $25.28 in
2009 from $22.45 reported in 2007, an increase of 6.1%, the overall operating
costs attributable to labor costs were still favorable (due to a decrease in FTEs).
Facility
Examining facility capacity and volume statistics is essential to understand
ASCs. MedPac 2010 report on ASCs presents that though the mean number of
operating rooms per ASC increased a little from 2.5 to 2.6, the median remained
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constant at 2. This indicates a similar growth rate in the number of operating
rooms, as in the number of ASCs. The 2009 VMG Health study that analyzed
ASCs reported that the median square footage was 12,781, per ASC and the
median rental rate was $26 per square foot as reported in 2009. They also
reported that the total operating expense (median) per square foot increased to $
411 in 2009 from $317 in 2007, an increase of 14%.
The growth of ASCs (as presented above) increases competition for the
hospitals. Reviewing pertinent literature on the impact of ASCs on hospitals is
essential to understand the reasoning behind hospitals‟ increasing interest in joint
venture arrangements with ASCs.
Impact of ASCs on Hospitals
Prior to the 1990‟s, hospitals and physicians considered their roles distinct
and focused on their separate roles (Benoff and Afable 2001). However, with
increasing competition due to technological innovations in the 1990‟s, the lines
distinguishing the roles of hospitals and ASCs began to blur. ASCs threaten
hospital survival in many ways: competing for labor, access, competing for
patients, cream-skimming patients, and thereby having a direct impact on the
financial performance of hospitals. Thus, it is imperative to review the literature
on the impact of ASCs on hospitals, in a given market.
Competition for Labor
Hospitals foresee a shortage of physicians, especially surgeons (Satiani
and Vaccaro 2010). They recognize the significance of revenues generated by
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ambulatory surgical procedures and feel threatened when specialists open their
own surgical centers to provide these services. In addition to creating a shortage
of physicians in hospitals, ASCs also draw away skilled / specialized nurses and
technicians, extremely valuable to hospitals. Scarcity of access to clinical labor is
emerging to be a significant problem for hospitals, as more and more physicians
open their own ASCs.
Competition for Patients
ASC proponents claim that patients are more satisfied when treated in
ASCs than in hospitals (Taparia 2010). Patients‟ preference for ASCs is
attributed to lower waiting times, easier access to the centers (in comparison to
hospitals), and less stressful experience while navigating facilities (Bershad
2005; Taparia 2010). In ASCs, patients are not medically admitted. This
significantly decreases the chances of contracting hospital acquired infections,
further increasing patient satisfaction (Bershad 2005).
Cream-skimming Healthier Patients
There has been considerable debate over ASCs „cream-skimming‟ or
„cherry picking‟ healthier patients and leaving the burden of providing care for
higher acuity patients / uninsured patients to the hospitals. The claim that ASCs
enjoy unfair cost advantages by treating less severely ill has been mentioned
several times in the literature (Casalino et al 2003; Devers et al 2003; Iglehart
2005; Bershad 2005). ASCs have been reported to draw away healthier, lesscost intensive procedures and insured patients from hospitals. Casalino et al
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(2003) study concluded that although far from conclusive, the preliminary
evidence does suggest that these claims could have some merit.
The burden of treating high acuity Medicaid/uninsured patients and
providing cost intensive procedures falls on hospitals, due to cream-skimming of
healthier patients by ASCs. This jeopardizes hospitals financial performance.
This could result in hospitals having to compromise their ability to maintain their
emergency departments, intensive care units, burn units and other emergent
high-cost and intensive care capabilities (Devers et al 2003; Bershad 2005).
From a societal perspective, this is not a good indication because these services,
although expensive to offer, are necessary for patients.
The criteria laid out by the Medicare Advisory Commission in 2008 for
services eligible for payment under Medicare ASC payment system, seemed to
be in favor of ASCs, with regard to „cream-skimming‟ low acuity patients. The
criteria included that surgery on patients should not “exceed 90 minutes of
surgical time or 4 hours of recovery time” and should not result in “excessive
blood loss, or generally emergent or life-threatening nature” (MedPac 2009).
Most high acuity cases do not fall under this bracket and hence can be treated
only in hospitals.
Financial Impact
On one hand where ASCs seem to offer physicians convenient and
financially lucrative practice opportunities (MedPac 2010), they do appear to be
adversely affecting hospitals by hurting their operating margins. By taking away
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revenue-producing areas such as outpatient surgeries from hospitals, ASCs have
a direct impact on hospital financials. Hospitals typically distribute their overhead
costs to all of their operations. A decrease in outpatient surgeries is
disadvantageous as there are lesser operations for distribution of overheads
(Bershad 2005). This leads to overburdening of other services with a higher
proportion of overhead costs, resulting in lowering the overall operating margins.
In an era of increasing competition, hospitals cannot avoid taking proactive measures to collaborate with ASCs. Hospitals are responding to pressures
from payers (e.g., Insurance companies), customer groups (e.g., physician
groups, patients), and the government to provide a continuous comprehensive
system of care by looking towards integration strategies to increase their
collaboration with physician owners of ASCs.
Integration Strategies: Acquisitions, Mergers and Joint Ventures
Similarities and Differences
Acquisitions, mergers and joint ventures are integration strategies pursued
by hospitals in order to ensure survival and success in the market. However,
each of these alliances has its advantages and disadvantages.
From the perspective of organizations responding to resource threats, all
three are similar. They all help increase access to resources (financial,
operational and human resource). All three help organizations respond to the
market. All three strategies lead to a more consolidated market. However, on
further examination, differences between these strategies are evident. This
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section presents some of the key ways in which these three strategies differ. The
choice of a hospital to opt for one of the three would depend on the motive (i.e.,
market share, profitability, collaboration) driving the decision to consider
integration strategies.
.

Integrated healthcare delivery systems (such as acquisitions, mergers and

joint ventures) form as a result of business combinations between existing
hospitals, physician groups, ambulatory providers, long-term care providers, or
other non-acute providers, and third party payers. Integrated delivery systems
bring together activities/functions/services previously provided by separate,
independent entities. Integrated healthcare networks aim to attain synergies and
economies of scale that include: more efficient use of personnel, medical
supplies, plant and equipment, and other overhead costs (laundry, medical
records, accounting, etc.). They also aim for broader geographic coverage of
patient populations; and the ability to offer new services and products. Mergers,
acquisitions, and joint venture arrangements allow organizations to enter new
markets, such as the outpatient surgery niche industry, quickly.
Acquisitions and Mergers
In venture capital literature, an acquisition is usually defined as the
purchase of one organization by another organization; or the process through
which one company takes over the controlling interest of another company.
Healthcare and hospital industry defines an acquisition as, “an arrangement
where one hospital is purchased by another hospital or multi-hospital system”
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(Shapiro and Balbirer 2000; Harrison 2002; Harrison et al. 2003). In acquisitions,
the acquiring hospital that buys out the smaller provider organization retains its
identity.
Financial and healthcare literatures define a merger as “a combination of
two or more entities through pooling of interests into a single legal entity” (Bazzoli
1995; Bazzoli and Andes 1995; Connor et al. 1997; Downes and Goodman
1999). This is a well accepted definition in both the business as well as service
industry. In a merger, individual entities entering the merger lose their individual
identities and form a new operating entity, governed by a pre-drawn legal
agreement.
The primary goal of most acquisitions is to maximize profits (Harrison
2002). A hospital decides to acquire another facility in order to supplement its
profits. A hospital or a multi-hospital system acquires another facility when the
net present value of the facility‟s income stream is higher than its sale price
(Harrison 2002). Acquisitions also require considerable capital outlay for
financing the purchase. Thus it more often occurs in stronger markets with higher
profit margins.
A merger decision is often driven towards the goal of increasing market
share. Considerations such as similarity in mission of the merging organizations,
resulting reputation, improved cost efficiency and change in market share are
some of key factors that weigh in the decision of a merger (Harrison 2002). A
merger does not require a capital outlay as it is primarily formed by a pooling of
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interests. Thus, mergers are preferred over acquisitions in weak markets
characterized by low profits.
Mergers provide many other benefits in addition to increasing market
share. They help achieve higher volumes of specialized services, cover broader
geographic area and provide unrealized economies of scale resulting in cost
savings. They also help gain access to capital and efficiently use excess capacity
through pooling of resources (Connor et al. 1997; Harrison et al. 2003).
In the hospital industry, many mergers have resulted in an increase in
reimbursement rates. Mergers typically lead to increased market share of the
merging organizations. Krishnan (2001) study found that greater market share
resulted in a 10% increase in DRG reimbursement rates for hospitals, post
merger. Other studies have also shown that markets with higher concentration
result (higher Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) in an increase in reimbursement rates
(Dranove and Ludwick 1999; Keller et al 1999). Another reason for increased
DRG reimbursement rates is higher intensity services (used by more chronically
ill patients) that are offered by consolidated facilities post merger or acquisition
(Harrison et al 2003). According to the Krishnan (2001) study, post consolidation,
DRG reimbursement rates grew 15.6% in comparison to pre-consolidation.
Healthcare Financial Management (1996) reported that between 1994 and
1996, almost 2 in 5 of the country‟s 5,200 nonfederal hospitals were involved in
either mergers or acquisitions. These deals were primarily driven by the goal to
provide cost-effective and efficient care. However, with increasing competition in
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the market, the goals of the participating entities changed to pursuing market
share and profit maximization.
In recent times, there has been considerable decline in acquisitions and
mergers, in the healthcare industry. The healthcare acquisition report (2010)
developed by Levin Associates presents that between 2005 and 2009, the
number of deals (acquisitions and mergers) were reduced from 523 to 371. Deal
volume decreased 21% from 2008 to 2009. In 2009, none of the mergers and
acquisitions (M&A) in healthcare exceeded $570 million in price (Levin
Associates 2010). It is evident that hospitals are being cautious in pursuing
acquisitions and mergers.
Joint Ventures
A joint venture is defined as, “the combination of resources of two or more
organizations for a specific purpose” (Ginter 2004; Harrison 2006). Both
acquisitions and mergers, entail major restructuring of involved entities and loss
of identity of all/some of the organizations entering into the arrangement. And this
restructuring and loss of individual legal identity is more permanent in nature. On
the other hand, joint venture arrangements are more temporary (for a prespecified amount of time) and allow the participating organizations to retain their
individual corporate identities during the interim period. Joint venture is a form of
collaboration amongst healthcare entities in which control is shared between
investors.
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A number of factors need to be analyzed prior to, during and post joint
venture decision. Some of the general factors are: objective, scope and terms,
roles, responsibilities and obligations, consequences of insolvency, default or
termination, and the management structure. Business registration, principle
activities, venture location, details of the participating entities, factors such as
confidentiality, dispute resolution, and conflict of interest are some of the key
legal requirements that need to be considered. From a financial perspective,
details such as percentage of interest, proportion of capital contribution (if any),
assets, equity, set-up costs, operational costs and apportionment of profits and
losses, need to be carefully examined.
In summary, there are many similarities and dissimilarities between
acquisitions, mergers and joint ventures. Table 2 encapsulates these significant
points.
The main variable of interest in this study is hospital entry in joint venture
arrangements with ASCs. A detailed review of the various types of joint ventures,
most common in healthcare would help gain a better understanding of these
arrangements. The following section provides a concise of the various types of
joint ventures and their key characteristics.
Types of Joint Ventures in Health Care Industry
`

While joint ventures are common in the healthcare industry, their structure

can vary considerably. There are various forms of joint venture arrangements
and the selection of the most suitable form is extremely crucial for success.
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Table 2: Acquisitions, Mergers and Joint Ventures
Acquisition
Profitmaximization

Merger
Increase market
share

Capital
Outlay

Mostly high

Timeline

Single point of
time
Permanent

Lower than
acquisition but
higher than JV
Single point of time

Primary Goal

Flexibility

Control

Acquiring
organization has
ownership control

Human
Resource

Acquiring
organization
personnel enjoy
greater stability
Market
Strong Markets,
Characteristic Higher Profit
Margin

Does not provide
much flexibility for
the merged
organizations
Neither. The new
entity formed needs
to draw up new
control structure.
Unpredictable for
personnel involved.

Competitive markets

Joint Venture
Pooling of resources
for specific mutual
goal
Mostly low

Over a pre-defined
period of time
More flexible:
defined period of
time and separate
corporate entities
Joint control by all
participating entities

Physician relation
building tool

Influenced by
presence/absence
of physician groups

Some of the most important forms of joint venture arrangements in healthcare
are: jointly owned corporations or groups of corporations, partnership, Limited
liability company (LLC), and contractual- (non equity) arrangements. These are
briefly explained below.
Jointly Owned Corporations / Groups of
Corporations /Subsidiary Corporations
These ventures are jointly owned corporations, a medium to hold the
assets of the joint venture (Pelfrey and Theisen 1989). Since a corporation is
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being formed, this type of venture can require substantial outside investorbacked financing. Requiring a formal incorporation also translates into large startup costs.
Partnership
Typically, these ventures are less expensive to develop and operate than
forming corporations. These can be formal (written) or informal (oral) between
participating entities, based on the state legal requirements in which they are
situated. These arrangements are not subject to federal taxations (Pelfrey and
Theisen 1989). Defined period of time and availability of financing are two
important considerations while forming these ventures.
Limited Liability Company (LLC)
Business law defines a limited liability company as an ownership structure
in which the operational activities follow the pattern of a partnership arrangement
but the limited liability shield is similar to that of a corporation (American Bar
Association; Nolo 2010). In this type of venture, owners' personal assets are
safeguarded through the option of limited liability. Most joint venture
arrangements between hospitals and physicians are examples of LLC. Such
ventures financially benefit both hospitals and physicians as the income directly
passes to the owners. The income generated is not subject to double taxation
(earnings taxed to both the corporation as well as individual investors). In case of
non-profit hospitals, this is more lucrative as the share of income from this
venture is tax exempt, adding to financial profitability (Lifton and Bryant Jr. 2006).
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Contractual- (non equity) arrangements
These ventures can either be a co-ownership model or simply a contract
between the parties. In this type of arrangement, the parties retain all their own
assets and agree to the terms and scope of the arrangement. They also have
their separate rights and obligations defined. Most outsourcing arrangements are
examples of these types of ventures. These are unincorporated alliances based
on simple legal contracts. These contracts clarify cooperation issues among
partners. The biggest advantage of this type of arrangement is its ease of
formation (Pelfrey and Theisen 1989).
As mentioned earlier, the changes in healthcare environment propelled
hospitals and physicians towards integration strategies. The last 25 years have
witnessed changes in these relationships and trends. There were many factors
responsible for the changes in hospital-physician integrations. The rise and fall of
these integration structures have generated an interest amongst researchers and
analysts to study the nature of these relationships and to predict the future of
such integration strategies. BDC Advisors, in their 2010 presentation of
healthcare market analysis focusing on trends in hospital-physician integration
depicted the change in hospital-physician relationships spanning over a period of
25 years. This is graphically represented in Figure 3.
Some of the factors that are also driving hospital-physician integrations
are performance based pricing, bundled pricing, and pressure on fee-for-service
reimbursement models (Figure 3). Performance based pricing is an arrangement
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Source: BDC Advisors L.L.C presentation on „Trends in Physician-Hospital Joint Integration‟ June
2010

Figure 3: Changes in Hospital-Physician Integration Over Time

where healthcare providers are paid based on their performance i.e., quality of
service. Bundled pricing refers to a system of payment initiated by Medicare
where hospitals and physicians receive a single, negotiated fee for each
operation which is then split amongst them. Fee-for-service reimbursement
arrangements (where services are paid for separately) are under pressure in the
changing payment system by Medicare. All these together create uncertainty for
hospitals to operate. In order to overcome the challenges posed by these
uncertainties, hospitals and physicians are increasingly considering integration
strategies (BDC Advisors 2010).Health Reform is another regulatory change that
has provides further incentives for hospital-physician integration. Anticipated
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impact of this regulatory change is further discussed later in the chapter under
the „regulatory environment‟ section.
As previously discussed, acquisitions and merger deals in healthcare have
decreased. Thus, the rising trend in hospital-physician integrations after 2005, as
seen in Figure 3, is primarily attributed to joint venture arrangements.
Joint venture arrangements in healthcare market raise regulatory
concerns that are unique, unlike in other industries. The Office of Inspector
General for the Department of Health and Human Services (OIG), which is the
primary federal governing body for fraud and abuse regulations, has attributed
this uniqueness to the distinct role of parties involved in healthcare. As
physicians take on the role of decision makers for the patients, opportunities for
overutilization of services increases, and financial/ ethical conflict of interest
concerns arise (CAP 2007). Hospital joint ventures in current regulatory
environment can be extremely challenging. Therefore, examining the laws
affecting hospital-physician relationships in order to address concerns such as
potential for antitrust violations is crucial.
Regulatory Environment Pertinent to
Hospital-Physician Relationships
Historically the number of joint venture arrangements between hospitals
and ASCs had been increasing. However, in mid to late 80‟s, recognizing the
potential for financial conflict of interest, state and federal lawmakers enacted
laws (known as Stark laws) which restricted formation of physician owned entities
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and shut many hospital-physician joint ventures that were formed prior to mid
80‟s (Hetzel and Tomey 2005). As a result of Stark laws, there was a general
agreement in the industry that joint ventures were doomed to financial peril
(Hetzel and Tomey 2005).
However, in early 2000s, the cycle seemed to have reversed again.
Hospital industry blamed the legal structure for “stifling productive alignment
between hospitals and physicians” (AHA 2007). In response, federal and state
regulatory agencies analyzed the scenario and incorporated exceptions to the
laws that allowed for a revival of hospital-physician joint venture arrangements
(Jones 2004). These exceptions include ambulatory surgery centers that offer
specialty surgical services (Hetzel and Tomey 2005). Federal and state laws
pertinent to hospital-physician joint ventures, especially hospital-ASC joint
ventures, are presented below.
The Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued a particular fraud alert for
joint ventures which they considered suspects in 1989. In this alert, OIG
addressed the characteristics of joint ventures that were suspect. OIG stated that
„suspect joint ventures‟ were characterized by selection of only „high patientbase‟ physicians as investors by hospitals, in order to ensure continuance of
referrals (Jones 2004).
According to the MedPac 2008 report, laws seem to be unclear with
respect to alignment strategies between hospitals and physicians. MedPac
Commission in their 2005 report called for reforms in the laws, to allow greater

40

collaboration among providers, thereby, reducing costs and increasing efficiency.
The justification provided was that joint collaboration between hospitals and
physicians in ASCs would result in efficient scheduling and usage of operating
rooms. Also, the collaboration would involve joint negotiating with suppliers and
managed care companies for better prices, which under the current federal law
are „restricted to few permissible activities‟ (MedPac 2008). When OIG raised
concerns in a special 1999 bulletin, regarding limited services being provided to
Medicare patients due to such arrangements (under the Civil Monetary Penalty
Statute); it threatened the viability of joint venture arrangements.
The Federal anti-kickback statute does not allow the offer, payment, or
exchange of monetary/other value to “induce the referral of patients for services
paid for by federal health programs” (MedPac 2008). However, ASCs on account
of being small investments are covered by the safe harbor provision of the law
(Jones 2004).
Another law that affects joint venture relationships between hospitals and
physicians is the Stark law. The law prohibits physicians from referring patients to
entities in which they have a financial stake, with some exceptions. The
exceptions include ASCs, dialysis centers, hospices, end-stage renal disease
facilities and cardiac catheterization laboratories. It allows for greater flexibility for
hospitals to structure and pursue physician arrangements (Melvin and Polacheck
2001). According to Harrison (2006), this law allows for increased opportunities
for hospital-ASC joint ventures.

41

Although antitrust laws raise some concerns for hospitals to joint venture
with ASCs, in a financially challenging and competitive market, hospitals are
continuing to joint venture with ASCs, albeit cautiously. Attention to regulatory
compliance during development, structuring and implementation of the joint
ventures can help hospitals reap the associated benefits without legally
jeopardizing their success.
IRS also poses a regulatory constraint on hospital joint venture
arrangements with ASCs. Most of the nation‟s not-for-profit hospitals are exempt
from federal income taxes (AHA 2011). These hospitals are required to abide by
certain restrictions in the Internal Revenue Code, failure of which can result in
loss of tax exempt status. Since, most ASCs are for-profit centers (MedPac
2004), not-for-profit hospitals entering into joint venture arrangements with forprofit ASCs could potentially lose their tax exempt status.
The Health Reform Legislation has introduced yet another regulatory
change in the healthcare market. Hospitals and ASCs would both be impacted as
healthcare service needs of 32 million additional Americans would have to be
met. Early industry speculations suggest that this change would cause providers
(hospitals and ASCs) to develop capacity and result in ASCs being considered
as „cost-saving contributors of system capacity‟ (ASC Advocacy Committee
2010). Reports also suggest that this reform would lead to an increase in surgical
volume and the number of physicians joining ASCs would provide opportunities
to improve hospital-physician relationships (Paige 2010), and create an
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environment that would foster consolidation activity between hospitals and
physicians (Neuterra Healthcare 2010). Overall, although challenging in terms of
simultaneously decreasing reimbursements and increasing pressure on centers
to be more efficient and effective, analysts are leaning towards the belief that this
would spur the growth of ASCs and provide opportunities for joint ventures
between hospitals and ASCs (Neuterra Healthcare 2010). With increasing
environmental uncertainty due to market competition and changing regulatory
requirements, the findings of this study would also help hospitals make an
informed decision towards considering joint venture arrangements with ASCs.
In addition to the above mentioned federal laws, there are some state
regulations such as certificate of need laws (CON) that might impact such joint
venture arrangements. According to the National Council of State Legislatures,
thirty six states currently maintain some form of CON laws. These laws aim at
controlling healthcare costs by restricting acquisition, expansion and creation of
newer facilities. In this study, one of the hypotheses also tests whether being
located in a state having CON would influence a hospitals decision to joint
venture with an ASC.
Table 3 summarizes the laws that are relevant to hospital-physician
collaborations. Joint ventures help improve efficiency and reduce costs subject to
hospitals and ASCs compliance with the regulatory requirements.
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Table 3: Laws Pertinent to Hospital-Physician Collaborations
Law
Civil money
penalty statute
(Section 1128A of
the Social Security
Act)
Federal antikickback statute
(42 U.S.C. 1320a7b)
Ethics in Patient
Referrals Act (The
Stark Law) (42
U.S.C. 1395nn)
Antitrust laws
(various federal
and state statutes)

IRS rules

Health Reform
Legislation
Certificate of Need
Laws

Brief Description
Prohibits hospital payments to physicians to reduce or limit
services to Medicare inpatients, regardless of the medical
necessity of the services. A hospital would be in violation of
this statute if, for example, it rewarded physicians for
reducing the number of days in the intensive care unit or
the drugs their patients use.
Prohibits the offer, payment, or receipt of anything of value
to induce the referral of patients for services paid for by
federal health programs.
Prohibits physicians from referring Medicare or Medicaid
patients for certain services to entities with which they have
a financial relationship, unless the arrangement fits within
an exception. Exceptions include certain compensation
arrangements and surgical services provided by ASCs.
May apply to hospitals and physicians that are independent
entities but that wish to jointly negotiate contracts with
health insurance payers. Antitrust laws are enforced by the
Federal Trade Commission, Department of Justice, state
attorneys general, and – potentially – private litigants.
Not-for-profit organizations should abide to restrictions of
Internal Revenue Code. The restriction includes payment
restrictions by hospitals to physicians in order to prevent
tax-exempt institutions assets from being used for non
charitable purposes.
Mandates providing care for millions of uninsured
individuals. This includes free colonoscopy screening for all.
Impact yet to be seen.
Laws governing acquisition, expansion and creation of
healthcare facilities in order to restrain rising healthcare
costs. These laws differ across states and are enforced by
state authorities.

Source: MedPac Report Chapter 3, June 2008; National Council for State Legislature 2010; AHA
Report titled „5 Regulatory Barriers to Clinical Integration‟ 2010.

Review of the dynamic market structure and regulatory environment show
that all healthcare providers (including hospitals and ASCs) are affected by these
changes. Hospitals and ASCs are increasing entering into collaborative
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arrangements to ensure survival. The motivations behind these collaborative
arrangements are reviewed in the forthcoming sections.
Hospital-ASC Joint Ventures – Hospitals Perspective
Industry analysts report that joint ventures (JV) are pursued primarily by
hospitals in order to attract and retain physicians/physician groups and integrate
them into the hospital system (HealthCare Partners 2010). Hospitals consider
JVs as a physician relationship tool. They view JV as a strategic alternative to
help align physicians‟ interests to their own, in order to draw related benefits. For
example, by having an arrangement with an ASC, a hospital could reduce the
burden on its operating rooms (OR) by directing its outpatient surgical patients to
the ASC. This would not only help reduce operating costs for the hospital OR but
also ensure availability of the OR for more number of inpatient and emergency
surgeries (HealthCare Partners 2010).
If managed well, joint venture arrangements also help hospitals increase
their inpatient and outpatient volume while simultaneously reducing costs.
Through careful management of joint ventures, hospitals could promote
themselves as being „patient-centric‟, by providing appropriate care in the right
setting. This could result in the development of a positive image amongst
stakeholders. With regard to patients, patient satisfaction at an associated ASC
could help attract patients to the hospital for other health concerns. With regard
to physicians, hospitals would seem supportive of the „superior experience of
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delivering care‟ (HealthCare Partners 2010). Having joint venture arrangements
with key physician groups would also help hospitals gain leverage while
negotiating contracts with managed care organizations.
A joint venture arrangement with an ASC could also help improve
hospitals service line. Hospitals could benefit from the technical expertise of
ASCs in specialized services and enhance their ambulatory care strategies. And
most important, hospitals would benefit as partners from the additional revenue
generated in ASCs and ancillary services.
Hospital-ASC Joint Ventures – ASC/Physician Perspective
Physicians prefer ASCs over hospitals for varied reasons. One of the key
reasons is operational efficiency (i.e., faster turnover time of patients/procedures;
convenient and reliable scheduling). ASCs are not affected by disruptions from
emergency surgeries. In addition to convenient scheduling, ASCs also offer
physicians the security of working repeatedly with the same team, on a daily
basis. Physicians believe that these lead to better outcomes and higher
satisfaction (shorter waiting times, patient experience from admission to
discharge – all in one day, and no overnight stay resulting in lower nosocomial
infection rates).
Satiani and Vaccaro (2010) note that surgical specialties are typically
known to be less satisfied with hospitals compared to other specialties. The
dissatisfaction is attributed to concerns regarding patient care, ease of practice,
and relations with hospital management. Thus, shared control becomes a very
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important factor in consideration of any joint ventures. Physicians would prefer to
have control over the entire clinical care process, and direct influence on the care
team. Typically, the decision making process is faster in ASCs than hospitals, in
part due to lack of various committee structures. Industry analysts report that
physicians appreciate a faster decision making process (HealthCare Partners
2010). In addition to these practice and control reasons, physicians could also
use the opportunity to supplement their income and offset part of the reductions
in professional fees.
Although owning ASCs seems to be intuitively preferable, physicians are
mindful of the advantages a hospital provides. For example, hospitals have
greater leverage when negotiating with managed care organizations and
suppliers. A joint venture with a hospital could help physicians draw benefits from
this higher power. In addition, having a collaborative relationship with a hospital
could help increase referrals to the ASC. Also, a joint venture could definitely
help ASCs by providing greater access to capital.
Response of Hospitals: Competition
to Collaboration - Joint Ventures
Based on the literature reviewed in this chapter, joint ventures seem to be
a good strategic choice for hospitals responding to increasing competition and
resource (physicians, patients and monetary resources) threats posed by ASCs.
Joint ventures (JV) allow for increased integration between hospitals and
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„physicians owning ASCs‟. It allows both entities to enjoy a mutually beneficial
financial and strategic partnership (Harrison 2006; Satiani and Vaccaro 2010).
Hospitals would prefer forming joint ventures than acquiring these centers
because they typically involve pooling of interests as opposed to a substantial
capital outlay. Under current circumstances, hospitals would not want to entertain
the alternative of employing physicians, which they previously did during the
1980s and the early 1990s. High acquisition costs, providing salary and benefits,
costs associated with making the electronic medical record compatible with the
hospitals, are some of the reasons why hospitals are hesitant to get back into the
employer role (Satiani and Vaccaro 2010).
Observing the increasing number of joint venture arrangements between
hospitals and ASCs does indicate that JV‟s are emerging as the preferred choice.
Researchers and analysts report that the strategic integration model (e.g., joint
venture arrangement) that would best suit hospitals goal will depend on the
hospitals financial and operational performance, relationship with key physician
groups, market position, available alternatives, cultural considerations in terms of
mission, and other key factors (Casalino et al. 2003; Keegan and Bruce 2009;
VMG Intellimarker 2010). Figure 4 depicts that the preferred ownership model is
shifting towards joint-ventures rather than freestanding facilities.
Joint ventures between hospitals and ASCs would allow both parties to
share risks and rewards of their operations, pool their resources in providing
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Source: Healthcare Partners presentation on Hospital-ASC Ownership 2010

Figure 4: Ownership model

services, combine complementary technological knowledge and supplement
financial resources.
Joint venture arrangements enable both groups to participate and have
control over the management of the venture. Hospital-ASC joint ventures are
becoming increasingly popular as both groups exercise control over the venture
and no single group has the unilateral ability to make all decisions, regardless of
the percentage of ownership, share of earnings or size. Analysts report that in
current healthcare environment, hospitals of all types, regardless of their mission
are interested in ASC joint ventures (Powell Goldstein LLP 2006)
Joint ventures are becoming increasingly common in the healthcare
industry as hospitals are trying to consolidate multiple functions (Gapenski 2003).
In case of hospital-ASC joint ventures, this also provides hospitals the
opportunity to enjoy the benefits of consolidation without violating regulations or
antitrust laws. Hospital-ASC joint ventures enable the healthcare industry to
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cover wider geographic markets, attain economies of scope, enhance newproduct/service development and achieve greater efficiencies (Curtis 2001).
Hospital-ASC joint ventures have also been viewed as a vehicle to attract
physicians in order to develop a structure supporting innovations, better
management and efficient operations (Snow 1998). These arrangements also
benefit by moving the focus from inpatient care and hospitalization to the entire
care process, for fewer dollars and improved profits (Harrison 2006). These
seem advantageous to the hospitals, physicians/physician groups owning the
ASCs as well as the key stakeholders i.e., patients.
There are many key factors influencing joint venture arrangements and
ensuring their success. Similarity in mission, trust, focus on continuum of care,
efficient management of resources, continuous technological upgrade,
development and implementation of clinical treatment protocols and integration of
information systems between hospitals and ASCs are some important
considerations that can help build a successful venture between a hospital and
an ASC (Miller and Hill 2004; Harrison 2006; Burns and Muller 2008). A well
developed and implemented joint venture can help improve access to care for
patients, increase speed and efficiency from consolidating their medical records
and enrich their experience by providing a seamless continuum of care.
Hospitals could benefit largely by considering joint ventures with ASCs. It
could provide hospitals with opportunity to supplement their declining revenues
(Harrison 2006). From an operational viewpoint, these ventures could provide an
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opportunity for hospitals to streamline their care processes, gain access to new
and improved technologies and most importantly develop better physician
relationships. Literature suggests that patient mix is an important factor towards
profitability of joint ventures (Harrison 2006). Joint ventures could lead to better
financial performance, for which focus needs to be on more profitable DRGs.
This requires patient mix to be managed well and organizational efficiency to be
monitored (Harrison 2006). Joint ventures also provide hospitals with the
opportunity to explore new technologies such as electronic medical records, online patient scheduling, and electronic billing processes (Harrison 2006).
Although hospital-ASC joint ventures can help improve relationships between
hospitals and physicians, it can only be favorable if the arrangement is based on
complementary goals (mission), and open communication.
As presented in this chapter, researchers and analysts have noted various
factors that influence or motivate joint venture arrangements between hospitals
and ASCs. However, the exhaustive review also indicates that there are very few
empirical studies that have explored factors related to hospital-ASC joint
ventures. Responding to this need, building on this review and the theoretical
premise presented in the next chapter, the study empirically examines the
various factors that affect a hospital‟s decision to joint venture with ASC.
Summary of Chapter 2
A review of relevant literature related to Hospital-ASC joint venture
arrangements was presented in this chapter. The key sections in this chapter
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were: growth of outpatient surgeries vis-à-vis inpatient surgeries, history of
ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs), ASC characteristics, impact of ASCs on
hospitals, similarities and differences between various integration strategies (i.e.,
acquisitions, mergers and joint ventures), most common types of joint venture
arrangements between hospitals and ASCs, laws pertinent to hospital-physician
relationships, motivations of hospitals as well as physician owners of ASCs to
collaborate jointly, and hospitals use of joint ventures as a means of
collaborative tool with ASCs. This chapter also reviewed empirical research that
helped develop this study.
Examining the growth of outpatient surgeries vis-à-vis inpatient surgeries
and the history of ASCs supported this study by highlighting the threat of
competition posed by ASCs to hospitals. The literature showed that technological
innovations and changes in the market resulted in formation of ASCs, which in
turn resulted in increasing competition for hospital industry. It also helped
understand that hospitals‟ survival is dependent on constant restructuring in
tandem with complex healthcare environment.
Literature suggested that changes in managed care environment,
Medicare reimbursements and safe harbors in federal regulations resulted in the
growth of ASCs. These ASCs continue to draw profitable outpatient surgery
services away from hospitals and pose a threat to hospitals survival. In response
to the declining outpatient surgical volume, hospitals started considering joint
venture arrangements with ASCs. This section presented the impact of
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organizational, operational and financial factors on hospital survival. This study
empirically analyzes these factors and examines their roles in hospitals decision
to joint venture with ASCs. Thus these two sections directly support the study
objective.
The section presenting literature on the differences between acquisitions,
mergers and joint ventures was extremely pertinent to this study. The study is
able to better address issues related to market and strategic choice amongst
integration strategies by understanding the similarities and differences between
these three strategies. The section also elaborated on advantages and
disadvantages of each of these three strategies.
Literature on different types of healthcare joint venture arrangements
provided a clearer understanding of the term „joint venture‟, the main variable in
the study. Understanding the various types of joint ventures helped the study in
two ways: 1) Defining the term „joint venture‟ and 2) Understanding the legal
facets and regulatory environment that surround these joint venture
arrangements.
Literature on the regulatory environment in which hospitals operate
indicated that federal and state regulations affect a hospitals decision to joint
venture. Certificate of need laws are especially crucial in assessing the strategic
decisions of hospitals. This is extremely relevant to this study as regulatory
factors are one of the most important independent constructs that this study
examines.
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The literature on the trends in hospital-physician relationships, and
examining motivators driving hospitals as well as physicians, indicated that
hospitals are increasingly involved in joint venture arrangements with ASCs. As
hospitals operate in a highly competitive market, the decision to joint venture
does include market factors such as market concentration measured by
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and other related market factors. Hospital-ASC joint
venture arrangements are also related to organizational factors such as size and
affiliation to a system, as well as operational factors such as the number of
outpatient surgical operations and occupancy rate. Since financial incentives are
one of the key considerations, hospitals decision to joint venture is also related to
financial factors such as cash flow margin and operating expense. Thus, it
supports the aim of this study.
The major concern that arises after this review of literature is that there is
no empirical multivariate study that assesses the relationship between market,
regulatory, organizational, operational and financial factors with the hospitals
decision to joint venture with ASCs. This study will contribute to the existing
literature by providing empirical insights into the factors affecting hospitals
decision to joint venture with ASCs.
The next chapter, Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework and
conceptual model for this study. The two theoretical perspectives used to form
the basis for this study are resource dependency theory and neo-institutional
theory. The framework, based on the combined insights of these two theories,
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helps develop the hypotheses for this study, and guides the directionality of the
hypotheses.

CHAPTER 3: MULTI-THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

A combined perspective of resource dependency theory (RDT) and neoinstitutional theory (NIT) is used to examine the main research questions in this
study. Both theories focus on an organization level of analysis. They are based
on a natural model - open systems theory. An open system theory suggests that
organizations (hospitals) engage in exchange relationships with the environment.
Hence there is dependence on the environment to acquire resources. Natural
open systems theory realizes that there is a human component to hospitals, and
attempts to take this factor into account. The natural systems perspective adds
components of interpersonal relationships and characteristics to the rational
systems perspective, making it somewhat more comprehensive in assessing how
hospitals really work.
Resource dependency theory emphasizes the importance of an uncertain
environment, resource scarcity and competition. On the other hand, Neoinstitutional theory lays emphasis on mimetic responses by organizations to
legitimize themselves to stakeholders under regulatory pressure. An integrated
approach of the two theories to investigate hospital joint ventures with ASCs
could potentially yield valuable insights. The above approach could also help to
test the strengths of these theories individually as well as determine their
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complementarities. By utilizing the integrated approach, the present study also
responds to the call by D‟Aunno and Zuckerman (1987), who asked that future
research combine different theoretical perspectives in order to contribute
meaningfully to the literature.
Resource Dependency Theory
Resource dependency theory posits that an organization‟s environment is
the source of scarce and valued resources necessary for survival (Alexander and
Morrisey 1989; Scott 2003). Organizations must interact with the environment to
obtain resources because an organization is not capable of generating all of its
needed resources. These resources can be either monetary or physical, in the
form of information or even one of gaining social legitimacy.
This study assesses the underlying reasons for hospitals to enter into joint
venture with ASCs. Hospitals want to acquire greater access to resources
(patients, physicians, financial resources) within their geographical market area.
According to resource dependency theory, the level of resource scarcity will
influence an organization to yield some of its autonomy or take other measures
to acquire the scarce resources through different bridging strategies. These may
include vertical and horizontal integration such as joint ventures, mergers and
acquisitions. This study evaluates whether hospitals and ASCs are giving up their
autonomy to enter into joint ventures with each other in order to exchange key
resources, i.e., patients and specialists. Thus, resource dependence theory is
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quite appropriate to study the indicators (both external and internal) that
characterize joint venture arrangements between hospitals and ASCs.
There have been many studies that have applied resource dependency
theory to the study of joint venture arrangements from as early as the 1990‟s. It
has been used to understand the strategic motivations for international alliance
formation (Glaister and Buckley 1996). Resource dependency theory has also
been applied to discuss the control and implementation of joint venture
relationships. This study focused on the strategic interdependence between the
joint venture and each parent organization as well as the environmental
uncertainty faced by the joint venture (Kumar and Seth 1998).
The resource based view has been used as the theoretical premise to
answer a number of questions. These are: a) examining the extent to which and
the means through which the collaborative process lead to reapportionment of
skills between partners in international alliances (Hamel 1991); b) examining why
firms form strategic alliances in the semiconductor industry (Eisenhardt and
Schoonhoven 1996); and c) formulating a model to translate the strengths of a
strategic alliance to knowledge that can improve a firm‟s performance (Simonin
1997). Other research questions addressed also include: a) examining the extent
to which technological change affects a firm‟s relationship with alliance partners
(Afuah 2000); b) discussing creation of firm linkages through collaboration in the
chemical industry (Ahuja 2000); c) determining whether firms learn to create
value alliances in the manufacturing sector (Anand and Khanna 2000); d)
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discerning the effect of resource complementarity, status similarity, and social
capital on alliance formation potential in the banking industry (Chung et al. 2000);
e) investigating the outcomes and duration of strategic alliances among
competing firms in the automotive, aerospace and telecommunications /
electronics industries (Dussauge et al. 2000); and f) researching partnerselection criteria important to firms from emerging and developed markets (Hitt et
al. 2000).
It is notable from the literature that most resource dependency theory
applications to examine joint venture arrangements have been in studies
investigating global alliances or the technology and manufacturing industries, and
not in the healthcare industry. Thus, there is a gap in literature concerning
resource dependency theory application to the study of hospital and physician
joint venture arrangements. This study is aimed at lessening this gap.
Another key tenet of the resource dependency theory which is especially
applicable to this study is its view on „organizational dependency‟. As per
resource dependency theory, organizational dependency does not necessarily
result in problems (D‟Aunno and Zuckerman 1987). Problems arise when the
environment is unstable, resources become scarce, external demands change,
and/or conflicting or multiple demands arise externally from the environment. The
healthcare environment is undergoing a lot of change with respect to regulatory
and technological changes.
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Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) have elaborated on three factors that
describe the level of environmental uncertainty, viz. resource munificence,
resource stability and resource complexity. Munificence refers to the availability
of resources or resource substitutions. Stability refers to the consistency of
resources in the environment and complexity refers to the complexity of
relationships an organization encounters to obtain resources. The current
healthcare environment is complex and poses constraints on resource
munificence and stability. Hospitals are operating in a complex environment
where they are forced to compete for limited resources (i.e., patients, revenue
and physicians). With physicians owning their own ASCs, hospitals face the
danger of losing their resources (physicians and patients) which threatens their
very survivability.
The resources that are relevant to understanding the complexity of
hospital joint ventures are organizational, operational and financial under market
and regulatory conditions. Just like under any other arrangement (be it JVs,
acquisitions, mergers or contract management, hospitals are seeking an
affiliation (i.e., joint ventures with physicians) to secure necessary resources.
Resources for hospitals include patients, physicians, capital and financial
resources, and favorable regulations. (Alexander and Morrisey 1989; McCue et
al. 2007). Market, organizational, operational and financial factors together
constitute the resource pool for an organization. The abundance or scarcity of the
above mentioned resource pool elicits a response strategy from organizations in
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a market (Pfeffer and Nowak 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Thus, in highly
competitive markets having limited specialists and more hospitals, this study
would expect a higher likelihood of hospitals entering into joint venture
arrangements with ASCs.
Neo-Institutional Theory
In addition to the factors discussed above, there are also other underlying
pressures that a hospital would feel in a competitive market. These pressures
can be explained using neo-institutional theory. D‟Aunno and Zuckerman (1987)
stressed the importance of integrating theoretical frameworks to fully understand
a context/scenario as opposed to using a single theory that only partially explains
a viewpoint. In this study, resource dependency theory and neo-institutional
theory are integrated to provide the framework for studying hospital joint venture
arrangements with ASCs. There have been studies that have utilized these two
theories together (Zinn et al. 1998; Barringer and Milkovich 1998; Sherer and Lee
2002). However, none of these studies that have used these two theories
complementarily have examined hospital-physician joint venture arrangements.
Neo-institutional theory is also an “open system” theory and is based on
Institutional theory. The institutional perspective of organizations was originally
developed by Meyer and Rowan (1977) and was further refined to develop a
neo-institutional approach by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). According to this
perspective, cognitive, regulative, and normative pressures constitute the

61

institutional environment. These pressures demonstrate levels of interactions
between environments and organizations (Scott 2003).
Cognitive Pressure
Cognitive pressure refers to the pressure felt by organizations (such as
hospitals) when they observe other similar organizations (hospitals) being
successful in the same market by following a new strategy (such as joint
venturing). This is an extremely common condition in hospitals operating in a
competitive healthcare market. Organizations tend to copy the behaviors and
structures of the most successful organizations in their sectors, because these
successful organizations are viewed as legitimate by stakeholders in the market.
This behavioral response is referred to as a “mimetic” mechanism as
organizations would like to be in tandem with culturally supported and
recognizable structures and behaviors (D‟Aunno and Zuckerman 1987).
When hospitals observe other hospitals entering into joint ventures with
ASCs in their market, they would tend to mimic their rivals‟ behavior and enter
into such an arrangement themselves. This would occur because of their belief
that the other hospitals that have entered into such arrangements are legitimate,
thereby gaining greater access to resources (physicians and patients) and
obtaining a competitive edge over other hospitals such as themselves. Hospitals
in competitive markets would not want other hospitals to gain a competitive edge
over them. Thus, this is an additional market factor that would influence a
hospital‟s decision whether to or not to joint venture with an ASC.
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Regulatory Pressure
Regulatory pressures such as legal requirements also have an effect on
organizations. Legal requirements are designed to force organizational
conformity as a condition for support and approval. Compliance leads to legal
acceptance and non-compliance leads to punishment (DiMaggio and Powell
1983; Scott 2003). One such regulatory pressure hospitals face is the process of
acquiring a Certificate of Need (CON). Essentially the CON regulations are
aimed at limiting healthcare expenditure by restraining health care facility costs.
CON provides for coordinated planning in the construction and expansion of new
hospital services or facilities.
Presence of CON regulations greatly impacts expansion strategies for
hospitals in various market areas. In environments such as these, presence of
fewer ASCs is expected as these regulations constrain the construction of new
service facilities and hence affect the level of competition. Presence of fewer
ASCs indicates less competition in comparison to markets where there are no
CON regulations. Neo-institutional theory complemented with resource
dependency theory state that joint venture arrangements are more likely in more
competitive environments.
Other regulatory pressures that hospitals face are the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) regulations and their mission. Not-for-profit (NFP) hospitals are
subject to different tax regulations than for-profit hospitals. The basic distinction
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between the two is that NFPs are expected to reinvest their profits back into the
hospital and provide more charity care consistent with their NFP status.
Most ASCs (90%) are for-profit entities (MedPac 2004). A joint venture
with a for-profit ASC can raise concerns regarding a non-profit hospital
maintaining its tax-exempt status. The IRS can revoke the tax-exempt status of a
NFP hospital if it deems that the hospital is behaving no different than a for-profit
hospital and is not guided by the mission of providing charitable care. This can
act as a regulatory barrier for NFPs to develop joint ventures with tax-paying, forprofit ASCs. NFPs may not want to enter into a joint venture because they do not
want to lose their tax-exempt status.
Neo-institutional theory suggests that violating the expectations may call
a hospital‟s legitimacy into question (D‟Aunno and Zuckerman 1987). Hence,
building on this theory, an NFP hospital might not enter into a joint venture with a
for-profit ASC.
Joint Venture Arrangements between Hospitals and ASCs
Prior literature suggests that both external environmental factors and
internal factors unique to hospitals influence physician-hospital alignment via joint
venture arrangements with ASCs (Lake et al. 2003; Berenson et al. 2007;
Casalino et al. 2008). These factors also constitute the boundaries that constrain
the strategic actions that can be pursued by a hospital in response to a changing
uncertain environment.
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External environmental factors relate to different market conditions and
regulatory factors where hospitals and physicians compete. Hospitals have
formed joint venture arrangements with physicians to own and operate ASCs in
markets with fewer competing hospitals that do not employ large numbers of
physicians (Berenson et al. 2007; Casalino et al. 2008). Hospitals have also
formed these ASC joint venture arrangements with physicians in markets where
they are losing service line revenues to competing free-standing ASCs.
Thus, a joint venture strategy allows hospitals to avoid losing an entire
revenue base of the service line by having a share in the revenues. As a result of
this arrangement, hospitals expect to retain a portion of the revenues they might
have otherwise lost and to increase physician referrals of patients requiring
inpatient hospital services (Casalino et al. 2008).
Among other external environmental reasons, regulatory factors could be
driving the pace of joint venturing arrangements with physicians. IRS regulation
on tax-exempt status ownership of non-profit hospitals may act as a barrier for
non-profit hospitals to develop such arrangements with tax-paying for-profit ASCs
(Berenson et al. 2007). Non-profit hospitals could potentially lose their non-profit
tax status if they joint venture with ASCs which are mostly for-profit entities. The
mission of for-profit hospitals, which are tax paying entities, is aligned with the
corporate tax paying entity status of physician owned ASCs and hence are less
constrained by IRS regulations.
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Another regulatory barrier is the certificate of need (CON) regulations in
some states which regulates the building of ASCs. ASCs are found to be
prevalent in markets without certificate of need regulations or with relaxed
certificate of need regulations (Devers et al. 2003; Casalino et al. 2008).
Stark III is another regulatory concern, the main purpose of which is to
curtail the monetary influence on healthcare decisions thus protecting patients
and federal healthcare programs from fraud and abuse (OIG 1999). After the
introduction of safe harbors in the Stark III in 1999 which includes ASCs (OIG
1999), avenues have opened up for hospitals to consider strategies such as joint
venturing arrangements with physician owned ASCs in order to supplement their
financial resources.
The recent revision of Stark III could very well have spurred the growth of
the JV arrangement. The revision has modified the previous exceptions to Stark
Laws of general prohibition on referrals and has thus revived the trend of
hospital-physician ventures (Jones 2004). Hospital-physician joint venture
arrangements have been increasing after these safe harbors were introduced
(Jones 2004).
In addition to these external environmental factors, internal factors related
to the management and mission of the hospitals may also be underlying motives
for the physician-hospital alignment via joint venture arrangements with ASCs.
These include the mix of services and procedures (such as gastroenterology,
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ophthalmology and orthopedics) offered by hospitals which may influence
hospitals‟ decision to joint venture with ASCs.
Also, in the case of those services that compete directly with some
specialized services provided by ASCs, hospitals‟ could be influenced to shift
the same from inpatient settings to outpatient settings to better align with
physicians via joint venture arrangements (Devers et al. 2003). The ability of
hospitals to market their services in order to gain access to new markets and
patients also influence their decision to joint venture with ASCs (Devers et al.
2003). In addition, this shift of delivering surgeries and procedures from an
inpatient hospital setting to ambulatory settings may help hospitals lower their
cost of care (Bian and Morrisey 2006).
Hospital management can also contribute to the operation of ASCs in
marketing and branding of services, scheduling patient flow and controlling
staffing levels, which can be viewed by hospitals as a selling point to physicians
with joint venture arrangements (Berenson et al. 2006; Berenson et al. 2007).
Finally, the availability of financial resources of hospitals may be another
underlying motive for such joint venturing arrangements. Hospitals that possess
the capital resources from generating positive cash flow, maintaining high levels
of liquidity and accessing external debt and equity capital are attractive to ASCs.
The latter need capital to purchase medical equipment and information systems
(EMR) as well as to build, expand and /or renovate ambulatory centers resulting
in greater market presence (Lake et al. 2003; Berenson et al. 2007; Taylor 2009).
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Conceptual Model
The conceptual model for this analysis is built on the premise of the
integrated framework of resource dependency theory and neo-institutional
theory. Thus, a joint venture with an ASC can be viewed as a function of all the
various factors that may affect the process to occur. Mathematically, a model can
be represented as follows:
JV = f (MKT, REG, ORG, OPR, FIN, CONT)

(Equation 1)

Where:
JV = those hospitals that joint venture with ASCs compared to those that did not
MKT = hospital market factors
REG = regulatory factors
ORG = hospital organizational factors
OPR = hospital operating factors
FIN = hospital financial factors
CONT = control factors
Depicted in Figure 5 is a graphical representation of the model in Equation
1. With regard to exploratory variables, under the main constructs of market,
regulatory, organizational, operational and financial factors, individual variables
are listed and their proposed directionality based on the theoretical framework
are shown.
The study also controls for complexity of service provided by the hospitals,
size of the market, the mission of a hospital and the time during which the

Market Factors:
1) Herfindahl-Hirschman
index (-)
2) Per capita income (+)
3) Unemployment rate (-)
4) Population size (+)
5) Number of specialists (-)
6) Number of ASCs (+)
7) % of elderly (-)
8) HMO concentration (+)
9) Number of other hospital
JVs with ASC in the same
county (+)

Regulatory Factor:
1) Certificate of need (-)
2) Not-for-profit ownership (-)

Hospital JV with
ASC

Control Factors:
1) Case-mix index
of hospitals
2) Teaching status
3) Public
4) County Size
5) Time

Organizational Factors:
1) Size (-)
2) Affiliation to a system (-)

Operating Factor:
1) Outpatient surgical
operations (-)
2) Occupancy rate (-)

Financial Factors:
1) Cash flow margin (-)
2) Days cash on hand (-)
3) Long term debt to total
capital (+)
4) Operating expense per
discharge (+)

Arrow sign

: Relationship is
tested in this Study

[(+): Higher, (-): Lower] the variable –
More Likely to Enter into a
JV with ASC

Figure 5: Conceptual Model: Relationship of Market Factors, Regulatory Factors, Organizational Factors,
Operational Factor and Financial Factors to Hospital Joint Venture Arrangements with Ambulatory Surgery
Centers.
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hospital entered in a joint venture arrangement with ASC. This study tests the
association of these factors to the main variable of interest (dependent variable)
i.e., a hospital joint venturing with an ASC using logistic regression.
Hypotheses
In this study, six hypotheses are tested to analyze the association of
market, regulatory, organizational, operational and financial factors to hospital
joint venture arrangements with ASCs.
Resource dependency theory conceptualizes an organization (hospital) as
a collection of productive resources bounded by an administrative framework.
This theory is based on the premise that organizations rationally adapt to
changes in the environment to ensure their survival. The survival of a hospital is
threatened if their relationship with key resource providing constituents (example
specialist groups) is diminishing.
Resource Dependence theory also postulates that organizations depend
on their resource environments but strive to acquire control over resources in
order to minimize their dependence on these resources. Joint venture
arrangements provide access to key resources (patients, physicians and
financial) as well as a level of control to hospitals and are therefore viewed as a
viable strategy to implement.
A key construct of resource dependency theory is competition. Scarce
resources and the need to share them with others results in a competitive
environment. This perspective posits that in highly competitive markets,
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cooperative exchange relationships between organizations are formed to secure
and stabilize resource flows (Scott 2003). In highly competitive environments,
organizations share a limited resource pool and survival depends on how
resources are allocated across competitors (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Ulrich
and Barney 1984). Thus, the first hypothesis is as follows:
H1a:

Keeping regulatory, organizational, operational and financial
factors constant, hospitals located in highly competitive
outpatient surgery markets (low Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
and more number of ASCs) are more likely to enter into joint
venture arrangements with ASCs than other hospitals.

Resource dependency theory suggests that organizations would opt for
different strategies under uncertain environmental conditions. This can minimize
negative effects of external environments and dependencies, thus increasing the
likelihood of organizational survival. One such strategy is forming strategic
alliances (Sheppard 1995; Currie 2000). The theory suggests that a joint venture
is a form of strategic alliance that a hospital would consider to help secure
resources (example patients). Therefore, organizations form interdependent
relationships to secure resources in unfavorable market conditions such as lack
of demand for services and inability to pay for services.
Based on prior literature, the community‟s financial ability to pay for
healthcare services can be measured by using per-capita income, unemployment
rate, and lower percentage of people aged over 65 as proxy measures (McCue

71

et al. 2000; Harrison 2002; Harrison et al. 2003).Also, total population is a
measure of market demand for health care services (McCue 2000; Harrison et al.
2003).
ASCs are traditionally owned by physicians (MedPac 2004). In order to
meet the demand in the environment, hospitals are dependent on physicians to
provide surgical services. Hence, supply of services depends on physicians. If
physicians own ASCs within the same market, then the hospitals‟ supply of
services would depend on strategic arrangements with the ASCs. This will
reduce environmental uncertainty and enhance access to patients for hospitals
based on the interdependence tenet of resource dependency theory and would
provide greater power to hospitals. Therefore, the following hypothesis can be
presented:
H1b:

Keeping regulatory, organizational, operational and financial
factors constant, hospitals located in markets with higher
demand (e.g., larger populations) and higher ability to pay
(e.g., lower percentage of elderly, low unemployment rate
and higher per capita income) are more likely to enter into
joint venture arrangements with ASCs than other hospitals.

The number of specialists available in a market is a crucial indicator of
supply in the market. The 2004 MedPac report indicates that ASCs are mostly
single specialty and owned by physicians/physician groups. If groups of
physicians together open an ASC in direct competition to a hospital and the
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market does not have many more specialists practicing in those specialties, it
could competitively handicap a hospital to provide those services.
A greater number of specialists in the market indicates a larger supply of
specialists in the market, which in turn, would lower the market power of
specialists/specialist groups and reduce the environmental uncertainty for the
hospital. The ASC literature shows that most of the ASCs are single one or two
specialty centers and the most common procedures/ surgeries performed in
ASCs relate to ophthalmology, gastroenterology or orthopedics specialty
(MedPac 2004; Bian and Morrisey 2006). These are the top three specialty
services offered by ASCs.
Physician specialists are viewed as key resources in the market since they
refer patients to hospitals. Given a fewer number of these key physician
specialists in the market; one would expect hospitals to consider a joint
arrangement with them in order to secure the service offerings. Since hospitals
perceive competition from specialists owning ASCs as the biggest threat (Lake et
al. 2003), the following can be hypothesized:
H1c:

Keeping regulatory, organizational, operational and financial
factors constant, hospitals located in markets with fewer
numbers of key specialists (gastroenterology, ophthalmology
and orthopedics) in the market are more likely to enter into
joint venture arrangements with ASCs than other hospitals.

73

One of the underlying motives for hospitals to joint venture is to strengthen
their ability to negotiate higher rates with health plans (Lake et al. 2003). The
literature suggests that hospitals and physicians have stronger negotiating
leverage with health plans if they are aligned together (Casalino et al. 2008).
Previous studies have used HMO penetration as a proxy measure for managed
care concentration in a market (Bian and Morrisey 2007). Thus, based on
literature evidence and the response of organizations to a competitive uncertain
environment, it can be hypothesized that:
H1d:

Keeping regulatory, organizational, operational and financial
factors constant, hospitals located in markets with a higher
HMO penetration are more likely to enter into joint venture
arrangements with ASCs than other hospitals.

One of the key tenets of neo-institutional theory is mimetic isomorphism.
Mimetic processes do not rely on concrete evidence that the newly adopted joint
venturing strategy will bear profitable results. Instead they focus on the normative
acceptance of such strategies by the stakeholders (McCue 2000). Hospitals will
tend to mimic the strategy adopted by other hospitals who appear to be early
adopters of presumed successful strategies (Walston et al. 2001). If more
hospitals in a market are entering into joint venture arrangements with ASCs,
other hospitals will also tend to do the same considering these hospitals to be
successful.
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The literature also suggests that the likelihood of the adoption of a
strategy is related to the previous number of similar adoptions in geographic
proximity, also referred to as „bandwagon pressures‟ that originate from
institutional forces (Katz and Shapiro 1985; Abrahamson and Rosenkoph 1993;
Walston et al. 2001). A greater number of existing joint ventures between
hospitals and ASCs in a market would put more institutional pressure on other
hospitals. Mimetic behavior has been attributed to the fear that competitors may
gain a competitive advantage through adoption (Abrahamson and Rosenkoph
1993; Westphal and Zajac 1998; Walston et al. 2001) of such a strategy. This
leads us to the next hypothesis which is as follows:
H2:

Keeping regulatory, organizational, operational and financial
factors constant, hospitals located in markets with higher
number of hospitals joint venturing with ASCs are more likely
to enter into joint venture arrangements with ASCs than
other hospitals.

Regulatory pressure is one of the three pillars of institutional environments
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Regulations (such as laws, rules, and sanctions)
require organizations to behave in a compliant way. Certificate of Need (CON) is
a regulatory process that healthcare organizations need to adhere to. Currently,
more than 34 states have regulations requiring CON. The supporters of these
regulations make an argument that healthcare is not a “typical” economic good
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and market forces do not play out the same way in healthcare as they do for
other goods (NCSL 2009).
Furthermore, most healthcare services (like diagnostic tests such as x-ray)
are ordered by physicians for patients and patients themselves do not shop for
these services contrary to other commodities. Thus, it follows that hospitals and
healthcare services are insensitive to market effects on price, and should require
a regulatory approach in the interest of the public (NCSL 2009).
In environments such as stated above, presence of fewer ASCs is
expected due to the presence of CON being an entry barrier. Presence of fewer
ASCs shows that those environments are less competitive than others where
there are more numbers of ASCs, which increases the level of competition.
Applying the reasoning of resource dependency theory to less competitive
markets, hospitals would prefer to maintain autonomy and remove
interdependency. Thus, the response of hospitals based on the regulatory
pressure as posited by neo-institutional theory and supplemented by resource
dependency theory suggests the following hypothesis:
H3a:

Keeping market, organizational, operational and financial
factors constant, hospitals located in states without CON
program are more likely to enter into joint venture
arrangements with ASCs than other hospitals.

The joint venture literature suggests that one of the key attributes
considered by organizations prior to joint venturing is similarity in culture and
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mission (Pelfrey and Theisen 1989; Alexander and Morrissey 1989; Snail and
Robinson 1998; Mark et al. 1998; Blaszyk and Hill-Mischel 2007). As most of the
Ambulatory Surgery Centers are for-profit (MedPac 2004), NFP hospitals fear the
loss of legitimacy and tax exempt status while considering joint venture
arrangements with them. This is due to the regulatory pressure applied by the
IRS on NFP entities that question joint venturing with other for-profit entities that
do not have the same charitable mission (Horwitz 2007). Thus, it is expected that
for-profit hospitals would be more likely to engage in such arrangements than
their NFP counterparts.
H3b:

Keeping market, organizational, operational and financial
factors constant, for-profit hospitals are more likely to enter
into joint venture arrangements with ASCs than non-profit
hospitals.

Resource dependency theory postulates that organizations depend on
their resource environments but also strive to acquire control over resources in
order to minimize their dependence on these resources. Therefore, hospitals will
try to be as independent as possible. Large hospitals have more resources,
which allow them to adapt their internal structures more rapidly to match
environmental demands (Greening and Gray 1994; Harrison 2006). Therefore,
large hospitals survive better in uncertain environments and have less incentive
to enter into any agreement with an external entity.
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Also, hospitals affiliated with a multi-hospital system have access to
additional system resources. This enables them to have greater power to
internally restructure and reorganize prior to considering external linkages such
as joint venture arrangements. Conversely, if hospitals are not affiliated to a
system, they do not have access to additional resources and hence would have
to consider external linkage strategies. This leads us to test the fifth hypothesis in
dual fashion which is as follows:
H4a:

Keeping market, regulatory, operational and financial factors
constant, smaller hospitals, (i.e., fewer hospital beds) are
more likely to enter into joint venture arrangements with
ASCs than other hospitals.

H4b:

Keeping market, regulatory, operational and financial factors
constant, free-standing hospitals are more likely to enter into
joint venture arrangements with ASCs than other hospitals.

Hospitals that are already in a joint venture arrangement have a higher
occupancy rate (Harrison 2006). Harrison‟s study also argues that hospitalphysician joint venture arrangements should improve efficiency. Since patient
volume is directly proportional to efficiency (Harrison 2006), it implies that lower
patient volumes are indicators of inefficiency in hospitals. Thus a hospital having
a lower occupancy rate will seek joint ventures with ASCs in order to become
more efficient and improve their occupancy.
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The literature also suggests that ASCs lower the cost of surgical care (in
comparison to hospitals) due to efficiency achieved from repeatedly performing a
narrow set of procedures over time (Herzlinger 2004) and that these ASCs draw
profitable surgeries and procedures away from the hospitals (Winter 2003),
thereby becoming a competitive threat to hospitals.
ASCs are also mostly single specialty (MedPac 2004) and are not
equipped to perform the procedures for patients with co-morbid conditions who
may require other specialty services as well during the surgeries. Therefore,
hospitals have not experienced a decline in the number of inpatient surgeries
because they perform surgery on high risk co-morbidity cases. In addition, the
literature shows that ASCs are substitutes to outpatient surgery performed in
hospitals (Bian and Morrisey 2006). Thus the following can be hypothesized:
H5a:

Keeping market, regulatory, organizational and financial
factors constant, hospitals with a lower occupancy rate are
more likely to enter into joint venture arrangements with
ASCs than other hospitals.

H5b:

Keeping market, regulatory, organizational and financial
factors constant, hospitals with fewer outpatient surgeries
are more likely to enter into joint venture arrangements with
ASCs than other hospitals.

Organizational change is likely in situations when hospitals are not
generating the financial resources necessary for their survival (Bazzoli and
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Cleverly 1994). Cash flow is considered to be a key resource to assess financial
survivability of an organization (McCue 2007; McCue et al. 2007). The literature
suggests that a higher level of cash or liquidity helps hospitals finance their
operations and helps fund the replacement of their plant and equipment (McCue
et al. 2000; Kim and McCue 2008). Lower cash flow margins and days‟ cash on
hand are indicators of poor financial performance of hospitals.
It follows that hospitals enter into joint ventures in order to improve their
financial performance (Oliver 1990; Harrison 2006; Blaszyk and Hill-Mischel
2007). Based on the theoretical premise of resource dependency theory,
hospitals would try to find ways to acquire access to financial resources,
specifically helping to generate cash flow and higher levels of liquidity which
would in turn support their operations. Therefore, the theoretical premise and
previous literature predict the following:
H6a:

Keeping market, regulatory, organizational and operational
factors constant, hospitals with poor financial performance
(e.g., lower cash flow margin and days cash on hand) are
more likely to enter into joint venture arrangements with
ASCs than other hospitals.

The financial literature also suggests that hospital‟s survival is critically
dependent on access to capital (Harrison 2002, Harrison et al. 2003). Based on
the tenets of resource dependency theory, hospital managers are proactive in
nature and will find ways to increase their resource domain in any possible
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manner while facing environmental change. A higher debt position indicates
limited debt capacity of a hospital. The literature also suggests that hospitals that
lack capital and have limited cash flow are unable to upgrade their technology
and eventually lose patients and face further decline in their financial resources
(Kirchheimer 2001; Harrison et al. 2003).
With innovations in healthcare technology occurring at a rapid pace, if
hospitals lack financial resources to upgrade through capital reserves, their
survival would be threatened. ASCs are emerging in the market as single
specialty state-of-the-art facilities. Joint venture arrangements with ASCs can
give hospitals instant access to facilities which they otherwise might not be able
to invest and access through their own capital reserves, which leads to the
study‟s final hypotheses:
H6b:

Keeping market, regulatory, organizational and operational
factors constant, hospitals with limited debt capacity are
more likely to enter into joint venture arrangements with
ASCs than other hospitals.
Summary of Chapter 3

This chapter reviewed and presented the theoretical premise and
empirical literature on hospital joint venture arrangements with ASCs. The key
tenets of the two theories (resource dependency theory and neo-institutional
theory), which form the basis for this study, were examined in this chapter. The
conceptual model presented in this chapter also graphically represented the
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research questions of the study. The study drew upon two natural model-open
system theories that guided the formulation of the six hypotheses to be tested.
The three precepts of resource dependency theory that were elaborated
upon were environment uncertainty, resource scarcity and competition. Based on
this theory, the following assumptions in the study were made. An organization‟s
environment is the source of scarce and valued resources necessary for its
survival. Thus, organizations must interact with the environment to obtain
resources because they are not capable of generating all of their needed
resources. The level of resource scarcity will influence an organization to give up
autonomy or take measures to acquire those resources through different bridging
strategies (vertical and horizontal integration) such as joint ventures, mergers
and acquisitions etc.
The other theory the study used to form the various hypotheses was neoinstitutional theory. The hypotheses related to the response of hospitals in
regulated markets with higher number of hospital-ASC joint ventures were
formed based on this theory. Drawing on this theory, this chapter examined the
cognitive and regulative pressures felt by the hospital and the need of the
hospital to remain legitimate.
The theory discussed above led to the understanding that organizations
tend to copy the behaviors and structures of the most successful organizations in
their sectors, because these successful organizations are viewed as legitimate
by stakeholders in the market. This mimetic behavior occurs because
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organizations like to be in tandem with culturally supported and recognizable
structures and behaviors.
Another application examined in this chapter that was based on neoinstitutional theory was the effect of regulatory pressures on hospitals response.
Organizations like to conform to regulations as they seek regulatory support and
approval, and want to avoid penalties faced due to non-compliance. As
compliance leads to legal acceptance and non-compliance leads to punishment
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 2003), mimetic responses of organizations to
legitimize themselves for their stakeholders is better understood.
The financial literature also provided insights for hospital response
scenarios to changing environmental conditions. A hospital‟s survival is critically
dependent on access to capital. Based on the theoretical premise, it was
suggested that hospital managers are proactive in nature and will find ways to
increase their resource domain in any possible manner while facing
environmental change. A higher debt position indicates limited debt capacity of a
hospital. With innovations in healthcare technology occurring at a rapid pace, if
hospitals lack financial resources to upgrade through capital reserves, their
survival will be threatened. Joint venture arrangements with ASCs would give
hospitals instant access to resources to ensure survival.
This chapter presented the following hypotheses to address the
relationship between hospitals‟ decision to joint venture with ASC and their
market, regulatory, organizational, operational and financial characteristics.
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H1a:

Keeping regulatory, organizational, operational and financial
factors constant, hospitals located in highly competitive
outpatient surgery markets (low Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
and more number of ASCs) are more likely to enter into joint
venture arrangements with ASCs than other hospitals.

H1b:

Keeping regulatory, organizational, operational and financial
factors constant, hospitals located in markets with higher
demand (e.g., larger populations) and higher ability to pay
(e.g., lower percentage of elderly, low unemployment rate
and higher per capita income) are more likely to enter into
joint venture arrangements with ASCs than other hospitals.

H1c:

Keeping regulatory, organizational, operational and financial
factors constant, hospitals located in markets with fewer
numbers of key specialists (gastroenterology, ophthalmology
and orthopedics) in the market are more likely to enter into
joint venture arrangements with ASCs than other hospitals.

H1d:

Keeping regulatory, organizational, operational and financial
factors constant, hospitals located in markets with a higher
HMO penetration are more likely to enter into joint venture
arrangements with ASCs than other hospitals.

H2:

Keeping regulatory, organizational, operational and financial
factors constant, hospitals located in markets with higher
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number of hospitals joint venturing with ASCs are more likely
to enter into joint venture arrangements with ASCs than
other hospitals.
H3a:

Keeping market, organizational, operational and financial
factors constant, hospitals located in states without CON
program are more likely to enter into joint venture
arrangements with ASCs than other hospitals.

H3b:

Keeping market, organizational, operational and financial
factors constant, for-profit hospitals are more likely to enter
into joint venture arrangements with ASCs than non-profit
hospitals.

H4a:

Keeping market, regulatory, operational and financial factors
constant, smaller hospitals are more likely to enter into joint
venture arrangements with ASCs than other hospitals.

H4b:

Keeping market, regulatory, operational and financial factors
constant, free-standing hospitals are more likely to enter into
joint venture arrangements with ASCs than other hospitals.

H5a:

Keeping market, regulatory, organizational and financial
factors constant, hospitals with a lower occupancy rate are
more likely to enter into joint venture arrangements with
ASCs than other hospitals.
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H5b:

Keeping market, regulatory, organizational and financial
factors constant, hospitals with fewer outpatient surgeries
are more likely to enter into joint venture arrangements with
ASCs than other hospitals.

H6a:

Keeping market, regulatory, organizational and operational
factors constant, hospitals with poor financial performance
(e.g., lower cash flow margin and days cash on hand) are
more likely to enter into joint venture arrangements with
ASCs than other hospitals.

H6b:

Keeping market, regulatory, organizational and operational
factors constant, hospitals with limited debt capacity are
more likely to enter into joint venture arrangements with
ASCs than other hospitals.

The next chapter presents the methodology for the study, the research
design, the data description including the dependent and independent variables,
and the analysis description used to test the study hypotheses. Chapter 5
presents the results of the analysis. Chapter 6 discusses the findings and
presents their implications. The concluding chapter also states and elaborates on
the limitations of the present study.

CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents the research design, data sources and data used in
the study. In addition, measurements of dependent and independent variables
are discussed in this chapter. Sources of data for each variable are also
presented. Finally, this chapter also describes the statistical procedures for
model estimation and method used to test the proposed hypotheses.
Research Design
This study used a cross sectional design to examine hospitals that entered
in a joint venture arrangement with ASCs in 2006 and 2007, which reflects the
latest available data. This study analyzed the relationship between hospitals
decision to joint venture with ASCs and related factors (according to the literature
and theoretical premise).
Study Population Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria
The unit of analysis in this study is the hospital. Nonfederal acute care
hospitals in the United States in 2005, 2006 and 2007 constitute the study
population. Federal government hospitals (i.e., Veterans Administration and
Department of Defense) are excluded from the study population. Also, specialty
hospitals such as psychiatric hospitals are excluded from this study. Remaining
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hospitals formed the study population. Hospitals are examined instead of multihospital systems because previous studies have shown that single hospitals
serve a single geographic market and are exposed to local market conditions and
competition (McCue et al. 2007). This study aimed to assess the underlying
reasons that drive a hospital‟s decision to joint venture with an ASC in a given
market. Considering single hospitals instead of systems allowed for more
accurate assessment because hospital‟s presence is limited to a particular
market whereas a systems‟ presence could span many markets.
Within the study population, hospitals that entered into a joint venture
arrangement with ASCs constituted the study group. Hospitals that did not have
a joint venture arrangement with ASCs in 2005 but entered into such an
arrangement in 2006 formed the 2006 sample cases. Similarly, hospitals that did
not have a joint venture arrangement with ASCs in 2006 but entered into such an
arrangement in 2007 formed the 2007 sample cases. For each of these two
samples, comparison groups of randomly selected hospitals were constituted.
Hospitals that did not enter into joint venture arrangements in 2006 or 2007 (the
same time period as study sample) formed the comparison study population for
this research.
Analysis Design
The analysis of this study was conducted in three parts: analysis of 2006
new hospital-ASC joint ventures, analysis of 2007 new hospital-ASC joint
ventures and analysis of the combined pool of all new hospital-ASC joint
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ventures during 2006 and 2007. The analysis designs for all three parts are
presented in the following sections.
The first part of the analysis was a cross-sectional study of the 2006
cases. In this analysis, logistic regression was used to determine the market,
regulatory, organizational, operational and financial factors related to hospitals
decision to joint venture with ASCs. In order to assess the causal association of
these factors to the joint venture decision, all the independent variables were
lagged one year. The following expression was used to test the causal
relationship:
JV2006= f (MKT2005, REG2005, ORG2005, OPR2005, FIN2005, CONT2005)
In this part of the analysis, the following definitions applied: joint ventures
(JV2006) were defined as hospitals that entered into joint venture arrangements
with ASCs in the year 2006. The market (MKT) factors were: HerfindahlHirschman index (HHI), per capita income, unemployment rate, population size,
number of specialists in the market, percentage of elderly, HMO concentration
and the number of other hospital joint ventures with ASCs in the same market.
The regulatory (REG) factors were: certificate of need and ownership status (forprofit, not-for-profit). The organizational (ORG) factors were: organizational size
and affiliation to a system. Operational (OPR) factors included: number of
outpatient surgical surgeries and occupancy rate. Financial (FIN) factors included
were: cash flow margin, cash on hand, long term debt to total capital, and
operating expense per discharge.
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The number of hospitals that entered into joint ventures in 2006 as
reported by American Hospital Association was 97. Various factors of these
facilities were analyzed to understand the driving forces behind hospitals
decision to joint venture with ASCs. Inferences for significance and directionality
of effect were drawn from the coefficients of the explanatory variables on the
hospitals‟ decision to joint venture with ASCs. The comparison sample (sample
of hospitals that did not enter into joint ventures with ASCs in 2006) provided a
baseline for this interpretation. The statistical analysis addressed all the
hypotheses proposed in Chapter 3. The results of the analysis are presented in
Chapter 5.
The second part of the analysis was a cross-sectional study of the 2007
cases. Similar to the first part, this analysis also used logistic regression to
determine the market, regulatory, organizational, operational and financial factors
related to hospitals decision to joint venture with ASCs. In order to assess the
causal association of these factors to the joint venture decision, all the
independent variables were lagged one year. The following expression was used
to test the causal relationship:
JV2007= f (MKT2006, REG2006, ORG2006, OPR2006, FIN2006, CONT2006)
In this part of the analysis, the following definitions applied: joint ventures
(JV2007) were defined as hospitals that entered into joint venture arrangements
with ASCs in the year 2007. The market (MKT) factors were: HerfindahlHirschman index (HHI), per capita income, unemployment rate, population size,
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number of specialists in the market, percentage of elderly, HMO concentration
and the number of other hospital joint ventures with ASCs in the same market.
The regulatory (REG) factors were: certificate of need and ownership status (forprofit, not-for-profit). The organizational (ORG) factors were: organizational size
and affiliation to a system. Operational (OPR) factors included: number of
outpatient surgical surgeries and occupancy rate. Financial (FIN) factors included
were: cash flow margin, cash on hand, long term debt to total capital, and
operating expense per discharge.
The number of hospitals that entered into joint ventures in 2007 as
reported by American Hospital Association was 73. The above mentioned factors
of these facilities were analyzed to understand the driving forces behind
hospitals‟ decision to joint venture with ASCs. Inferences for significance and
directionality of effect were drawn from the coefficients of the explanatory
variables on the hospitals‟ decision to joint venture with ASCs. The comparison
sample (sample of hospitals that did not enter into joint ventures with ASCs in
2007) provided a baseline for this interpretation. As before, the statistical tests
addressed all the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 3. The results of this analysis
are also presented in Chapter 5.
The last part of the analysis was a cross-sectional study of the pooled
sample of 2006 and 2007 cases. Similar to previous two parts, in this analysis
also, logistic regression was used to determine the market, regulatory,
organizational, operational and financial factors related to hospitals decision to
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joint venture with ASCs. In order to assess the causal association of these
factors to the joint venture decision, all the independent variables were lagged
one year from their dependent variable year respectively. The following
expression was used to test the causal relationship:
JV2006&2007= f (MKT2005&2006, REG2005&2006, ORG2005&2006, OPR2005&2006,
FIN2005&2006, CONT2005&2006)
As before, in this part of the analysis, the following definitions applied: joint
ventures (JV2006&2007) were defined as hospitals that entered into joint venture
arrangements with ASCs in the years 2006 and 2007. The market (MKT) factors
were: Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), per capita income, unemployment rate,
population size, number of specialists in the market, percentage of elderly, HMO
concentration and the number of other hospital joint ventures with ASCs in the
same market. The regulatory (REG) factors were: certificate of need and
ownership status (for-profit, not-for-profit). The organizational (ORG) factors
were: organizational size and affiliation to a system. Operational (OPR) factors
included: number of outpatient surgical surgeries and occupancy rate. Financial
(FIN) factors included were: cash flow margin, cash on hand, long term debt to
total capital, and operating expense per discharge.
The number of hospitals that entered into joint ventures in 2006 and 2007
as reported by American Hospital Association was 170. Various factors of these
facilities were analyzed to understand the driving forces behind hospitals‟
decision to joint venture with ASCs. Inferences for significance and directionality
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of effect were drawn from the coefficients of the explanatory variables on the
hospitals‟ decision to joint venture with ASCs. The comparison sample (sample
of hospitals that did not enter into joint ventures with ASCs in 2006 and 2007)
provided a baseline for this interpretation. As in the previous two parts, the
statistical analysis addressed all the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 3. The
results of this analysis, in addition to the previous two parts, are presented in
Chapter 5.
Data Sources and Sampling Process
The data for this study was drawn from five main sources. Depending on
the type of study variable, the five sources from which the variables were drawn
are: the American Hospitals Association Annual Survey of Hospitals (AHA), the
Area Resource Files (ARF), the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) minimum cost dataset, previously known as HCFA minimum cost data
files (HCFA), the National Council for State Legislatures website (NCSL) and
CMS case-mix index (CM). Specifically, the data elements were from the
following data sources:
AHA Annual Survey of Hospitals datasets: 2005, 2006 and 2007
Area Resource Files (ARF) datasets: 2005 and 2006
HCFA minimum cost datasets: 2005 and 2006
NCSL file on state CON laws: 2008 (Assuming CON laws with regard to
ASCs remained unchanged during the period 2005-2007).
CMS case-mix index (CM): 2005 and 2006.
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American Hospital Association Annual Survey of hospitals (AHA)
provides extensive organizational data including whether a hospital is in a joint
venture with an ASC. The main dependent variable (hospital-ASC JV) of the
study was identified with the help of this dataset. AHA datasets are a national
survey of detailed information on all US hospitals. Data from all hospitals are
collected annually. In the healthcare literature, there have been many studies
that have extensively used AHA data to study the impact of organizational factors
of hospitals in various empirical studies (Alexander and Morrisey 1988;
Alexander and Morrisey 1989; McCue 1991; Harrison 2002) and joint venture
studies (Harrison 2006). This study used the 2005, 2006 and 2007 datasets of
the AHA survey. The dependent variables (JVs) were drawn from 2006 and 2007
dataset and the corresponding independent variables (i.e., ownership status,
hospital size, affiliation to a system, total outpatient surgical visits, and
occupancy rate) were drawn from 2005 and 2006 datasets respectively.
Area Resource File (ARF) provides extensive county level information on
market characteristics, demographics, economic activity, resource scarcity and
other measures of the hospital environment. The Bureau of Health Professions
from the US department of Health and Human Services compiles the data. Data
from these files have been extensively used in numerous other studies that
examined market characteristics (McCue 1991; Burns et al 2000; McCue 2000;
McCue et al 2000; Harrison 2002). Many studies examining hospital-physician
integration strategies such as acquisitions, mergers and joint ventures, have also
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used this data (Alexander and Morrisey 1988; Alexander and Morrisey 1989;
Harrison 2002; Harrison 2006). In this study, we used 2005 and 2006 files from
this data repository. Some key independent variables extracted from this dataset
for this study were: MSA size, HMO penetration, percentage of elderly, number
of specialists, population size, unemployment rate in the county and per capita
income.
The CMS (Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services) minimum dataset
provides information on hospital financials. For hospitals that receive Medicare
reimbursements, it is mandatory to submit financial information annually to CMS.
These minimum cost datasets are the most comprehensive data sets available
for US hospitals that serve Medicare patients. This study uses the 2005 and
2006 datasets, for all hospitals that had a service code 10 representing nonfederal acute care hospitals. The independent variables of interest formed from
the data elements drawn from these datasets for this study were: cash flow
margin, cash on hand, long-term debt to total capital, and operating expense per
discharge. Since these data files provide comprehensive information on financial
performance, hospital utilization and operational efficiency, and are comparable
across all the hospitals in the industry, they have been repeatedly used in
hospital studies (Bazzoli and Cleverly 1994; Clement et al. 1997; McCue 2000;
McCue et al. 2000; Harrison 2002).
The data on CON was obtained from the National Council for State
Legislature (NCSL) Website. NCSL is a bipartisan organization that provides
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research and technical assistance to the legislators and staffs of all 50 states, its
commonwealth and territories of the US. NCSL was formed in order to promote
policy innovation and communication among state legislatures, improve their
quality and effectiveness and also ensure that they are a strong, unified
representation in the federal system. In this study, one key independent variable
was Certificate of Need laws. It was included as a binary variable (presence or
absence of these laws in different states) derived from NCSL source. Review of
literature has indicated that these laws could be an important indicator of the
number of facilities in a market (Casalino et al. 2003, Bian and Morrisey 2006;
Bian and Morrisey 2007) and thus, can affect the competition in the health care
market.
Lastly, the data for case-mix index (CMI) is obtained from the CM casemix files for 2005 and 2006. The CMI depicts the mean diagnosis-related group
(DRG) relative weight for a hospital. CMS calculates it by summing the DRG
weights for all Medicare discharges and dividing by the number of discharges.
Thus, it is a measure of the average acuity of illness of patients treated by a
healthcare organization. In order to understand a hospitals decision to engage in
a joint venture arrangements with an ASC, it is necessary to correctly assess the
hospitals patient base vis-à-vis other hospitals. Thus, inclusion of CMI in the
model was crucial to drawing insightful interpretations.
In order to avoid problems in estimation efficiency, instead of comparing
the study sample to the remaining group of 5,500 non-federal acute care
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hospitals, a random sample of non-federal acute care hospitals were chosen as
comparison group that did not joint venture with ASCs. Using this choice
sampling strategy, for each hospital in the study sample for the study year
(hospitals entering into joint venture arrangements with ASCs), three hospitals
that did not joint venture with ASCs from the same study period were chosen to
constitute the comparison group. This sampling technique has been previously
used in hospital-physician integration literature (Alexander and Morrisey 1988;
Harrison 2002).
In 2006, 97 hospitals entered into joint venture arrangements with ASCs.
For this part of the analysis, a random sample of 291 non-federal acute care
hospitals that did not enter into joint venture arrangements constituted the
comparison group. As 73 hospitals entered into joint venture arrangements in
2007, the 2007 comparison group of hospitals that did not enter into joint venture
arrangements with ASCs based on a random choice sample of three times the
number of hospitals in the study sample were 219. For the pooled study sample
of 170 from the 2005 and 2006 study periods, the comparison group of hospitals
that did not enter into joint venture arrangements with ASCs based on a random
choice sample of three times the number of hospitals in the study sample
amounted to 510.
The organizational, operational and financial factors in this study are
analyzed at a hospital level. The market factors are analyzed at a county level
and the regulatory factor is analyzed at a state level. The dependent variable is
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the hospital‟s decision to enter/not enter into a joint venture arrangement in 2006
and in 2007. The independent variables for the cases are from the years prior to
their decision of entering/not entering into a joint venture with ASCs. For
example, independent variables for hospitals that entered into joint venture
arrangements with ASCs in 2006 came from 2005 and for those that entered into
joint venture arrangements in 2007 came from 2006.
Measurement of Dependent Variables
Harrison (2002) defined a dependent variable as a choice variable that an
event will occur and independent variables as contributors to that choice. The
focus of this study is to identify the various factors related to the decision of
hospitals to joint venture with ASCs. In order to achieve this objective,
independent variables were selected based on the review of literature and
theoretical premise from previously mentioned data sources. The dependent
variable in this study was the hospital‟s decision to joint venture with ASCs
(binary: yes or no) and was obtained from the AHA database. The following
section presents the underlying reasoning behind variable selection in this study.
There are many studies that have examined integration strategies such as
mergers and acquisitions in the healthcare industry (Levitz and Brooke 1985;
McCue and Furst 1986; Alexander and Morrisey 1988; Connor et al. 1997;
Krishnan 2001; Yafchak 2000; Harrison 2002; Harrison et a.l 2003), and joint
venture arrangements (Pelfrey and Theisen 1989; Blair et al. 1990; Mitchell and
Sunshine 1992; Harrison 2006; DiGiaimo 2009). These studies explored many
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issues pertaining to hospital-physician integrations including the relative benefits
and risks associated with each of these strategies. These issues ranged from
discussing the impact of market changes, economies of scale and scope, effect
of strategies on organizational control, operational performance and financial
implications. Based on these studies and the theoretical premise discussed in
Chapter 3, the explanatory variables for this study were chosen. A brief
description of the constructs, variables, measures and data sources are
presented in Table 4.
Table 4: Constructs, Variables, Measures and Source
Construct
Variable
Dependent Variable
JV
Hospital JV with ASCs
Independent Variables
MKT
Herfindahl-Hirschman
index

MKT
MKT

Per capita income
Unemployment rate

MKT

Population size

MKT

ASC Specialists per
1000

MKT

Percentage of elderly

MKT
MKT

HMO penetration
Number of hospitals in
JV with an ASC

Measure

Source

1, if JV; 0 otherwise

AHA

Sum of squares of the market
as a percentage of the
hospitals operating in the
county.
Per capita income in the county
Unemployment rate in the
county
Log of county population per
100,000
Sum of specialists for
ophthalmology,
gastroenterology and
orthopedics per 1000 in the
county
Population age 65 and above
per total population in the
county
HMO penetration in the county
Total of hospitals with joint
venture arrangement with ASC
in the county in the prior year

AHA

ARF
ARF
ARF
ARF

ARF

ARF
AHA
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Construct
Variable
MKT
Number of ASCs
REG
Certificate of need
REG

Ownership status

ORG
ORG

Size
Affiliation to a system

OPR
OPR

Total outpatient
surgical visits
Occupancy rate

FIN

Cash flow margin

FIN

Days cash on hand

FIN

CONT
CONT

Long-term debt to
total capital
Operating expense
per adjusted discharge
Case-Mix index
Teaching status

CONT

Public

CONT

Large county

CONT

Time

FIN

Measure
Number of ASCs in the county
1, if present in state; 0
otherwise
1, if hospital is for-profit; 0
otherwise
Number of staffed beds
1, if hospital is affiliated with a
multi-hospital system; 0
otherwise
Total number of outpatient
surgical visits
Total number of inpatient days
divided by the beds in service.
(Net income + depreciation
expense + interest
expense)/(Net patient revenue
+ other income)
(Cash + short and long term
investments)/[(Total operating
expenses –depreciation)/365]
Long-term debt /Total capital

Source
ARF
NCSL

Operating expenses/ Adjusted
discharge
Medicare case-mix index
1, if hospital is affiliated to
Council of Teaching Hospitals;
0 otherwise
1, if hospital is public; 0
otherwise
1, if hospital is located in
county greater than 1 million; 0
otherwise
1, if in 2007; 0 if in 2006

CMS

Notes:
AHA = American Hospital Association Files;
CMS = Center of Medicare and Medicaid Minimum Data Set;
ARF = Area Resource File;
NCSL = National Conference of State Legislatures;
CM = HCFA (Health Care Financing Administration Files) Case-Mix Files

AHA
AHA
AHA

AHA
AHA
CMS

CMS

CMS

CM
AHA

CMS
ARF

AHA
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Measurement of Independent Variables
Independent variables are explanatory variables that contribute towards
prediction of the response or the dependent variable. All independent variables
are lagged by a year in order to account for potential lagged market responses
and reverse causality. The independent variables of this study are classified
under six main factors: market, regulatory, organizational, operational, financial,
and control factors. As previously mentioned, Table 4 describes how each of
these variables is measured as well as the sources for the data.
Market Factors
The market construct examines the demand for healthcare services and
supply of services in the environment. Factors related to this construct are
measured at the county level. Previous studies have validated the use of county
to define market areas (Alexander and Morrisey 1988; Harrison 2002; Harrison et
al 2003). Factors constituting the market construct that were examined in this
study included Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, per capita income, unemployment
rate, population size, number of specialists, number of ASCs, % of elderly, HMO
concentration and number of other hospital joint ventures with ASCs in the same
county.
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is a measure of market concentration
and is calculated by squaring the market share (measures as a percentage of the
providers operating in the market) of each provider in the market. Higher HHI
indicates more concentrated markets. This index has been extensively used in
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healthcare literature (Alexander and Morrisey 1988; Clement et al. 1997;
Krishnan 2001; Harrison 2002). As this index allows estimation of local hospital
market concentration, it helps estimate the influence a hospital has over its
environment. For example, a hospital having a small market share and operating
in a highly concentrated market has little control over its environment. Healthcare
literature suggests that hospital-physician integration strategies are more
common in markets with low concentration (Connor et al. 1997; Burns et al.
2000; Harrison 2002; Harrison et al. 2003). As reviewed in Chapter 2, hospitalphysician integration strategies such as joint venture arrangements creating
substantial increase in market share (measured by HHI) could result in violations
of the federal and state regulations and raise anti-trust concerns (Harrison 2002).
Per capita income measures the economic soundness of the community.
If the per capita income of residents in a county is high, it reflects that individuals
staying in the county have well paying jobs and are economically sound. It
follows that individuals capable of paying would demand more hospital services
resulting in increased profitability for hospitals. Greater ability to pay, lower
uncompensated care and increased health insurance coverage has a positive
impact on hospital profitability. However, to provide healthcare services, hospitals
need physicians. ASCs are traditionally owned by physicians (MedPac 2004).
With increasing number of physicians/physician groups opening ASCs, it follows
that in these markets, hospitals are more likely to enter into joint venture
arrangements with ASCs.
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Unemployment rate has also been used as a measure of a markets
financial ability to pay for healthcare services (MCCue et al. 2000, Harrison
2002). Higher unemployment rate in a market reflects lower ability to purchase
health insurance. This in turn results in lower demand and ability to pay for
healthcare services. Higher the demand for services, higher is the likelihood that
hospitals enter into joint venture arrangements with ASCs. Thus, lower
unemployment rate increases the probability of hospitals deciding to joint venture
with ASCs. Percentage of elderly is also indicative of paying capacity in the
market. Higher percentage of elderly and decreasing Medicare reimbursement
rates create financial distress for hospitals (Bazzoli 1995; Harrison 2002) and
indicate less commercial patient pool for the hospital. Less commercial patient
population indicates lesser demand and thus lesser likelihood of a joint venture
between hospitals and ASCs in those counties.
Population size is a measure of market demand (McCue 2000; Harrison et
al. 2003). Larger population size reflects higher demand for services and higher
demand can be met by hospitals only if they have the human resources
(physicians) to provide the services. Thus, larger population size pressures
hospital to consider joint venture arrangements with ASCs in order to maintain
collaborative relationship with key physicians in the market, failing which a
hospital would face the threat of not being able to meet the demand.
The MedPac report indicates that the emergence and growth of ASCs is
not similar across specialties. Studies have shown that the top three specialties
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that have the most frequently performed procedures / surgeries are
ophthalmology, gastroenterology and orthopedics in a national sample of 750
Medicare-certified ASCs (MedPac 2004; Bian and Morrisey 2007). The specialist
index (a proxy indicator for physician supply in the context of competition) is
calculated for this study by taking the total number of specialists available in the
market for these three specialties per 1000 population. Since currently, there is
no information available on procedure volumes or specific specialties of ASCs
(Bian and Morrisey 2007); this proxy measure, in addition to the number of ASCs
in a market, is assumed to be the best supply indicator for physicians in a
market.
HMO penetration is a measure of managed care in a market. It is
calculated by dividing the total HMO enrollment in the county by the total
population (Bureau of Census 2005; Bureau of Census 2006). HMO penetration
has been used extensively in hospital literature, to better represent market
construct (Burns et al. 2000; Harrison 2002; Harrison et al. 2003).
Prior years‟ number of hospitals joint ventures with hospitals is taken as a
measure for successful joint ventures within the market. Using a lagged variable
as a measure to study the mimetic response of hospitals to institutional
pressures (based on neo-institutional theory) has been well documented in the
literature (Walston et al. 2001). Greater number of joint ventures in a market
indicate greater acceptance of such strategies which help legitimize such
arrangements in the eyes of the stakeholders.
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Regulatory Factors
The two regulatory factors that examine the regulatory construct in this
study are the presence or absence of a CON program in states where these joint
ventures are occurring and the ownership status of the hospitals entering into
joint ventures with ASCs. Both factors together represent the impact of state and
federal regulations on strategic decisions considered by hospitals.
As discussed in chapter 2, certificate of need laws (CON) are state
mandated laws that allow/disallow expansion of facilities or procedures. 36 of the
50 states in US have some form of CON laws (NCSL). The presence of CON
laws in a state makes it difficult for hospitals to consider expansion strategies
such as joint venture arrangements with ASCs. In this study, CON is measured
as a binary variable. The presence of CON laws in a state is denoted by the
value 1 and absence by 0.
Ownership of hospitals entering into joint venture arrangements with ASCs
also sometimes brings forth regulatory concerns. For-profit hospitals are subject
to different tax laws than not-for-profit hospitals. Not-for-profit hospitals could lose
their tax exempt status if they decided to joint venture with ASCs. In this study,
ownership status is also measured as a binary variable. A value of 1 denoted forprofit status and 0 denoted not-for-profit status of hospitals.
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Organizational Factors
The organizational factors that measure the organizational construct in
this study include size (measured by staffed beds), and affiliation to a system.
The factorsare measured at the individual hospital level.
Hospital size is an indicator of hospital capacity to provide services.
Literature suggests that larger hospitals are better able to adapt to environmental
uncertainty and are less likely to engage in external relationships to acquire more
resources (Alexander and Morrisey 1989; Harrison 2002). According to resource
dependency theory, hospitals would prefer autonomy to external linkages and
loss of control in a stable market. However, in a competitive and uncertain
environment, the theory suggests that hospitals would prefer to engage in
external relationships rather than risk their survival. In this study, number of
staffed beds has been used to measure hospital size. This measure has been
used in earlier studies involving organizational factors (Alexander and Morrisey
1989; Clement et al. 1997; Harrison 2002; Harrison et al. 2003). This measure is
also positively related to expenses, revenue and cash flow of hospitals (Clement
et al. 1997). Larger hospitals (higher number of staffed beds) are better able to
deal with environmental uncertainty (as per theory) and unfavorable financial
performance than smaller hospitals. Thus, the study hypothesizes that smaller
independent hospitals are more likely to joint venture with ASCs than other
hospitals.
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Another organizational factor that is extremely important in a limited
resource competitive environment is affiliation of a hospital to a system. Affiliation
to a system provides hospitals access to additional system resources. Also, it
enables them to have greater power to internally restructure and reorganize prior
to considering external relationships such as joint venture arrangements. This
rationale is based on the premise of resource dependency theory (as explained
earlier) as well as evidence from the literature. In this study, affiliation to a system
was measured as a binary variable where a value of 1 depicted hospitals that
were affiliated with a multi-hospital system and a value of 0 depicted hospitals
that were not affiliated with a multi-hospital system.
Operational Factors
Operational performance reflects a hospitals ability to survive in a
competitive market. Factors that measured operating performance construct in
this study included total number of outpatient surgeries performed in hospitals
and occupancy rate. These two operating factors were measured at the
individual hospital level.
There have been studies that indicate that ASCs are a direct competition
for hospital outpatient surgeries (Winter 2003, Bian and Morrisey 2006) as they
draw profitable outpatient surgeries away from hospitals. This results in a
decrease in revenue for hospitals. Literature and industry analysts suggest that
hospitals consider joint venture arrangements with ASCs in order to retain a
portion of the revenue instead of potentially losing the entire outpatient surgical
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revenue to ASCs by doing nothing (Devers et al. 2003; Bernick 2005; Taparia
2010).
Another operational factor in this study is the hospital occupancy rate. This
factor is measured by dividing the total number of inpatient days by the beds in
service (Deloitte and Touche 1997; Yafchak 2000; Harrison 2002; Harrison et al.
2003). This factor assesses how well a hospital is able to secure resources
(patients) from the market (McCue et al. 2007). Literature indicates that with
increase in proportion of outpatient services vis-à-vis inpatient services, there is a
decrease in hospital occupancy rate (Yafchak 2000; Harrison 2002). AHA 2010
chartbook shows that the ratio of hospital outpatient surgeries to inpatient
surgeries has been steadily increasing. It follows that hospitals that have a low
occupancy rate would have lesser influence over the market and would face a
greater threat to their survival. Thus, based on resource dependency theory,
hospitals with low occupancy rate would be more likely to consider joint venture
arrangements with ASCs.
Financial Factors
Factors that measured the financial construct in this study included: cash
flow margin, cash on hand, long term debt to total capital and operating expense
per discharge. Joint venture literature suggests that financially poor performing
hospitals would more likely want to enter into joint ventures than better
performing hospitals. A study by Boettiger and Young (2004) elaborated on the
benefits of joint venture arrangements. These included spreading the costs
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across the joint venture entities and thus lowering upfront cash investments.
Further, other benefits that were also elaborated included access to state-of-theart technology, increased expertise in a service line (especially in the case of
ASCs), better work environment, improved relationships with physicians and
more simplified admissions for patients (Harrison 2006). Joint ventures are also
considered the strategy of choice as they help mitigate operational and financial
risks (Boettiger and Young 2004). However, the main reason behind hospital joint
venture is still financial (reducing costs and increasing profitability).
McCue et al (2007) suggested that cash flow is better than accounting
profits for financial valuation of an organization and is a key resource for
assessing financial survivability. In this study, the cash flow margin was
calculated using the formula: Cash flow margin = (Net income + depreciation
expense + interest expense) divided by (net patient revenue + other income).
Low cash flow margin represents poor financial performance of a hospital. Based
on resource dependency theory, hospitals viability would depend on its ability to
acquire resources (financial) from its environment. As ASCs are increasingly
drawing outpatient surgical revenue away from hospitals, hospitals would be
more inclined towards developing an arrangement with ASCs. Thus, hospitals
with lower cash flow margins would be more likely to consider joint venture
arrangements with ASCs.
Another factor that influences capital access is cash on hand (McCue
1997; McCue et al 2007). Lower cash on hand indicates lesser access to capital

109

(McCue 1997) and poor financial performance. Literature suggests that hospitals
enter into joint venture arrangements in order to improve their financial
performance (Oliver 1990; Harrison 2006; Blaszyk and Hill-Mischel 2007). In this
study, based on financial formulae, cash on hand was calculated as:
Cash on hand = (cash + short and long term investments) divided by [(total
operating expenses – depreciation)/365]
Long term debt to total capital is another key factor in understanding
financial performance of a hospital. A higher debt position indicates limited debt
capacity of a hospital. This translates into limited ability to raise capital. This
measure is calculated by dividing long term debt by total capital. Hospitals that
lack capital and have limited cash flow are unable to upgrade their technology,
eventually resulting in loss of patients and further decline in their financial
resources (Kirchheimer 2001; Harrison et al 2003). Hospitals that lack financial
resources are under risk of financial peril in an environment characterized by
rapidly changing technology. ASCs have the advantage of being newer facilities
and possessing latest technologies to deliver care. Thus, it follows that higher the
long term debt to total capital, more likely it is for a hospital to consider joint
venturing with ASCs.
Operating expense per discharge is defined by dividing operating
expenses by adjusted discharges. This indicates operating expenses incurred
from providing patient care services. Higher operating expense per discharge
signals higher financial constraint for hospitals. Resource dependency theory
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suggests that hospitals would proactively seek ways to increase their resource
(financial) domain in any manner while facing resource (financial) scarcity.
Therefore, higher operating expense per discharge would be positively
associated with hospitals decision to joint venture with ASCs.
Control Factors
The study model of hospital joint ventures with ASCs also controls for
hospitals‟ complexity of services, mission, size of the market and the time during
which the hospitals entered in joint venture arrangements with ASCs. The
variables to measure these include case-mix index (measures complexity of
services), teaching status and public hospital status (measuring mission), large
MSA (measuring size of the market) and time (indicating the year hospitals
entered in JV arrangements with ASCs).
Based on the review of pertinent literature in Chapter 2 and hypotheses
development in Chapter 3, Table 5 summarizes the hypothesized relationship
between the independent variables and the dependent variables, in this study.
Analytical Methods
This study used univariate (descriptive) as well as multivariate
analysis to examine the effect of the market, regulatory, organizational,
operational and financial factors on hospitals decision to enter in joint venture
arrangements with ASCs. In addition to univariate analysis which examined
individual variables, correlation analysis was also performed in order to identify
potential multicollinearity issues. The multivariate analysis performed to assess
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Table 5: Hypothesized Directionality between Dependent and Independent
Variables in the Study Models
Dependent Variable
Independent Variables
Herfindahl-Hirschman index
Per capita income
Unemployment rate
Population size
Percentage of elderly
ASC specialists per 1000
Number of ASCs
HMO penetration
Number of hospitals in JV with an ASC
Certificate of need
Ownership status (Not-for-profit)
Size
Affiliation to a system
Occupancy rate
Total outpatient surgical visits
Cash flow margin
Cash on hand
Operating expense per discharge
Long-term debt to total capital

Hospitals JV with ASCs
Target
Hypothesized
Hypothesis
Direction
H1a
H1b
+
H1b
H1b
+
H1b
H1c
H1c
+
H1d
+
H2
+
H3a
H3b
H4a
H4b
H5a
H5b
H6a
H6a
H6a
+
H6b
+

the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable
was logistic regression.
Univariate (Descriptive) Analysis
Descriptive analysis included descriptive statistics (mean and standard
deviation, frequency) of various independent variables, univariate test of
significance for each independent variable in isolation and correlation analysis for
potential multicollinearity issues among independent variables. It also helped
assess the distribution of values for each variable and detect outliers.
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Multivariate Analysis (Logistic Regression)
Multivariate analysis was used to examine the relationship of various
explanatory (independent) variables to the dependent variable (hospital JV with
ASCs). By simultaneously analyzing the independent variables, it helped
establish the directionality of each relationship (between independent and
dependent variable). Isolating the estimated effect of the dependent variables
after adjusting for the other independent and control variables in the model,
helped determine if the variables had a positive, negative, neutral or statistically
insignificant effect on hospitals decision to joint venture with ASCs.
Multivariate logistic regression was preferred over linear regression for this
study. In case of the dependent variable being dichotomous, application of linear
regression has many drawbacks. These limitations include production of bimodal
distribution leading to unreliable coefficients and standard errors (Harrison 2002).
Menard (1995) suggested that it is more prudent to use logistic regression than
linear regression when the dependent variable is binary.
As the dependent variable in this study was a dichotomous variable,
logistic regression analysis was used to test the association of independent
variables with hospitals that joint ventured compared to those that did not joint
venture with ASCs. This method is statistically more appropriate for the nature of
the dependent variable and provides consistent and meaningful estimators.
Application of logistic regression in healthcare research has been well
documented in previous studies (McCue and Furst 1986; Friedman and Shortell
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1988; Alexander and Morrisey 1989; Clement et al. 1997; McCue et al. 2000;
Krishnan 2001; Harrison 2006). McCue and Furst (1986) applied logistic
regression to examine the association of financial performance and organization
factors with hospital acquisitions. Friedman and Shortell (1988) applied logistic
regression to examine the effect of organizational and market factors on the
financial performance of hospitals, pre and post Medicare prospective payment
system. Alexander and Morrisey (1989) applied logistic regression to estimate
the influence of market and mission factors on hospital acquisition. Clement et al.
(1997) applied logistic regression to examine the association of market factors on
financial performance of hospital strategic alliances. McCue et al. (2000) applied
logistic regression to examine the association of market, mission and financial
characteristics with hospital cash reserves. Krishnan (2001) applied logistic to
assess the relationship between market factors, regulatory environment and
management effectiveness. Harrison (2006) applied logistic regression to
examine the organizational and market characteristics, and profitability of
hospitals that operated joint venture arrangements with other providers.
Logistic regression results provide the odds of a hospitals decision to joint
venture with ASCs, considering the independent and control variables in the
model. In this study, maximum likelihood estimation method has been used to
test study hypotheses as the sample data is substantially large.
Chi-square test was also performed to test the statistical significance of
the covariate estimate. A significant likelihood ratio (p<0.1) indicated that the
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model could make better prediction based on the independent variables. Pseudo
R2 provided the measure of the predictive power of the empirical model.
Summary of Chapter 4
Chapter 4 presented the methodology including research design, study
population - inclusion/exclusion criteria, data sources, description of constructs,
variables and measures, and analytical framework used in this study. Based on
the review of literature and theoretical premise, this chapter also presented the
hypothesized directionality of relationships between independent and dependent
variables.
In this study, the data is analyzed in three parts: 2006 hospital-ASC joint
ventures, 2007 hospital-ASC joint ventures and a pooled sample of 2006 and
2007 hospital-ASC joint ventures. For each hospital that joint ventured with an
ASC, three hospitals that did not joint venture with ASCs were randomly chosen
for comparison.
Descriptive statistics and logistic regression was performed to analyze the
data in this study. Descriptive statistics helped examine the variables in isolation
and logistic regression helped establish the relationship between each of the
independent variables with the dependent variable (i.e., hospitals decision to joint
venture with ASCs).
Chapter 5 presents the analysis results of the study. Chapter 6
discusses the conclusions that can be drawn from the study results, implications
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of the study results, limitations of the study and potential areas for further
research.

CHAPTER 5: RESULTS

Analyses
The results of the empirical analysis used to evaluate the hypotheses and
research questions are presented in this chapter. The first section of the chapter
presents the outlier analysis performed on the datasets. This section is followed
by analyses (correlation, univariate, and multivariate analysis) of hospitals that
joint ventured with ASCs and hospitals that did not joint venture with ASCs.
These are presented with an analysis of each study period (2006, 2007 and the
pooled model for 2006 and 2007).
In the section for descriptive statistics, various central tendency measures
for the independent variables are presented. Mean and standard deviation for
continuous independent variables are presented. Frequencies and percentages
are presented for categorical independent variables. Significance levels for these
are also presented. This is followed by a presentation and discussion of the
multivariate analyses (logistic regression) that were used to test the hypotheses
and research questions.
Outlier analyses performed for better understanding of variables and their
distributions in the dataset are presented in this chapter. The section starts with
the description of the method used to identify and manage outlier values. This is
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followed by a listing of variables that had outlier values in each of the study
period datasets.
Varying significance levels are reported for the independent variables in
the models. Results with p-values of < 0.05 and < 0.01 levels are viewed as
statistically significant at 95% and 99% respectively. Results with p-values
between 0.05 and < 0.10 levels are viewed as marginally significant. The
statistical significance of the results is discussed. The chapter concludes with the
results pertaining to the impact of various driving factors (i.e., market, regulatory,
organizational, operational, and financial) on the hospitals‟ decision to joint
venture with ASCs.
Outlier Analysis
In any data analysis procedure, analyzing cases with outlier values is an
essential step, as including (without analyzing) these cases could generate
unreliable results. A value is considered an outlier if it is markedly different from
other values in the sample. It is extremely important to identify potential outliers
as they could be indicative of bad data or measurement error. In this study,
observations had few outliers in some of the variables. The percentage of outliers
for these variables was less than five percent. However, as the study used an
analytical model that assumes a normal distribution for continuous variables,
these outliers were further explored.
In all three of the models, 2006 model, 2007 model and the pooled model,
variables which had outlier values were long term debt to total capital, size of the
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hospital and number of outpatient surgeries performed by a hospital. All of these
had fewer than 5% outlier values but when put in the model, resulted in a higher
variation. The techniques to identify and deal with these outliers are explained
below.
Outlier value analysis involved a three step procedure: identification of
outliers, exploration of these outliers to determine the reasoning (measurement
error, bad or unrealistic values and such, or unusually/low but correct value) for
these values and application of an appropriate technique to deal with these
outliers. When the variables that contained outlier values were plotted using stem
and leaf diagrams and percentiles for each of the three variables, they revealed
that although very few number of values seemed to drop away from most of the
values for the same variable in the sample but they differed markedly causing an
unreliable increase in the measure of spread (standard deviation). These values
were thus winsorized at the 90th percentile to perform subsequent analyses.
Winsorization is a method of transformation of extreme values in the data
to remove the heavy influence of outliers on the distribution (Reinard 2006).
Winsorization helps in replacing the most extreme scores with the next available
less extreme scores at a predetermined percentile value. A commonly used
winsorization level is 90% (Fernandez et al 2002; Reinard 2006; Pedlow et al
2010). Ninety percent winsorization means setting all data below 5 percentile
value to the 5th percentile value, and setting all data above 95th percentile value
to the 95th percentile value. An alternative to winsorization is trimming outliers
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(removing outliers instead of replacing values). However, the advantage of
winsorizing is that it helps retain observations indicating there are sample
members with large and small values, but lessens the impact of them to “likely”
be large and small values (Reinard 2006). Using this procedure in this study,
outliers were not deleted, but were not allowed to introduce large amounts of
variability in the spread of the distribution.
This procedure was followed in all three models (2006, 2007 and pooled
model) to detect and adjust for outliers. Thus, management of outliers resulted in
satisfying the normality assumption for continuous variables as well as provided
more realistic and reliable results.
Correlation Analysis
Correlation is a measure of the linear association between two random
variables. To test for multicollinearity, Pearson‟s correlation coefficients, r, were
examined for combinations of independent continuous variables. Multicollinearity
among independent variables in regression analyses weakens the predictive
value of the analyses and results in parameters that are unreliable.
Pearson‟s correlation coefficients range from -1 to 1. The greater the
absolute value of the coefficient, the stronger is the linear association. A positive
coefficient implies that the association is positive; a negative value implies it is
negative. Typically, a value of 0.8 or higher is considered very high and a value
of 0.6 to 0.8 is considered high (Harrison 2002). Among the variables included in
the empirical analysis, most had low correlations, suggesting no significant
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collinearity problem. However, correlation analyses revealed some high
correlations (higher than 0.6 - positive and negative) that were indicative of
multicollinearity problems. Table 6 presents the observed high correlations
between variables in the three models.
Table 6: Correlations between variables (0.6 or higher)
Variable 1
Herfindahl Hirschman
index
Number of ASCs
Operating expense per
adjusted discharge
ASC specialists per
1000
Number of outpatient
surgeries

Variable 2
Population size

M1
-0.821

Correlation Coefficients
M2
M3
-0.836
-0.810

HMO
penetration
Case-mix index

0.771

0.737

0.756

0.618

0.622

0.619

Number of
ASCs
Hospital size

0.908

0.917

0.911

0.713

0.792

0.736

M1: 2006 Model
M2: 2007 Model
M3: Pooled Model (2006 and 2007)

On the basis of the above information, five variables: population size,
HMO penetration, ASC specialists per 1000, case-mix index and number of
outpatient surgeries were deleted from the analysis. These variables were
dropped from all the three models (2006 model, 2007 model and the pooled 2006
and 2007 model).
Herfindahl Hirschman index is an important indicator of market
competition in the model. Population size in part is controlled for in all the models
by a control variable which is a binary variable that distinguished markets by
large and small populations. Hence, population size was deleted from the
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analysis. As the focus of the study is hospital joint ventures with ASCs, the
number of ASCs in a county is crucial to ascertain the supply of physicians and
competition in the county. Thus the variables HMO penetration and ASC
specialists per 1000 that were highly correlated with this variable were dropped
from the analysis. Operating expense per adjusted discharge is also one of the
important financial indicators in the model which tests whether financial factors
are associated with hospitals decision to joint venture with ASCs. Since case-mix
is not needed to test any hypothesis directly in the study, it was dropped from the
analysis as it was highly correlated with operating expenses per adjusted
discharge. Hospital size is the only continuous organizational variable in the
study that is needed to test Hypothesis 4. Also this variable can be useful in
identifying outliers amongst other variables such as cash flow margin, day‟s cash
on hand and others. Hence, the number of outpatient surgeries was dropped
from the analysis.
Descriptive Analysis
Three descriptive tests were performed to provide a better understanding
of the variables individually. All the tests were performed using SPSS statistics
version 16.
For continuous variables, an independent sample t-test was performed to
test the difference in means of the variables of interest between two independent
groups (hospitals that joint venture with ASCs and hospitals that do not). In order
to determine the significance of the difference in means between the two groups
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for the variables, the results of Levene‟s test for equality of variances was
explored. Equal variance was not assumed if the significance for Levene‟s test
was 0.05 or below (SPSS Tutorial 2010). Equal variance was assumed if the
significance for Levene‟s test was above 0.05.
For the categorical variables, chi-square test and z test were performed.
Chi-square test was useful in determining whether there was a significant
difference between the two groups on the frequencies of the categorical variables
and z test added additional information by providing the difference between the
two groups, as given by the z value.
Multivariate Analysis
Logistic regression was used to model the data and identify significant
relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable,
„hospitals‟ decision to enter into JVs with ASCs‟. Detailed listing of the variables,
beta coefficients, p-values, odds ratios and 90% confidence intervals for the odds
ratios of the logistic regression model are presented in respective sections. The
presentation of odds ratios‟ interpretation is consistent with previous studies
(McCue 2000; LaValley 2008) that have interpreted odds ratios. For variables
that present one percent change, the percent change represents one whole
percent change. An example of this would be a change from 3 to 4 percent. The
signs of the model coefficients are interpreted as follows, consistent with
previous studies (McCue 2000; Ozgen and Ozcan 2002):
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When coefficients are positive, a higher value of the variable increases
the likelihood of hospitals‟ decision to joint venture with ASCs.
When coefficients are negative, a lower value of the variable increases
the likelihood of hospitals‟ decision to joint venture with ASCs.
2006 Hospital-ASC Joint Venture Study Period
Descriptive Findings
The 2006 study period sample included 97 hospitals that entered into joint
venture arrangements with ASCs in 2006. However, four hospitals were
eliminated as they had missing data. As a result, the 2006 study period included
93 hospitals in the study group. A comparison group of 279 hospitals was chosen
using random selection.
Preliminary descriptive analysis produced means and standard deviation
for all the continuous variables of interest. Assessment of these values was
performed to check for unusual values of data or problems with the distribution of
the data and adjustments were made accordingly. These univariate measures
were reviewed for hospitals that joint ventured with ASCs and those that did not,
and the results were then compared to the same measures obtained in data
analyses of subsequent study periods.
Table 7 presents the descriptive statistics of continuous variables for the
2006 study period. From a market perspective, hospitals that joint ventured with
ASCs operated in markets characterized by higher per capita income, higher
competition, lower unemployment and a lower percentage of elderly population.
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Variables for the 2006 Study Period
(n=372)

Variables
Market
Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI)
Per capita income
Unemployment rate
Percentage of elderly
Number of hospitals in JV
with ASCs
Number of ASCs
Organizational
Bed size
Operational
Occupancy rate
Financial
Cash flow margin
Cash on hand
Long-term debt to total
capital
Operating expense per
discharge

Hospitals JV
with ASCs
N=93
Mean (Std.
Dev.)

No JV
Hospitals
N=279
Mean (Std.
Dev.)

t-statistic

0.56 (0.31)

0.64 (0.34)

1.83*

$33,988 (9,250)
4.91 (1.24)
12.28% (3.7)
3 (2)

$30,702 (8,529)
5.37 (1.75)
13.55% (4.15)
3 (3)

-3.15***
2.74***
2.62***
-0.08

10 (12)

13 (34)

1.25

306 (212)

160 (131)

-6.26***

0.67 (0.11)

0.59 (0.19)

-5.09***

0.10 (0.12)
86 (111)
0.33 (0.30)

0.07 (0.12)
64 (154)
0.38 (0.43)

-1.72*
-1.25
1.08

$9,042 (3,421)

$8,142 (4,265)

-1.85*

*** significant at p=0.01
** significant at p=0.05
* significant at p=0.1

From an organizational perspective, hospitals that joint ventured with
ASCs on average had more beds. From an operational perspective, hospitals
that joint ventured with ASCs had a higher occupancy rate. From a financial
perspective, hospitals that joint ventured with ASCs had slightly higher cash flow
margin and higher operating expense per adjusted discharge.
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A frequency analysis was performed for categorical values such as
certificate of need laws, ownership and affiliation to a system. In addition to chisquare test, a z-test between two proportions was also performed. Certificate of
need laws and ownership status fall under the umbrella of regulatory construct
whereas affiliation to a system comes under organizational construct. The results
of this analysis are presented in Table 8.
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics of Categorical Variables for 2006 Study Period
(N=372)

Variables
Regulatory
Certificate of need
For-profit ownership
Organizational
System affiliated

Hospitals JV with ASCs
N=93
Frequency Percentage

No JV Hospitals
N=279
Frequency Percentage

ZValue

31
13

33.33%
13.98%

115
73

41.22%
26.16%

-1.35
-2.41**

60

64.52%

180

64.52%

0.00

*** significant at p=0.01
** significant at p=0.05
* significant at p=0.1

As noted from Table 8, not-for-profit hospitals constitute a higher
percentage than for-profit hospitals amongst hospitals that joint venture with
ASCs. In the 2006 study period, 13.98% of for-profit hospitals entered into joint
venture arrangements with ASCs. It should be noted that for-profit hospitals are a
significantly smaller proportion (19.93%) of the overall U.S. hospital population
(AHA 2009).
Multivariate Findings
The appropriate analytic technique when the dependent variable is
dichotomous and the model involves a number of predictors is multivariate
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logistic regression. Logistic regression was used to model the data and identify
significant relationships between the independent variables and the dependent
variable, „hospitals‟ decision to enter into JVs with ASCs‟. A detailed listing of the
variables, beta coefficients, p-values, odds ratios and 90 % confidence intervals
for the odds ratios of the logistic regression model are presented in Table 9.
Table 9: Logistic Regression Results of Hospital-ASC Joint Ventures for 2006
Study Period (N=372)
Variables
Market
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
Per capita income
Unemployment rate
Percentage of elderly
Number of hospitals in JV
with ASCs
Number of ASCs
Regulatory
Certificate of need
For-profit ownership
Organizational
Bed size
Affiliation to a system
Operational
Occupancy rate
Financial
Cash flow margin
Days cash on hand
Long-term debt to total
capital
Operating expense per
adjusted discharge
*** significant at p=0.01
** significant at p=0.05
* significant at p=0.1

Beta
Coefficient

p-Value

Odds
Ratio

90% CI for
Odds Ratio

-0.581
0.000
-0.247
-9.787
0.021

0.302
0.526
0.017**
0.013**
0.726

0.559
1.000
0.781
0.000
1.022

(0.222,1.411)
(1.000,1.000)
(0.659,0.926)
(0.000,0.036)
(0.924,1.129)

-0.022

0.035**

0.979 (0.962,0.995)

0.549
0.518

0.061*
0.203

1.731 (1.069,2.802)
1.679 (0.860,3.280)

0.006

1.006 (1.004,1.008)

0.115

0.000**
*
0.707

0.488

0.610

1.629 (0.337,7.875)

0.782

0.563

2.187

0.000
-0.030

0.871
0.941

0.000

0.221

1.122 (0.678,1.859)

(0.236,20.25
4)
1.000 (0.998,1.002)
0.971
(0.501,
1.881)
1.000 (1.000,1.000)

Percentage Correct Prediction = 78.5
-2 Log likelihood = 337.084
Nagelkerke R-square = 0.508
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test: Chi-square = 8.001; Sig = 0.433

127

As noted in Table 9, three of the five market factors, unemployment rate,
percentage of elderly and number of ASCs in the market, are associated with
hospitals‟ decision to JV with ASCs. All the three variables: unemployment rate,
percentage of elderly and number of ASCs, were significant at .05 level.
The negative coefficient for unemployment rate indicates that hospitals
operating in markets with lower unemployment rate are more likely to joint
venture with ASCs. The odds ratio for unemployment rate indicates that the
relative odds of a hospital joint venturing with ASCs decrease 21.9% with every
1% increase in the unemployment rate. The negative coefficient of percentage of
elderly population indicates that hospitals operating in markets with lower
population of individuals over 65 are more likely to joint venture with ASCs. The
odds ratio for percentage of elderly indicates that the relative risk of hospitals not
having a joint venture with ASC is very high with every 1% increase in
percentage of elderly.
The negative coefficient of the number of ASCs indicates that hospitals
operating in markets with fewer ASCs are more likely to joint venture with ASCs.
The odds ratio indicates that the relative odds of a hospital joint venturing with
ASCs decreases 2.1% with a one unit increase in the number of ASCs in the
county.
One of the two regulatory factors, presence of certificate of need laws was
found to have a marginal significant association with hospitals that JV with ASCs.
A positive coefficient of certificate of need indicates that hospitals located in
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states having certificate of need are more likely to joint venture with ASCs.
Results indicate that the odds of a hospital entering into joint venture
arrangements with ASCs in a state with certificate of need laws are 1.7 times
greater than in states without certificate of need laws.
One of the two organizational factors, hospital size was found to be
significantly associated hospitals‟ decision to JV with ASCs. Bed size of the
hospital was found to be significant at .01 level. A positive coefficient of bed size
indicates that larger bed size hospitals are more likely to joint venture with ASCs.
The odds ratio indicates that for every 10 bed increase in the bed-size of a
hospital, the odds of it joint venturing with an ASC would increase by 6%.
The percentage correct prediction of 78.5 indicates a reasonably high
predictive power for the 2006 study period logistic regression model. A
Nagelkerke R-square value of 0.508 additionally reassures that this empirical
model has reasonably high predictive power. In logistic regression, Hosmer and
Lemeshow goodness-of-fit is a post-hoc test performed to evaluate the fit of a
specific model (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). The null hypothesis in this test is
that the weighted combination of predictors is related to outcome log-odds in
linear fashion. A non-significant chi-square indicates a good fit of data with linear
model. Since Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test is designed
specifically for a binary response variable, it is considered more reliable than Rsquare value while interpreting model strength in logistic regression. This test
was also conducted in this study. The results of the Hosmer and Lemeshow
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goodness-of-fit test with Chi-square value 8.001 and significance value 0.433
indicates that the model fit was good in this study period.
In summary, hospitals operating in markets with lower unemployment and
percentage of elderly population, and having fewer numbers of ASCs are more
likely to enter into joint venture arrangements with ASCs. These hospitals also
have more beds and are located in states governed by certificate of need laws.
These results are compared to the results of the other two study periods later in
the chapter.
2007 Hospital-ASC Joint Venture Study Period
Descriptive Findings
The 2007 study period sample included 73 hospitals that entered into joint
venture arrangements with ASCs in 2007. However, 1 hospital was eliminated as
it had missing data. As a result, the 2007 study period included 72 hospitals in
the study group. A comparison group of 216 hospitals was chosen using random
selection.
Preliminary descriptive analysis produced means and standard deviation
for all the continuous variables of interest. Assessment of these values was
performed to check for unusual values of data or problems with the distribution of
the data and was dealt with accordingly. These univariate measures were
reviewed for hospitals that joint ventured with ASCs and those that did not, and
the results were then compared to the same measures obtained in data analysis
of other study periods.
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Table 10 presents the descriptive statistics of continuous variables for the
2007 study period. From a market perspective, hospitals that joint ventured with
ASCs operated in counties with a higher per capita income and a lower
percentage of elderly population. From an organizational perspective, hospitals
that joint ventured with ASCs were larger facilities in terms of bed size. From a
financial perspective, hospitals that joint ventured with ASCs had higher cash
flow margin and higher days cash on hand.
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Variables for the 2007 Study
Period (n=288)

Variables
Market
Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI)
Per capita income
Unemployment rate
Percentage of elderly
Number of hospitals in JV
with ASCs
Number of ASCs
Organizational
Bed size
Operational
Occupancy rate
Financial
Cash flow margin
Days cash on hand
Long-term debt to total
capital
Operating expense per
discharge
*** significant at p=0.01
** significant at p=0.05
* significant at p=0.1

Hospitals JV
with ASCs N=72
Mean (Std. Dev.)

No JV Hospitals
N=216
Mean (Std. Dev.)

t-statistic

0.62 (0.32)

0.58 (0.33)

-0.80

$36,254 (8,952)
4.64 (1.47)
12.24% (2.6)
4 (3)

$33,777 (11,508)
4.87 (1.62)
13.94% (3.97)
4 (3)

-1.67*
1.05
4.16***
-0.02

10 (23)

13 (33)

0.69

254 (148)

184 (165)

-3.20***

0.61 (0.13)

0.59 (0.18)

-0.72

0.11 (0.09)
87 (116)
0.38 (0.45)

0.09 (0.1)
60 (85)
0.35 (0.36)

-2.05**
-1.79*
-0.71

$8,855 (2,310)

$8,855 (5,227)

0.00
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A frequency analysis was performed for categorical values such as
certificate of need laws, ownership and affiliation to a system. In addition to chisquare test, a z-test between two proportions was also performed. Certificate of
need laws and ownership status fall under the umbrella of regulatory construct
whereas affiliation to a system comes under organizational construct. The results
of this analysis are presented in Table 11.
Table 11: Descriptive Statistics of Categorical Variables for 2007 Study Period
(N=288)

Variables
Regulatory
Certificate of need
For-profit ownership
Organizational
System affiliation

Hospitals JV with ASCs
N=72
Frequency Percentage

No JV Hospitals
N=216
Frequency Percentage

ZValue

35
7

48.61%
9.72%

84
40

38.89%
18.52%

1.45
-1.75*

48

66.67%

134

62.04%

0.71

*** significant at p=0.01
** significant at p=0.05
* significant at p=0.1

Ownership status of hospitals was found to be marginally significant
between the two groups (hospitals that joint ventured and those that did not).
Not-for-profit hospitals constitute a higher percentage than for-profit hospitals
amongst hospitals that joint venture with ASCs. In the 2007 study period, 9.72%
of for-profit hospitals entered into joint venture arrangements with ASCs.
However, as noted earlier, for-profit hospitals are a significantly smaller
proportion (19.93%) of the overall U.S. hospital population (AHA 2009).
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Multivariate Findings
As previously mentioned, the appropriate analytic technique when the
dependent variable is dichotomous and the model involves a number of
predictors is multivariate logistic regression. Logistic regression was used to
model the data and identify significant relationships between the independent
variables and the dependent variable, „hospitals‟ decision to enter into JVs with
ASCs‟. A detailed listing of the variables, beta coefficients, p-values, odds ratios
and 90% confidence intervals for the odds ratios of the logistic regression model
are presented in Table 12.
As noted in Table 12, two of the five market factors, Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index and percentage of elderly, are associated with hospitals‟ decision to JV
with ASCs. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index was marginally significant at 0.10
level and the percentage of elderly was significant at .01 level. A positive
coefficient of Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) indicates that hospitals operating
in more concentrated markets are more likely to joint venture with ASCs. The
odds ratio indicates that the likelihood of hospitals joint venturing with ASCs
increases more than 3 times with a one unit (e.g., from 0.2 to 0.3) increase in
market concentration. The negative coefficient of percentage of elderly
population indicates that hospitals operating in markets with lower population of
individuals over 65 are more likely to joint venture with ASCs. The odds ratio for
percentage of elderly indicates that the risk of hospitals not having a joint venture
with ASC is very high with every 1% increase in percentage of elderly.
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Table 12: Logistic Regression Results of Hospital-ASC Joint Ventures for 2007
Study Period (N=288)
Variables
Market
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
Per capita income
Unemployment rate
Percentage of elderly
Number of hospitals in JV with
ASCs
Number of ASCs
Regulatory
Certificate of need
For-profit ownership
Organizational
Size
Affiliation to a system
Operational
Occupancy rate
Financial
Cash flow margin
Cash on hand
Long-term debt to total capital
Operating expense per adjusted
discharge
*** significant at p=0.01
** significant at p=0.05
* significant at p=0.1

Beta
p-Value
Coefficient

Odds
Ratio

90% CI for
Odds Ratio

3.226
1.000
0.878
0.000
1.029

(1.109,9.381)
(1.000,1.000)
(0.736,1.049)
(0.000,0.000)
(0.938,1.130)

1.171
0.000
-0.13
-18.394
0.029

0.071*
0.550
0.228
.001***
0.611

-0.002

0.740

0.998 (0.985,1.010)

-0.404
0.599

0.201
0.210

0.668 (0.397,1.123)
1.820 (0.830,3.993)

0.004

1.004 (1.002,1.006)

-0.300

0.001**
*
0.371

-1.964

0.091*

0.14

1.498

0.423

4.474

0.002
0.640
0.000

0.179
0.129
0.238

0.741 (0.426,1.287)
(0.021,0.950)

(0.207,96.74
7)
1.002 (0.999,1.005)
1.897 (0.948,3.798)
1.000 (1.000,1.000)

Percentage Correct = 76.0
-2 Log likelihood = 281.922
Nagelkerke R-square = 0.446
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test:
Chi-square = 10.971; Sig = 0.203

One of the two organizational factors, hospital size was found to be
significantly associated hospitals‟ decision to JV with ASCs. The size of the
hospital was found to be significant at .01 level. A positive coefficient of bed size
indicates that larger bed size hospitals are more likely to joint venture with ASCs.
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The odds ratio indicates that for every 10 bed increase in the bed-size of a
hospital, the odds of it joint venturing with an ASC would increase by 4%.
The operational factor- occupancy rate was found to be significantly
associated hospitals‟ decision to JV with ASCs. Occupancy rate was found to be
marginally significant at .10 level. A negative coefficient of occupancy rate
indicates that hospitals with lower occupancy rate are more likely to joint venture
with ASCs. The odds ratio indicates that the relative odds of a hospital joint
venturing with ASCs decrease 86% with every 1% (e.g., from 3 to 4) increase in
the occupancy rate.
The percentage correct prediction of 76.0 indicates a reasonably high
predictive power for the 2007 study period logistic regression model. A
Nagelkerke R-square value of 0.446 additionally reassures that this empirical
model has reasonably high predictive power. The results of the Hosmer and
Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test with Chi-square value 10.971 and significance
value 0.203 indicates that the model fit was good in this study period.
In summary, larger hospitals (in terms of bed size) operating in more
concentrated markets with a lower percentage of elderly population, and having
lower occupancy rate are more likely to enter into joint venture arrangements
with ASCs. These results are compared to the results of the other two study
periods later in the chapter.
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Pooled Model of 2006 and 2007 Hospital-ASC Joint Venture Study
Descriptive Findings
The 2006 and 2007 pooled sample included 165 hospitals that
entered into joint venture arrangements with ASCs in 2006 and 2007. A
comparison group of 495 hospitals was chosen using random selection.
Preliminary descriptive analysis produced means and standard deviation for all
the continuous variables of interest. Assessment of these values was performed
to check for unusual values of data or problems with the distribution of the data.
These univariate measures were reviewed for hospitals that joint ventured with
ASCs and those that did not, and the results were then compared to the same
measures obtained in data analysis of prior study periods.
Table 13 presents the descriptive statistics of continuous variables for the
2006 and 2007 pooled model. From a market perspective, hospitals that joint
ventured with ASCs operated in markets characterized by a higher per capita
income, lower unemployment rate and lower percentage of elderly population.
From an organizational perspective, hospitals that joint ventured with ASCs were
larger facilities in terms of bed size. From an operational perspective, hospitals
that joint ventured with ASCs had a higher occupancy rate. And from a financial
perspective, hospitals that joint ventured with ASCs on average had a higher
cash flow margin and more days cash on hand.
A frequency analysis was performed for categorical values: certificate of
need laws, ownership and affiliation to a system. In addition to chi-square test, a
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Table 13: Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Variables for the 2006 and 2007
Pooled Model (n=660)

Variables
Market
Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI)
Per capita income
Unemployment rate
Percentage of elderly
Number of hospitals in JV
with ASCs
Number of ASCs
Organizational
Size
Operational
Occupancy rate
Financial
Cash flow margin
Days cash on hand
Long-term debt to total
capital
Operating expense per
discharge

Hospitals JV
with ASCs
N=165
Mean (Std. Dev)

No JV Hospitals
N=495

tstatistic

0.59 (0.32)

0.61 (0.33)

0.86

$34,977(9,163)
4.80 (1.35)
12.26% (3.26)
4 (3)

$32,044 (10,045)
5.15 (1.71)
13.72% (4.07)
4 (3)

-3.32***
2.42**
4.66***
-0.07

10 (17)

13 (33)

1.44

283 (188)

170 (147)

-7.03**

0.64 (0.13)

0.59 (0.18)

-4.15***

0.10 (0.11)
86 (113)
0.36 (0.37)

0.08 (0.11)
63 (128)
0.36 (0.4)

-2.59***
-2.13**
0.24

$8,960 (2,981)

$8,453 (4,718)

-1.61

Mean (Std. Dev.)

*** significant at p=0.01
** significant at p=0.05
* significant at p=0.1

z-test between two proportions was also performed. Certificate of need laws and
ownership status fall under the umbrella of regulatory construct whereas
affiliation to a system comes under organizational construct. The results of this
analysis are presented in Table 14.
As noted from Table 14, not-for-profit hospitals constitute a higher
percentage than for-profit hospitals amongst hospitals that joint venture with
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Table 14: Descriptive Statistics of Categorical Variables for 2006 and 2007 Study
Period (N=660)

Variables
Regulatory
Certificate of need
For-profit ownership
Organizational
System affiliation

Hospitals JV with
ASCs N=165
Frequency Percentage

No JV Hospitals
N=495
Frequency Percentage

Z-Value

66
20

40%
12.12%

199
113

40.2%
22.83%

-0.05
-2.97***

108

65.45%

314

63.43%

0.47

*** significant at p=0.01
** significant at p=0.05
* significant at p=0.1

ASCs. In the 2006 and 2007 pooled study model, 12.12% of for-profit hospitals
entered into joint venture arrangements with ASCs.
Multivariate Findings
As previously mentioned, the appropriate analytic technique when the
dependent variable is dichotomous and the model involves a number of
predictors is multivariate logistic regression. Logistic regression was used to
model the data and identify significant relationships between the independent
variables and the dependent variable, „hospitals‟ decision to enter into JVs with
ASCs‟. Detailed listing of the variables, beta coefficients, p-values, odds ratios
and 90% confidence intervals for the odds ratios of the logistic regression model
are presented in Table 15.
As noted in Table 15, three of the five market factors, unemployment rate,
the percentage of elderly and the number of ASCs, are associated with hospitals‟
decision to JV with ASCs. Unemployment rate was significant at 0.05 level,

138

Table 15: Logistic Regression Results of Hospital-ASC Joint Ventures for 2006
and 2007 Pooled Model (N=660)
Variables
Market
Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index
Per capita income
Unemployment rate
Percentage of elderly
Number of hospitals in JV
with ASCs
Number of ASCs
Regulatory
Certificate of need
For-profit ownership
Organizational
Bed size
Affiliation to a system
Operational
Occupancy rate
Financial
Cash flow margin
Days cash on hand
Long-term debt to total
capital
Operating expense per
adjusted discharge
Time
*** significant at p=0.01
** significant at p=0.05
* significant at p=0.1

Beta
Coefficient

p-Value

Odds
Ratio

90% CI for
Odds Ratio

0.257

0.523

1.294

(0.667,2.510)

0.000
-0.176
-11.435
0.018

0.522
0.013**
0.000***
0.658

1.000
0.838
0.000
1.018

(1.000,1.000)
(0.746, 0.942)
(0.000,0.002)
(0.953,1.088)

-0.011

0.06*

0.989

(0.979,0.999)

0.051
0.501

0.804
0.091*

1.052
1.650

(0.752,1.472)
(1.013,2.688)

0.005
-0.070

0.000***
0.749

1.005
0.933

(1.004,1.006)
(0.652,1.334)

-0.306

0.666

0.736

(0.229,2.362)

1.524
0.000
0.280

0.152
0.649
0.307

4.589
1.000
1.323

(0.796,26.444)
(0.999,1.002)
(0.843,2.075)

0.000

0.057*

1.000

(1.000,1.000)

0.064

0.755

1.066

(0.762,1.491)

Percentage Correct = 76.7
-2 Log likelihood = 646.078
Nagelkerke R-square = 0.446
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test:
Chi-square = 11.375; Sig = 0.181

percentage of elderly was highly significant at 0.01 level and number of ASCs
was marginally significant at 0.10 level. The negative coefficient of
unemployment rate indicates that hospitals operating in markets with lower
unemployment rate are more likely to joint venture with ASCs. The odds ratio
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indicates that the relative odds of a hospital joint venturing with ASCs decrease
16.2% with 1% increase in the unemployment rate. The negative coefficient of
percentage of elderly population indicates that hospitals operating in markets
with lower population of individuals over 65 are more likely to joint venture with
ASCs. The odds ratio for percentage of elderly indicates that the risk of hospitals
not having a joint venture with ASC is very high with every 1% (e.g., from 3 to 4)
increase in percentage of elderly. The negative coefficient of number of ASCs
indicates that hospitals operating in markets with fewer ASCs are more likely to
joint venture with ASCs. The odds ratio indicates that the relative odds of a
hospital joint venturing with ASCs decreases 1.1% with a unit increase in the
number of ASCs in the county.
One of the two regulatory factors, ownership status was found to be
significantly associated hospitals‟ decision to JV with ASCs. Ownership status
was marginally significant at 0.10 level. A positive coefficient of ownership status
indicates that for-profit hospitals are more likely to joint venture with ASCs.
Results indicate that the odds of a for-profit hospital entering into joint venture
arrangements with ASCs are 1.65 times greater than not-for-profit hospitals.
One of the two organizational factors, hospital size was found to be
significantly associated hospitals‟ decision to JV with ASCs. Size of the hospital
was found to be highly significant at 0.01 level. A positive coefficient of bed size
indicates that larger bed size hospitals are more likely to joint venture with ASCs.
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The odds ratio indicates that for every 10 bed increase in the bed-size of a
hospital, the odds of it joint venturing with an ASC would increase by 5%.
One of the four financial factors, operating expense per adjusted
discharge was found to be significantly associated hospitals‟ decision to JV with
ASCs. Operating expense per adjusted discharge was marginally significant at
0.10 level. A positive coefficient of operating expense per adjusted discharge
indicates that hospitals with higher operating expense per adjusted discharge are
more likely to joint venture with ASCs. However, the odds ratio indicates that
there would be very little change (almost 0) in the odds of a hospital joint
venturing with ASCs with a unit increase in operating expense per adjusted
discharge.
The percentage correct prediction of 76.7 indicates a reasonably high
predictive power for the 2006 and 2007 pooled logistic regression model. A
Nagelkerke R-square value of .446 additionally reassures that this empirical
model has reasonably high predictive power. The results of the Hosmer and
Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test with Chi-square value 11.375 and significance
value 0.181 indicates that the model fit was good for this pooled sample.
A time variable was added as a control variable in this model as the
pooled sample has data from two different years. However, this variable was
found to be not significant. In summary, the pooled model results suggest
hospitals operating in markets with lower unemployment rate, lower percentage
of elderly population and fewer numbers of ASCs, and having for-profit
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ownership status, greater number of staffed beds, and higher operating expense
per adjusted discharge are more likely to enter into joint venture arrangements
with ASCs.
Summary of Findings of the Three Analytical Models
The following table summarizes the expected hypothesized direction as
compared to the actual observed direction of the association of the independent
variables with the dependent variable, hospitals‟ decision to JV with ASCs. This
comparison is discussed in detail in Chapter 6. Table 16 presents the
hypothesized directions and actual observed directions of relationships of
independent variables with the dependent variables.
The directionality of the relationship between the independent variables
and the dependent variable is presented using „+‟ and „-„ signs. The „+‟ sign
indicates: higher/greater/presence/an increase in an independent variable, the
more likely it is for the hospital to enter into joint venture with ASC. Similarly, a „-„
sign indicates: lower/smaller/absence/a decrease in an independent variable, the
more likely it is for the hospital to enter into joint venture with ASC.
The following statistically significant relationships within the variables for
the JV model are shown in Table 16. As expected, the market factor of
unemployment rate was negatively associated with hospitals‟ decision of joint
venturing with ASCs. Also as expected, the market factors of percentage of
elderly was negatively associated with hospital-ASC JVs. Unexpectedly number
of ASCs was negatively associated with hospital-ASC JVs.
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Table 16: Hypothesized Directions and Concluded Directions of Relationships of
Independent Variables with Dependent Variables in the Hospital-ASC JV Model
Variable
Market
HerfindahlHirschman Index
Per capita income
Unemployment
rate
Percentage of
elderly
Number of
hospitals in JV
with ASCs
Number of ASCs
Regulatory
Certificate of
need
For-profit
ownership
Organizational
Size
Affiliation to a
system
Operational
Occupancy rate
Financial
Cash flow margin
Cash on hand
Long-term debt to
total capital
Operating
expense per
adjusted
discharge
*** Significant at p = .01
** Significant at p = .05
* Significant at p = .1

Dependent
Variable

Expected
Direction

M1

M2

M3

Concluded
Direction

JV with ASC

-

-

+*

+

+

JV with ASC
JV with ASC

+
-

+
-**

+
-

+
-**

-

JV with ASC

-

-**

-***

-***

-

JV with ASC

+

+

+

+

JV with ASC

+

-**

-

-*

-

JV with ASC

-

+*

-

+

+

JV with ASC

+

+

+

+*

+

JV with ASC
JV with ASC

-

+***
+

+***
-

+***
-

+

JV with ASC

-

+

-*

-

-

JV with ASC
JV with ASC
JV with ASC

+

+
+
-

+
+
+

+
+
+

JV with ASC

+

+

+

+*

M1: 2006 Model
M2: 2007 Model
M3: 2006 and 2007 Pooled Model

+
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Also, as expected, the regulatory variable of for-profit ownership was
positively associated with hospital-ASC JVs. The certificate of need variable was
found to be marginally significant in 2006 model and was unexpectedly, positively
associated with hospital-ASC JVs. However, in the 2007 model, the directionality
changed towards hypothesized direction, but the variable certificate of need was
found to be insignificant.
Unexpectedly, the organizational variable- bed size was positively
associated with hospital-ASC JV. In all three models, this variable was highly
significant at 0.01 level.
As expected, the operational variable- occupancy rate was found to be
negatively associated with hospital-ASC JVs in the 2007 and the pooled model.
This variable was marginally significant in the 2007 model at 0.10 level.
Also, as expected, the financial variable- operating expense per adjusted
discharge was positively associated with hospital-ASC JVs. This variable,
although consistent with the hypothesized direction, was marginally significant (at
0.10 level) in only the pooled model.
The models presented here also controlled for population in a county
(large population), teaching status of a hospital as well as their public status. The
results presented in this chapter are further examined, discussed and presented
in Chapter 6.
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Summary of Chapter 5
Chapter 5 presented the results of the analysis of all three models. They
included the descriptive and multivariate findings for the 2006, 2007, and a
pooled model. The relationships of the variables with hospitals‟ decision to joint
venture with ASCs were also presented.
Chapter 6 summarizes the study findings and interprets them. This
is followed by a presentation of the implications of the study findings for all three
key audiences: researchers, health care managers and policy makers.
Limitations of the study and areas for future research are also identified in
Chapter 6.

CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This chapter presents a summary and explanation of significant findings
related to hospitals‟ decision to joint venture with ASCs. Responses to the
research questions as well as the limitations of this study are also presented.
Implications for researchers, hospital and ASC managers, and policy makers are
outlined. Finally, the chapter concludes with suggestions for areas of future
research.
The purpose of this study was to explore the relationships of various
market, regulatory, organizational, operational, and financial factors with
hospitals‟ decision to joint venture with ASCs. The hypothesized relationships
were based on a combined framework of resource dependency theory and neoinstitutional theory. The literature suggests that changing technology, increased
demand for services, growing number of ASCs and regulatory changes have
generated greater competitive pressures on hospitals. These competitive
pressures increase the environmental uncertainty and have prompted hospitals
to consider strategic alliances such as joint venture arrangements.
The market construct, which reflected the demand and supply of
hospital services at the county level, included the following variables: Herfindahl-
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Hirschman index, per capita income, unemployment rate, percentage of elderly
(age 65 and older), number of hospitals in joint ventures with ASCs, and number
of ASCs.
The regulatory construct included variables: certificate of need and
ownership status. Certificate of need laws are mandated at state level and
ownership status is governed by the IRS.
The organizational construct was measured at the individual hospital level
and included the following variables: size and system affiliation. The operational
construct, also measured at the individual hospital level, was assessed with the
help of the occupancy rate variable. The financial construct, also measured at the
individual hospital level included the following variables: cash flow margin, days
cash on hand, long term debt to total capital and operating expense per adjusted
discharge.
Discussion of Hypotheses and Research Questions
The following section addresses the research questions and hypotheses
based on the hypothesized joint venture model.
Research Question 1: Market
Are hospitals that operate in favorable market conditions (e.g., low
unemployment rate, and high per capita income) more likely to enter
into joint ventures with ASCs?
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The following hypotheses restate this research question in detail. Hypotheses
H1a through H1d restate the above research question based on resource
dependency theory and Hypothesis H2 restates research question 1 based on
neo-institutional theory.
H1a:

Keeping regulatory, organizational, operational and financial
factors constant, hospitals located in highly competitive
outpatient surgery markets (low Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
and large number of ASCs) are more likely to enter into joint
venture arrangements with ASCs than other hospitals.

Unexpectedly, in the 2007 model, Herfindahl-Hirschman index was found
to be marginally significant (at 0.10 level) and had a positive association with
hospital-ASC JV arrangements indicating that these ventures are more likely in
less competitive markets. Also, the number of ASCs in the market was found to
be negatively associated with hospital-ASC JVs in 2006 and the pooled model.
From the combined results of Herfindahl-Hirschman index and number of
ASCs, the study results indicate that hospitals located in less competitive
outpatient surgery markets are more likely to enter into joint venture
arrangements with ASCs than other hospitals. In highly competitive outpatient
surgical markets, resource dependency theory suggests that a hospitals survival
would depend on how resources are allocated across competitors (Ulrich and
Barney 1984) and hospitals would form alliances (such as JV) to increase the
likelihood of their survival (Currie 2000). However, the results here indicate that
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these JVs are occurring in less competitive markets. An attempt to mitigate the
threat of ASC monopoly and protect patient volume of their hospital service lines
could be the underlying reasons for the occurrence of hospital-ASC JVs in lesscompetitive markets.
H1b:

Keeping regulatory, organizational, operational and financial
factors constant, hospitals located in markets with higher
demand (i.e., large population) and higher ability to
pay (e.g., low unemployment rate, low percentage of elderly
and higher per capita income) are more likely to enter into
joint venture arrangements with ASCs than other hospitals.

The significant results of the analyses found that the unemployment rate
(a proxy measure for community‟s financial ability to pay) and low percentage of
elderly were negatively associated with hospital-ASC JVs. As hypothesized, the
first finding indicates that hospital-ASC joint ventures occur in markets where the
ability to pay for healthcare services, as measured by low unemployment rate, is
higher. The second finding suggests that hospital-ASC joint ventures occur in
markets with a lower demand from the elderly in the market, which may support
the first finding. Markets with low percentage of elderly may also imply that
hospital-ASC joint ventures are occurring in markets with a higher percentage of
the population insured by commercial payers. Findings of a recent study (Gabel
et al 2008) examining association of physician ownership with referral patterns
suggests that well-insured commercially insured patients are increasingly being
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referred to ASCs whereas low paying patients covered by Medicare and
Medicaid are more often referred to hospital outpatient departments. This could
also be because co-morbid conditions affect surgical outcomes in elderly patients
(Williams et al 2008) and present more complex cases with co-morbidities. Thus,
they might need to be referred to hospital outpatient departments. Thus ASCs
benefit financially from providing services for higher paying commercially insured
patients. In order to increase their financial solvency, hospitals would be more
likely to joint venture with ASCs to gain a part of the revenue which would be
otherwise lost to them.
Also, there have been many changes to the ASC payment system by the
Center of Medicare and Medicaid Services. CMS has cut back on the payment
rates for the highest volume procedures (MedPac 2009). Although the changed
payment rates were implemented in 2008 and were planned to be phased in over
four years, it is reasonable to assume that hospitals and ASCs took proactive
measures to lessen their reliance on payments for their Medicare and Medicaid
beneficiaries and increase their financial profitability by targeting commercially
insured patients. This might have provided additional incentives to hospitals to
joint venture with ASCs.
H1c:

Keeping regulatory, organizational, operational and financial
factors constant, hospitals located in markets with fewer
numbers of key specialists (gastroenterology, ophthalmology
and orthopedics) in the market are more likely to enter into
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joint venture arrangements with ASCs than other hospitals.
This hypothesis could not be tested in this study. Due to a high correlation
of the variable ASC specialists (measuring the number of specialists in
gastroenterology, ophthalmology and orthopedics in the market) with number of
ASCs in the market, this variable was dropped from the analysis and hence this
hypothesis could not be tested.
H1d:

Keeping regulatory, organizational, operational and financial
factors constant, hospitals located in markets with a higher
HMO penetration are more likely to enter into joint venture
arrangements with ASCs than other hospitals.

Again, this hypothesis could not be tested in this study. Due to a high
correlation of the variable HMO penetration with number of ASCs in the market,
this variable was dropped from the analysis and hence this hypothesis could not
be tested.
H2:

Keeping regulatory, organizational, operational and financial
factors constant, hospitals located in markets with higher
number of hospitals joint venturing with ASCs are more likely
to enter into joint venture arrangements with ASCs than
other hospitals.

This study found no statistically significant relationship between the
number of hospitals in a joint venture with an ASC in a market and the likelihood
of hospitals entering into joint venture arrangements with ASCs. Thus, it did not
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provide any support for the mimetic mechanism postulated by neo-institutional
theory.
Research Question 2: Regulatory
Are regulatory constraints such as CON regulations and ownership
status associated with a hospitals decision to joint venture with
ASCs?
The following H3a and H3b hypotheses restate the research question:
H3a:

Keeping market, organizational, operational and financial
factors constant, hospitals located in states without CON
laws are more likely to enter into joint venture arrangements
with ASCs than other hospitals.

Presence of certificate of need laws was found to be marginally significant
(at 0.10 level) in the 2006 model and had a positive association with hospitalASC joint venture arrangements. Presence of CON laws suggests that provider
facilities (both hospitals and ASCs) are limited in their options to expand or
upgrade their infrastructure. CON laws were implemented for cost containment
purposes and to limit capital expansion (Henderson 2008). Research indicates
that there is greater proliferation of ASCs in states without CON laws (Gregg et al
2010). There is significant overlap of CON laws applicable to hospitals and ASCs
in many states. The three exceptions where CON laws applied to hospitals but
not ASCs were Florida, Missouri and New Jersey (NCSL 2009). This study
showed that in states with CON laws, there was a greater likelihood of hospitals
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forming joint ventures with ASCs. No information was gathered regarding
approvals or disapprovals of CON applications in this study. Therefore, a logical
explanation is that CON laws could be perceived as a barrier to entry. Thus, the
hospital may pro-actively want to further reduce competition by forming joint
ventures with existing ASCs in the market.
H3b:

Keeping market, organizational, operational and financial
factors constant, for-profit hospitals are more likely to enter
into joint venture arrangements with ASCs than non-profit
hospitals.

As expected, for-profit hospitals were found to be more likely to JV with
ASCs than non-profit hospitals. This association was found to be marginally
significant (at 0.10 level) in the pooled model. Thus the results support prior
theoretical and empirical research which suggests that similarity in culture and
mission is one of the key attributes considered by organizations prior to joint
venture (Pelfrey and Theisen 1989; Alexander and Morrisey 1989; Snail and
Robinson 1998; Mark et al. 1998; Blaszyk and Hill-Mischel 2007). Most ASCs are
for-profit in their ownership (MedPac 2010). There is mutual compatibility of
mission between for-profit hospitals and for-profit ASCs as they are both profit
seeking entities. Whereas not-for-profit hospitals might be less likely to joint
venture with for-profit ASCs as it might result in conflict of mission and jeopardize
their tax-exempt status (Anderson and Gevas 2006).
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Research Question 3: Organizational
Are the size of a hospital and its affiliation to a multi-hospital system
related to hospital’s decision to joint venture with ASCs?
The following H4a and H4b hypotheses restate the research question:
H4a:

Keeping market, regulatory, operational and financial factors
constant, smaller bed size hospitals are more likely to enter
into joint venture arrangements with ASCs than other
hospitals.

Unexpectedly, the results of this study indicated that larger hospitals (as
measured by bed size) were more likely to enter into joint venture arrangements
with ASCs. Although the theoretical premise of this study posits that larger
hospitals would prefer to internally restructure themselves (Greening and Gray
1994) prior to considering external alliances such as JVs, it is also true that bed
size is a measure of complexity of acute care hospitals (Harrison 2006). Larger
hospitals tend to be higher acuity hospitals and typically provide less profitable
services such as emergency departments, intensive care units and burn units.
These hospitals also rely greatly on more profitable services such as outpatient
surgeries in order to compensate for their loss on less profitable services and
remain financially viable. Thus, the reason for larger hospitals JVing with ASCs
could be that these hospitals feel greater threat to their financial viability because
of ASCs in their markets than smaller hospitals, and thus resulting in greater
likelihood of entering into hospital-ASC JV arrangements.
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H4b:

Keeping market, regulatory, operational and financial factors
constant, free-standing hospitals are more likely to enter into
joint venture arrangements with ASCs than other hospitals.

This study found no statistically significant relationship between system
affiliation of hospitals and the likelihood of hospitals entering into joint venture
arrangements with ASCs.
Research Question 4: Operational
Is operational performance of hospitals related to their decision to
joint venture with ASCs?
The following H5a and H5b hypotheses restate the research question:
H5a:

Keeping market, regulatory, organizational and financial
factors constant, hospitals with a lower occupancy rates are
more likely to enter into joint venture arrangements with
ASCs than other hospitals.

As expected, hospitals with lower occupancy rates were found to be more
likely to enter into JVs with ASCs than hospitals with higher occupancy rates.
This association was found to be marginally significant (at 0.10 level) in the 2007
model. Lower occupancy rates indicate weak demand for services and thereby
decreased likelihood of hospital profitability (Harrison 2006). Based on the
study‟s theoretical premise, hospitals operating in unfavorable market conditions
characterized by lack of patient demand would be more likely to JV with ASCs in
order to market directly their outpatient services and indirectly their inpatient
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services, which will improve market share (Taparia 2010). The results of this
study support this theoretical proposition.
H5b:

Keeping market, regulatory, organizational and financial
factors constant, hospitals with fewer outpatient surgeries
are more likely to enter into joint venture arrangements with
ASCs than other hospitals.

This hypothesis could not be tested in this study. Due to a high correlation
of the variable number of outpatient surgeries with bed size, this variable was
dropped from the analysis and hence this hypothesis could not be tested. This
was done to avoid multicollinearity problems between independent variables.
Research Question 5: Financial
Does the financial performance of hospitals (e.g., cash flow margin,
days cash on hand, long term debt to total capital and operating
expense per adjusted discharge) drive their decision to joint venture
with ASCs?
The following H6a to H6b hypotheses restate the research question:
H6a:

Keeping market, regulatory, organizational and operational
factors constant, hospitals with poor financial performance
(e.g., lower cash flow margin and days cash on hand) are
more likely to enter into joint venture arrangements with
ASCs than other hospitals.
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This study found no statistically significant relationship between cash flow
margin and days cash on hand, and hospital-ASC JV arrangements.
H6b:

Keeping market, regulatory, organizational and operational
factors constant, hospitals with limited debt capacity and
higher operating expense per adjusted discharge are more
likely to enter into joint venture arrangements with ASCs
than other hospitals.

This study results supported hypothesis H6b. This study found no
statistically significant association between limited debt capacity and hospitalASC joint venture. However, as expected, the results indicated that hospitals with
higher operating expense per adjusted discharge were more likely to JV with
ASCs than hospitals with lower operating expense per adjusted discharge. This
association was found to be marginally significant (at 0.10 level) in the pooled
model.
Literature suggests that operating expenses per adjusted discharge is a
key operational indicator of hospitals (McCue and Thompson 2010) and it is often
used to measure organizational efficiency (Harrison 2006). Resource
dependency theory suggests that poor performing hospitals would like to engage
in external linkages such as joint ventures to improve their performance. Thus, it
follows that hospitals with higher operating costs look to joint venture
arrangements in order to improve their financial performance. This could occur in
two ways. Firstly, hospitals may try to lower their operating costs by shifting care
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to outpatient basis provided in ASC setting and away from more costly inpatient
setting. Another very likely occurrence could be that hospitals having higher
operating expense might want to joint venture with ASCs in order to reduce their
costs. ASCs are specialized facilities equipped with specialized labor. Labor
costs form a large part of operating expenses for hospitals (McCue et al 2003).
Hospitals may be able to reduce the burden of their labor costs and thereby their
operating expenses, by joint venturing with ASCs.
Limitations of the Study
It is important to address the findings of this study in light of its limitations.
This research was a cross-sectional study of the relationships between hospitalASC JV and various market conditions, regulatory environment, organizational
factors, operational efficiency and financial performance. The study examined the
association of the independent variables with the dependent variable (hospitalASC JV) at a single point in time. Thus, this study did not account for changes in
variables over time. As the conceptual model based on prior research and
theoretical premise suggests that time could influence JV decisions of hospitals,
a longitudinal study would be able to incorporate these effects. However, it was
not feasible considering the lack of available data. The current study design is
the strongest plausible design given the current availability of data.
A second limitation of this study is with regard to the use of secondary
data sources. This study relied on secondary data sources, which do have
inherent limitations with regard to their accuracy and completeness of the data.
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The key dependent variable in this study, hospital-ASC JV was derived from the
American Hospital Association annual data for hospitals. Since the hospital
submits the data in a survey, the authenticity of the data is on face value and
subject to interpretation. For example, one primary issue with the dependent
variable in this study is that JVs can be of many types and the AHA does not
define the type of JV arrangements with ASCs. In this study, a broad definition of
JV is assumed, as defined in earlier chapters (Introduction and Chapter 2).
The financial independent variables have been derived from the Medicare
cost reports. These data elements, although reviewed by the Center for Medicare
and Medicaid Services, are not audited by an external organization (Harrison
2002). Another data source, the National Council of State Legislatures which
supplied the presence or absence of certificate of need (CON) laws variable for
this study, does not provide detailed enforcement levels of these laws in different
states. Thus, the differing levels of CON laws followed in different states could
have had a different effect on the dependent variable compared to merely
including the presence or absence of these laws in a state. Thus, it is observed
that the ability of the secondary data to measure the constructs as governed by
the theories in this study are limited.
A third limitation of this study concerns the reporting periods of hospitals in
different data sources. The American Hospital Association reports data for the
hospitals based on the calendar year whereas the Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Services provides financial data in the hospital cost reports based on
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the fiscal year. If the majority of the days (more than 180 days) of a hospital fell
under a particular year (2006 or 2007), as reported in the CMS hospital cost
reports, the hospital was included in that years study model. However, it is
important to note that since data from both these sources were merged to
analyze the association of the independent variables with the dependent
variable, the differing reporting periods could result in under estimation of the
financial variables.
A fourth limitation of this study pertains to a measure of supply of
physicians. There has not been any validated variable to measure supply of
physicians within a market specific to the type of ASCs present in the market.
Thus the specialist index, based on the total number of specialists in
ophthalmology, gastroenterology, and orthopedic disciplines per 1000 residents,
was calculated and applied to all the markets. As different markets might have
different specialty ASCs, it is important to interpret the results of this study with
caution.
A fifth limitation of this study concerns the variations caused by
geographical location. This study did not analyze hospital-ASC JVs according to
geographic locality. However, incorporating CON laws (which are based on
individual states) does reduce the effect of this omission considerably.
A sixth limitation of this study is with regard to urban-rural variation. This
study included variables to measure the market construct at the county level and
did not contrast hospital-ASC JVs based on urban versus rural variation.
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Improvements in these limiting conditions should be incorporated in future
studies on hospital JV arrangements with ASCs.
A final limitation of this study concerns the variables of interest that could
not be examined due to high collinearity with other independent variables.
Specifically, population size, HMO penetration, ASC specialists per 1000
population, case-mix index and number of outpatient surgeries were dropped
from the empirical model due to high correlations with other predictor variables,
as mentioned earlier in Chapter 5. Thus, their impact on hospitals decision to
joint venture with ASCs could not be assessed.
Implications of the Research Study
This empirical study of hospital-ASC joint ventures has important
theoretical, managerial and policy implications. This section presents these
implications in detail.
Theoretical Implications
The results of this study provide support for the integrated applicability of
resource dependency theory and neo-institutional theory to examine hospital joint
venture arrangements. Resource dependency theory posits that organizations
interact with the environment in order to generate or acquire access to key
resources (patients, physicians, finances). It also posits that scarcer the resource
or more uncertain the resource environment, higher the likelihood that
organizations would forsake autonomy and consider engaging in external
alliances. Therefore, applying this argument to the study context, it follows that
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hospitals that engage in joint venture arrangements with ASCs are more likely to
be in unfavorable markets.
The study provides empirical evidence that resource scarcity
characterized by lack of demand (low percentage of elderly) leads to increased
likelihood of hospital-ASC joint venture. In addition, resource dependency theory
also posits that increasing access to resources is important for an organizations
survival. In the case of this analysis, hospitals were more likely to joint venture
with ASCs in markets with low unemployment rates which suggests that they are
admitting patients who have the ability to pay for these healthcare services.
Unemployment rate has been used as a proxy to measure a community‟s ability
to afford healthcare services in a particular market (McCue et al 2000). This
study provides further support for this view.
Surprisingly, the results of this study did not support the premise of
environmental competition as posited by resource-dependency theory. Resource
dependency theory suggests that competitive environments would encourage
organizations to consider external linkages. However, this study found that
hospital-ASC joint ventures were more likely in less competitive environments (as
measured by higher Herfindahl-Hirschman index and fewer ASCs).
High Herfindahl-Hirschman index indicates more concentrated markets
with low competition. Also, HHI reflects market structure and competition level
more accurately than other similar measures of market concentration (Chen and
Lii 2005). Furthermore, fewer competitors for the hospital translate into greater
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dominance in the market. However, it could be possible that larger medical
groups of specialists are forming ASCs resulting in fewer ASCs. Casalino et al
(2003) identified that more number of specialists are joining large medical
practices and the key reasons for formation of larger groups was to gain
negotiating leverage with health plans and to gain a reputation for providing high
quality of care to patients. In such a scenario, fewer medical groups in a market
allow them to gain market power to attract patients away from hospitals. In turn,
this market change would jeopardize hospitals ability to protect their existing
patient base as well as attract new patients requiring hospital services in these
specialties. Thus, hospitals located in less competitive markets may still view
ASCs as a competitive threat and want to continue reducing their competition by
joint venturing with them.
In this context, detailed ownership structure of the ASCs in the market
could provide a better understanding of the underlying reasons. However, due to
data constraints this could not be performed in the study and only the number of
ASCs was included as a proxy measure to quantify market competition.
Neo-institutional theory emphasizes the importance of regulatory and
mimetic pressure, and their effect on organizations. The theory suggests that
organizations would try and adhere to the regulatory environment in order to
maintain legitimacy amongst stakeholders. Also, the theory posits that
organizations would try and mimic other organizations who are “early adopters”
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of perceived successful strategies, in the hopes of becoming successful
themselves.
The findings of this analysis support the theoretical premise in terms of the
impact of regulatory pressure. The results indicated that for-profit hospitals were
more likely to joint venture with ASCs, providing support for regulatory
compliance behavior as posited by neo-institutional theory. The evidence
towards mission compatibility between joint venturing organizations indicated that
the regulatory pressures do impact hospital strategic decision making process. It
was observed that for-profit hospitals were more likely to joint venture with ASCs.
More than 90 percent of ASCs are for-profit in ownership (MedPac 2003). Forprofit hospitals joint venturing with for-profit ASCs (similar mission to maximize
profits for their stakeholders) does not raise regulatory concerns such as IRS.
However, not-for-profit hospitals joint venturing with for-profit ASCs (incompatible
mission) might come under regulatory scrutiny and may endanger their taxexempt status and are thus less likely to joint venture with ASCs.
No statistically significant association was found between number of
existing hospital-ASC JVs and the likelihood of new hospital-ASC joint venture
arrangements. Thus the study did not provide support for the mimetic response
behavior as posited by neo-institutional theory. Therefore, hospitals decision to
joint venture with ASCs is a preemption strategy (to lessen competition) rather
than a replication of competitors‟ strategy.
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Resource dependency theory emphasizes the importance of uncertain
environment, resource scarcity and competition. Neo-institutional theory lays
emphasis on responses by organizations to regulatory norms in order to
legitimize themselves in the view of stakeholders. An integrated approach to the
context of hospital JVs with ASCs provides some valuable insights to the
strengths of the theories individually as well as their complementarities. For
example, resource dependency theory posited that organizations in unfavorable
markets would seek to increase their financial viability and as thus consider
engaging in external alliances. The results of this study provided support for the
theory as hospitals entering into joint venture arrangements with ASCs were
found to be more likely in markets which had lower percentage of elderly (lack of
demand) and lower unemployment rate (higher ability to pay). Both these results
were found to be highly significant in the study. Additionally, the finding of forprofit hospitals being more likely to joint venture with ASCs lent support to the
regulatory premise of neo-institutional theory as discussed earlier.
This study also addresses the gap in the literature as identified by
D‟Aunno and Zuckerman (1987), who state that more research on the integrated
approach of combining different theoretical perspectives is required to contribute
meaningfully to theoretical literature. A hospitals decision to joint venture with an
ASC is obviously complex involving multiple factors. This study makes a
contribution by understanding what factors were significant in increasing the
likelihood of joint ventures between hospitals and ASCs by examining them
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under different theoretical perspectives such as resource dependency theory and
neo-institutional theory.
Managerial Implications
Findings of this study also have important managerial implications. The
hospital industry is operating in an uncertain and unfavorable environment. More
recent phenomena such as increasing number of elderly population (spurred by
retirement of the baby-boom generation), increasing number of uninsured
population and increasing operational expenses are further complicating the
already complex environment. It is very evident that hospitals survival is
increasingly depending on their proactive strategies in finding new innovative
approaches to provide healthcare services.
Hospital managers are trying to find ways and means of improving their
access to key resources such as patients and physicians under competitive
pressures and stringent regulatory statutes. This study found that market factors
were significantly associated with hospitals decision to joint venture with ASCs.
The most significant market factors were low unemployment rate and lower
percentage of elderly, both indicating that hospitals patient base comprised of
commercially insured patients. ASCs in the market could attract these patients
away from hospitals and threaten the hospitals market share. Thus managers of
hospitals could use the joint venture strategy as a way to retain their
commercially insured patients.
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Also, the study found that larger bed size hospitals were more likely to
joint venture with ASCs. Thus, managers of large bed size hospitals could
consider joint venture arrangements as a viable option for developing better
relationships with specialist groups in the markets. A joint venture arrangement
with ASC could also benefit hospitals in two more ways. Managers may be able
to reduce their hospitals‟ operating expense (which was found to be marginally
significant in the study) by shifting to outpatient services. Also, hospitals could
use these ventures to establish and improve their relationship with key specialist
groups (Taparia 2010) and indirectly market their inpatient services. This might
help hospital managers to improve their operational efficiency (as measured by
occupancy rate which was found to be marginally significant in this study).
Finally, managers of for-profit hospitals consider joint venture strategy with
for-profit ASCs as there is mission compatibility and lesser risk of scrutiny by
regulatory authorities. A not-for-profit hospital manager should be careful in
considering a joint venture arrangement with for-profit ASC in terms of not
comprising their tax exempt status.
Therefore, this study provides hospital managers with valuable insights
and a better understanding of the factors that are associated with JV
arrangements with ASCs. With increasing environmental uncertainty due to
changing market conditions and regulatory requirements, the findings of this
study also help hospital managers make an informed decision towards
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considering joint venture arrangements with ASCs amongst various external
alliances.
Policy Implications
From a policy perspective, joint ventures are viewed as means to enhance
provision of health care services by ensuring a continuum of care. This study
found that large bed size hospitals with lower occupancy rates were more likely
to joint venture with ASCs. Most large bed size hospitals tend to be safety net
hospitals providing a wide range of services and uncompensated care to the
market in which they are located (Mann et al 1997; Zuckerman et al 2001). The
range of services typically include low margin services such as trauma,
emergency, psychiatric care, pediatric and neonatal intensive care, alcoholism
inpatient care and burn care which are vital to the community (Gaskin 1999). A
recent study found that non- safety net hospitals trimmed certain essential
specialty services (Bazzoli et al 2005) leaving only safety net hospitals to offer
these services.
Also, low occupancy rates in large bed size hospitals indicate greater
pressure on hospitals. By joint venturing with ASCs these facilities curtail further
erosion of market share by retaining patients and revenue from patient services
lost to ASCs. This strategy could also have a positive impact for the community
by financially helping these hospitals fund the previously mentioned low-margin,
services.
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Another important policy aspect of this study is the examination of impacts
of regulatory pressures on joint venture arrangements between hospitals and
ASCs. The results of this study revealed that for-profit hospitals were more likely
to joint venture with ASCs than not-for-profit hospitals. In the 2006 study sample,
about 74% of not-for-profit hospitals did not joint venture with ASCs. In the 2007
study sample, this percentage increased to 82%, indicating greater caution by
not-for-profit hospitals in forming joint ventures with ASCs. These results provide
reassurance to policy makers that the current IRS regulations are adequate to
ensure that hospitals are mindful of their non-profit mission and are unwilling to
lose tax-exempt status. The three main forms of tax-subsidies offered to not-forprofit hospitals are exemption from paying federal and state income taxes,
access to tax-exempt bond financing and property tax abatements (Morrisey et al
1996). Not-for-profit hospitals would lose access to tax-exempt bond financing
and be subjected to taxes if found to be in violation of IRS regulations.
In addition, this study analyzed data from 2006 and 2007, when
reimbursements for Medicare services were undergoing drastic revisions for
ASCs. The results of this study indicated that joint venture arrangements
between hospitals and ASCs were occurring in markets with low unemployment
rates and low number of elderly people. Whereas this provided greater
opportunities to gain access to private paying patients, it is not clear that the
interest of the vulnerable section such as the elderly and the indigents were
being addressed. Public policy to rationalize Medicare and Medicaid payments
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would have a salutary impact in markets not characterized by low unemployment
rates and low elderly populations.
In light of the new Health Reform Legislation, studying hospital-ASC joint
ventures becomes even more important. The Health Reform Legislation has
introduced yet another regulatory change in the healthcare market. It is
anticipated that hospitals and ASCs would both be impacted as healthcare
service needs of 32 million additional Medicaid patients would have to be met.
Early industry speculations suggest that this change would cause providers
(hospitals and ASCs) to develop capacity and result in ASCs being considered
as „cost-saving contributors of system capacity‟ (ASC Advocacy Committee
2010). This also supports the results of the Harrison (2006) study which
suggested that capacity to provide healthcare services is enhanced when
hospitals and physicians enter into joint ventures.
Reports also suggest that the healthcare environment as a result of this
legislation would be characterized by consolidation of providers offering
integrated services (Neuterra Healthcare 2010). Increasing numbers of uninsured
patients and rapidly rising elderly population warrants attention towards low cost
alternatives. Page (2003) suggested health care costs can be controlled and
medical errors can be reduced by hospital and physician collaborated networks.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Health Reform Bill
passed 2010) establishes Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) as a new
payment model under Medicare (Fisher and Shortell 2010). The plan also seeks
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to extend the payment model to private payers and Medicaid. The new payment
system is linked with performance measurement. For hospitals and ASCs, and
their collaborative interests such as joint ventures, ACOs could either provide
incentives to help improve quality of care to patients or stint on needed care by
making them focus narrowly on higher margin services (Fisher and Shortell 2010;
Shortell and Casalino 2010). Since policy measures should encourage the first
and not the second outcome, it is important to have a transparent performance
measurement system that can win the confidence of the provider organizations
such as hospitals and ASCs. Lacking which, it may discourage joint venture
arrangements between hospitals and ASCs in future.
Areas of Future Research
This study has provided important information on the key factors
associated with hospital-ASC joint ventures at a time when Medicare
reimbursements are undergoing drastic changes. Since, this is amongst the first
empirical studies examining the association specific to ASCs; a simple base
model is conceptualized. Further research is suggested in the following areas.
The model in this study does not include an analysis of inter-relationships
(excluding collinearity) amongst independent factors such as market, regulatory,
organizational, operational and financial constructs. Further research involving
development of more complex models using techniques such as structural
equation modeling could reveal such causal relationships between the
independent constructs and improve the predictive power of the model, providing
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more accurate insights into the driving factors of hospital-ASC joint venture
arrangements.
A longitudinal analysis incorporating data over a period of time could help
analyze the effect of changes over time on hospital-ASC joint ventures. Such an
analysis would help exclude time invariant unobserved effects and observe
whether these joint ventures follow a temporal order. A longitudinal study could
help examine hospital-ASC JVs over time and would help relate these
occurrences to changes in the environment. It would be especially useful if this
analysis is performed on data incorporating the effect of the last revision of
Medicare payment changes in 2011.
Further research incorporating more market variables would also improve
the understanding of hospital-ASC joint ventures. For example, incorporating
variables identified in the limitation section of this study such as urban-rural
location could be useful to better understand if hospitals located in urban areas
differ in their choice of external alliance strategy with ASC than hospitals located
in rural areas.
Further research could also include empirical evaluation of the effect of
hospital-ASC joint ventures on the access to care. This research should quantify
the impact of joint venture arrangements on the population in the respective
market. Examining this association would be very crucial for policy makers in
their decision to allocate funds for improving provision for healthcare services.
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Lastly, this study focused on hospital-ASC new joint ventures. During the
same period, it was observed that hospitals that were previously in JVs with
ASCs exited the arrangement. A natural extension of this study would be to
examine factors associated with the exit of hospital-ASC joint venture
arrangements. This would provide a comprehensive picture of factors that drive
joint venture arrangements and factors that oppose such arrangements.
Conclusions
This study examined the association of market, regulatory, organizational,
operational and financial factors with hospital-ASC joint ventures. Findings from
this study laid foundational work for empirical research in the area of hospitalASC joint venture arrangements. The results indicated that hospitals located in
markets with lower unemployment rate and lower percentages of elderly were
more likely to joint venture with ASCs. The results also indicated that hospital
joint ventures were more likely to occur in markets with fewer ASCs. In addition
the findings revealed that hospitals that joint ventured with ASCs have larger bed
size, lower occupancy rate and higher operating expense per adjusted discharge.
While the hypotheses of the study clearly indicated a sound theoretical
foundation, several unexpected results were also observed. As this area of study
is complex, there is significant lack of empirical evidence in this area; all findings
of this study provide valuable information for design and implementation of future
studies.
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The present study‟s findings partially support the integrated framework of
resource dependency theory and neo-institutional theory in examination of
hospital-ASC joint venture arrangements. This study also documents the
important contributions of its findings in three key areas: theoretical development
and application, managerial applicability and decision making process, and the
policy implications.
Chapter Summary
This chapter presented the discussion and interpretation of the study‟s
findings. The limitations of this study were also detailed in this chapter.
Implications of the study findings were elaborated for three audiences:
researchers, hospital managers and policy makers. Future areas of research
were also identified and presented in this chapter.
The results of this study are instrumental in understanding the association
of various independent constructs to hospital-ASC joint venture arrangements.
The findings of this study provide support for the conceptual framework in
relation to showing an association between some of the key identified variables
and the likelihood of the occurrence of joint venture arrangements between
hospitals and ASCs.
Researchers can use this model as a foundational framework for further
examining joint venture arrangements between hospitals and physician owned
entities. Hospital managers can better evaluate the decision to joint venture or
not depending on their preferences, performance and markets, as guided by
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findings of this study. Policy makers can use the results of this study, especially
the finding pertaining to larger sized hospitals, towards evaluating the societal
benefit of these ventures and the potential harm to access of care if the laws
governing these ventures are to be made more stringent. In summary, this study
provides a good empirical model with good predictive power based on the
integrated framework of resource dependency theory and neo-institutional theory
to examine hospital-ASC joint venture arrangements.
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